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Signs of Change, Inertia Seen at NATO Sessions

PM1812163790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 90 Second Edition p 7

[Report by correspondent V. Peresada: "NATO's Winter Marathon; Report From North Atlantic Bloc Headquarters"]

[Text] Brussels—The North Atlantic alliance's system of contact with the press is as regimented as the order of work of its leading bodies. The latter sit in session according to a traditionally established timetable—every spring and every winter—and invariably behind closed doors; journalists know that they will be invited to a NATO session twice a year, when publicity will extend to the final communique and some details at news conferences.

All that is being repeated this time around as well. The latest "series" of NATO sessions started in Brussels the other day. The Eurogroup, Military Planning Committee, and Nuclear Planning Group have already held conferences in which the defense ministers took part. That is the first half of the "winter marathon." The second half will be a conference of the NATO Council, scheduled for 17-18 December at foreign minister level.

...The central auditorium of NATO headquarters is packed with journalists. All are holding the communique that has just been handed out and still smells of printer's ink. Before the news conference begins, let us see whether there is anything new and substantial. This is a reasonable hope, because the main theme of every session has been the "transformation" of NATO in light of the present changes on the European Continent.

NATO makes a curious assessment of modern-day Europe. We have entered a new, very promising era, the communique says. We have taken a great step forward, thanks to the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The joint declaration between the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states has ended the cold war. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Europe, on which the Soviet Union embarked at its own initiative, is helping to strengthen security and stability. In short, the European climate is described as extremely favorable. So how does the North Atlantic alliance intend to adapt to this?

By reviewing its military strategy, first of all. As is well known, the decision on this was taken at the July session of the NATO Council in London. The communique says that a new strategic concept is to be adopted in spring next year.

Several features of this concept are already evident, however. Judging by the document, the essence of the changes will be to reduce the number of NATO's nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe "to a level safeguarding defense," and also to modify its main operational doctrines, including the infamous "flexible response." However, both the concept of "deterrence" and reliance on a combination of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe, including U.S. forces, remain unchanged.

Addressing the news conference, NATO Secretary General M. Woerner gave the following explanations in this connection. The classic threat of the past no longer exists, but there is a risk of instability caused by the shifting situation in Central and East Europe, and also by the possibility of a military threat arising from non-European regions. Moreover, NATO feels it necessary to have a "counterweight" to the Soviet Union's military potential, which, "despite cuts, is still the most powerful in Europe."

Well, all this is understandable, but questions arise nevertheless. Given the present situation, is this not too narrow a framework for a strategy review? Does it correspond to the statements made by the NATO countries in their joint declaration with the Warsaw Pact states, for example? And, as the Soviet Union's military potential is given a separate mention, in which category of assessment is it going to be included: "risk" or "threat"? Perhaps we should wait until spring, however, when everything will become clear.

Of the other points on the agenda, the question of tactical nuclear systems in Europe is interesting. NATO currently operates from the premise that the political and military situation in Europe allows cuts to be made. This was mentioned by Woerner and also by U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, who took part in the news conference. According to them, the allies are already holding consultations to develop a framework for talks on short-range nuclear systems.

On the basis of adjustments now being made (cuts in troops and military budgets), the defense programs of individual countries and members of the alliance were also discussed. The intention is to place greater emphasis in the future on mobile reserves rather than on smaller active forces. It is planned to increase the contribution of European members of the alliance to the "defense of Europe," although transatlantic solidarity is described as "unshakable" in this respect, and it is planned to form NATO forces on a multinational basis in order to strengthen this solidarity.

All in all, NATO's "winter marathon" once again shows that, on the one hand, a process of change has begun in the North Atlantic alliance but that, on the other, the inertia of the past is still quite strong. Evidently, the future course of the West's military-political organization will be determined in the confrontation and interplay between these two elements.

Brussels NATO Planning Session Previewed

PM1012143190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Markushin under the rubric "From a Military Observer's Viewpoint": "Strategy, Catch Up With Policy!"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] When this issue of the newspaper has been made up, a joint session of the Military Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group will have begun its work in Brussels at the level of the NATO countries' defense ministers. There can be no doubt about the importance of this event. It is expected to discuss, above all, the progress in revising NATO's coalition military strategy, i.e. the "flexible response" strategy. In a couple of words I will remind you that its essence consists in the fact that the "retaliatory" measures taken by the bloc countries must correspond to the degree of the threat—from a show of force to the use of nuclear weapons.

The concepts and approaches adopted by the bloc a quarter-century ago are plainly obsolete. Evaluation the new military-political situation and definition of appropriate adjustments to NATO activity is proposed.

Which questions specifically will be discussed? If information in the Western press is to be relied upon, there may be a discussion of, for example, the possible consequences for NATO of the realization of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces and the subsequent need to make changes to current and long-term planning; the nature of combat operations in the European theater of war and the requirements for tactical nuclear weapons; the prospect of a reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe and the "Europeanization" of NATO; amplifications to the regular organizational structure of the Allied Armed Forces and an evaluation of the new areas of national military organizational development already adopted in a number of countries; a new plan for reinforcing the grouping in times of crisis and the formation of multinational mobile combined units as the basis of the NATO Allied Armed Forces; the bloc's nuclear strategy and recommendations for a unified position at the upcoming talks on tactical nuclear weapons.

The list of questions expected to be discussed attests to the unusual nature of the 6-7 December sessions. But the most important thing will undoubtedly be the spirit in which the debate proceeds and the recommendations which are formulated. For they will lay the foundations for future decisions at the highest level—at NATO Council sessions.

In general, there is tremendous interest in Brussels, there is something to expect and something to hope for. Although too great hopes are always fraught with disappointment. Particularly as—judging from certain statements by representatives of the NATO leadership—the alliance's military intellect will be concentrated on maintainence of combat potential of the NATO Allied Armed Forces, given the reduction in the troops' effective combat and numerical strength, and even to secure an increase in it in conformity with the new tasks. Or, let us say, it will be concentrated on what should be done to extend NATO's sphere of "responsibility."

In this sense we cannot fail to take note of the intent gaze of West Europeans toward the Near East and the active efforts of the member countries of the Western European Union to create highly mobile combined units, units, and subunits with a total strength of up to 150,000 men—a European rapid deployment force. The purpose of this force is an open secret—to be permanently ready to set off in any direction to demonstrate force and, if necessary, use it too.

The traditional conservatism of the bloc's military organs and simply the heightened circumspection of people who understand, each in his own way, their personal responsibility for what specifically is being undertaken will also probably affect the general mood of the sessions in Brussels. As also happens in our country, there will be a strenuous quest for the optimum options which might be able to suit both radicals and conservatives.

I believe that the path from the London declaration to the introduction of concepts, in keeping with the spirit of the times, into the staffs' activity might prove not that short. Unfortunately, life still confirms the following rule: At a time of abrupt turns in history military thinking cannot keep up with political thinking. There is nothing unnatural about this, but it does not make things any easier, as it were. The inauspiciousness of this rule inevitably manifests itself. There is feedback, as it were: The influence of strategy on policy is felt—a restraining, enslaving influence.

True, in spite of everything, facts are taking place before our eyes which attest to the decisive significance of a lively, flexible policy and its ability to make breakthroughs of which no "strategic designs" are capable. Take the unification of Germany. Could we have imagined a little over one year ago that our German brothers in arms would be serving in the Bundeswehr, that Luftwaffe pilots would be mastering the MIG-29 superaircraft, and that the FRG Government would be assigning billions to the construction of housing for Soviet servicemen?

Or the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces. For this is a most vivid example of how radically it is possible to simplify the search for a compromise, given political determination.

But maybe the period of breakthroughs has been left behind, and we have entered a dreary period of wrangling and arguments over approaches to ensuring European security? Is it possible to arrive at a common denominator here?

Probably it is still possible. If we constantly think about the fact that genuine security is our common goal and that therefore we must do all we can to promote military-political integration on a continent-wide scale.

Readers' Fears Over CFE Cuts, Germany Eyed

PM1812161590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Manki Ponomarev under the "International Observer Replies" rubric: "Such Similar Letters..."]

[Text] The first person to send the editorial office a letter containing an assessment of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty signed in Paris was D. Yaryshkin from Sverdlovsk. I was about to reply to him personally when another letter arrived—from N. Shimanov in Sobinka, Vladimir Oblast—followed by others from V. Panagushin in Yoshkar-Ola and A. Veselkov in Omsk. They were written by different people and sent from different places, but in many respects they coincide in terms of content. this is hardly accidental. They evidently reflect a viewpoint which is pretty widespread among a certain section of our readers. Thus, I decided to reply to them via the newspaper.

Dmitriy Ivanovich Yaryshkin, for example, is convinced that we don't need the CFE Treaty, as he writes, because it will lead to "the most complete disarmament" and "undermines secrecy" since it envisages stringent inspections of our Armed Forces. Other writers of letters on this subject are also in virtual agreement with him.

You can understand their doubts. But I believe that their conclusions are somewhat hasty. Because the treaty establishes **equal** limits for both the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact states: 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. The Soviet Union is entitled to keep on European territory approximately one-third of the total number of arms to be retained by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact put together—13,300 tanks, 20,000 armored vehicles, 13,700 artillery systems, 5,150 combat aircraft, and 1,500 attack helicopters. What kind of disarmament is this?

Of course the Soviet Union will have to eliminate a considerable quantity of weaponry and combat equipment—a total of around 19,300 items. But other countries, including NATO countries, are also making considerable reductions. Thus the FRG will have to eliminate over 11,000 items—virtually half of all its arms.

The comrades who wrote to the editors complain that the inspection arrangements determined by the treaty compel us to open our garrisons to monitors from the NATO countries. This is admittedly so. But NATO garrisons are being opened up to our monitors to an equal extent. Reliable verification of the fulfillment of the terms of the treaty will promote the growth of trust between the parties to it. Let us remind you how the custom of greeting one another by offering the right hand was borne—it was to show that it was empty and carrying no weapon. To some extent the prescribed monitoring measures can be compared with this ancient custom. They are also intended to lead to the strengthening of trust, and consequently to security.

While we're on the subject of security. Doubts that the threat to our country has diminished and its security strengthened are expressed particularly sharply by N. Shimanov. He believes that the USSR leadership is displaying excessive pliancy vis-a-vis the Western countries, particularly in the political, ideological, and other fields. Again he mentions the results of the Paris summit and the CFE Treaty signed there.

Let us recall, however, how many anxieties were caused at the time by the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. On that occasion, too, many people in our country reckoned that this treaty left us virtually weaponless, was unequal, and represented a unilateral concession to the United States. But what proved to be the case in practice? The Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles did not weaken but strengthened the Soviet Union's security. Because America's Pershings and cruise missiles posed a direct threat to the highly important nerve centers of the Soviet Union on which they were targeted and essentially constituted strategic weapons in Washington's hands. The elimination of these missiles removed this threat. So did the danger increase as a result? Of course not. It only strengthened.

The comrades come back to the question of Germany's unification and inclusion in NATO. I consider that detailed explanations on this have been repeatedly given by the Soviet side. The realities need to be looked straight in the eye. We were no longer able to keep our troops in Hungary and Czechoslovakia intact—these countries' peoples were insistently demanding their withdrawal. Nor could we obstruct the unification of Germany—that was the German people's virtually unanimous wish. And the fact that Germany joined NATO did not harm our security either. There are no NATO troops in the eastern part of the country; for the time being Soviet troops are still stationed there. There are no longer any nuclear weapons there either. In fact the long-standing dream of a nuclear-free zone in the center of Europe has been achieved. Here even the German leaders themselves, as FRG Defense Minister G. Stoltenberg has stated, now advocate the total elimination of short-range nuclear systems throughout the country's territory. So, with the passage of time, this zone could be extended even further.

All the writers of these so similar letters speak with one accord about the need to maintain friendship with Cuba—our only remaining ally. But I, for example, have never heard anywhere that we are opposed to this friendship. Admittedly on some questions of international politics, particularly in connection with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, Cuba holds a different position from the USSR and most other countries in the world community. We may regret this, but it in no way means that we are severing relations with it and ceasing to render aid. . On the contrary, there have already been

reports in the press that, despite all the difficulties, such aid will continue in the future.

The writers of all the letters also write about these difficulties. Admittedly in different ways. V. Panagushin, for example, fears that our economy's weakness will not allow us to restore the kinds of weapons that are being reduced "should it be necessary." He sees this as a threat to security. But our economy has been ailing for some time now. And despite this it has managed to ensure the production of such a huge quantity of first-class aircraft, tanks, and other types of weapon that we have spurted way ahead of other countries here. Now the surpluses have to be destroyed, which will require substantial resources. But apart from everything else it must not be forgotten that the basis of our security is reasonable sufficiency for defense and military strategic parity between the USSR and the United States based primarily on nuclear missiles. It is the existence of weapons of this kind, not superfluous thousands of tanks and guns, that makes war impossible.

It is another matter when N. Shimanov talks about the economic crisis being experienced by our country as one of the main sources of instability. Admittedly this is where the main threat to the Soviet Union's security lies today. He is also right when he writes that we look to our own forces, not wait for handouts from outside, and overcome the crisis ourselves. And in my view he is absolutely correct to say that this requires "organization, discipline, sensible calculation, selfless labor by the people, and competent leadership."

Nevertheless, judging by our readers' unanimous view, there are grounds for the anxieties they express. The USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee recently discussed the CFE Treaty and submitted its findings—a recommendation that it be ratified. It is now up to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In adopting its decision it will have to carefully weigh up all the circumstances, including these anxieties.

Karpov, Kuklev Interviewed on Paris Meeting

Karpov on CSCE Summit

91WC0029A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 48, Nov 90 p 14

[Interviews with Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, deputy USSR foreign minister, by correspondent Yu. Popov; place and date not given: "We Have Signed Off on the Past"]

[Text] [Popov] Viktor Pavlovich, how do you evaluate the results of the Paris meeting?

[Karpov] The meeting in Paris within the framework of the all-European process was a unique phenomenon in Europe's postwar history. It was conducted on the initiative of the Soviet Union ahead, as it were, of the scheduled convening of all-European conferences initiated in 1975 in Helsinki. The next conference had been scheduled for 1992. But it was anticipated by a special meeting timed to coincide with the completion of the elaboration of the treaty on a reduction in armed forces on the continent, the signing of the joint declaration of 22 countries, and the Paris Charter for a New Europe. Each of these documents is unique. And all together they inaugurate a new stage in the development of the system of the all-European conference.

[Popov] What may be highlighted as most important in the results of the Paris meeting?

[Karpov] I would prefer to begin with the declaration. It puts the problem of relations between the two military alliances on an entirely new footing. We all know that the all-European process that began in 1975 preserved to a considerable extent that same confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It has now been proclaimed that their participants are no longer enemies.

The treaty on armed forces, on the other hand, constitutes the material basis, as it were, for the new course in relations between members of both blocs. The first Vienna negotiations on a reduction in armed forces in central Europe, which lasted 10 years, led to nothing. Against this background the dialogue begun in Vienna in March 1989, produced truly striking results: 22 states were able to agree on a reduction in armed forces that no one could have foreseen 18 months ago.

What is the thrust of the treaty, which may provisionally be called "Vienna 1?" Its main purpose is a start on a reorganization of the structure of the armed forces of both alliances on a defensive basis. This is connected also with a revision of the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Their representatives have already discussed questions on the content of the doctrines and ascertained the directions in which they should develop in order for a purely defensive nature to be imparted to them.

[Popov] What lies ahead?

[Karpov] The problem of deeper cuts remains urgent. There is already agreement on a continuation of the Vienna negotiations on arms reductions to solve the problems that we inherited from the "Vienna 1" negotiations. This is why the period up to 1992, when the next all-European conference will assemble, has provisionally been called "Vienna 1A". Negotiations are under way in parallel on confidence-building measures within the framework of the 34 states.

All this will make it possible to adopt new confidence-building and security measures in Europe. In other words, it will be necessary to formulate the mandate of future negotiations for the next Helsinki meeting. And, what is more, negotiations no longer between two blocs, but among all participants in the all-European process—with regard for the national interests of each of them, that is, outside of a bloc framework. This will afford an

opportunity for taking a broader view of questions of an even more radical reduction in troops and arms (by a further 50 percent within a framework of all Europe, possibly) and the creation of new institutions of European security: imparting regularity to the meetings of heads of state and government and foreign ministers and creating in Vienna a conflict-prevention center with a rapid communications system encompassing all of Europe, in Prague, the secretariat of the all-European process, which will prepare the material for foreign minister meetings, in Warsaw, a free elections bureau, inasmuch as the Charter imbibes both confidence-building measures and humanitarian spheres, economic cooperation, human rights and so forth.

As a result, new ways to the economic, legal, and political integration of Europe will be opened. We are experiencing a great need to establish contacts with West European institutions—the EC, the Council of Europe, and others. The Paris Charter speaks of the establishment of a parliamentary assembly—an integrated body incorporating all participants in the CSCE and permitting the development of cooperation of the legislators of these states.

[Popov] Viktor Pavlovich, have we not sold too cheaply in the course of the negotiations?

[Karpov] Truly, our reduction is the most substantial. But if we have resolved to reduce offensive arms on both sides to the lowest possible and at the same time equal level, whoever has more, consequently, will reduce more.

[Popov] What might the treaty's influence on a solution of our domestic problems be?

[Karpov] In connection with the limitation on the levels of arms, the need for them declines sharply. For this reason manufacture of them will decline, and it would be expedient to reorient the spare production capacity toward consumer goods. There will be a diminution in the numbers of army personnel, and these are high-proficiency rated specialists. They will replenish the ranks of tractor manufacturers, repairmen, and operators of combines and other intricate technology.

Of course, the destruction of a vast quantity of arms and the organization of an inspection and monitoring mechanism will require considerable expenditure. But subsequently, the realization of the treaty in full will have a pronounced effect on both the financial and economic position of our country.

I would like to further mention the importance of the change in the overall international climate that will be created as a result of realizing the treaty and the Charter. After all, new opportunities for our cooperation with Western Europe and the United States and Canada in the economic sphere, particularly in such science-intensive sectors as electronics and the like, will open up. An entirely different situation is now emerging. Signs of these changes are already visible to all. In fact, it would seem that the Western countries could have availed themselves of the situation that has come about in the USSR to cause it even greater harm in the economy, imposing on us a blockade, boycotts, embargoes, and so forth. However, quite the opposite is happening: Our adversaries of yesterday are expressing an interest in the preservation of an integral, united Soviet state, and our reforms are meeting among them with understanding and support. The task of integration of the Soviet in the world economy is becoming realistic.

[Popov] Could you not briefly describe the "intrigues" behind the preparation of the treaty and the other documents and who took part in them?

[Karpov] We managed, as I have said, to formulate the treaty within a very compressed timeframe—in a matter of 18 months. This required immense effort on the part of the Soviet delegation in Vienna, in which highly skilled advisers and experts were involved, and also of those in Moscow supporting its activity. They were involved in the elaboration of the other documents also. We have an interdepartmental system for coordinating efforts and harmonizing questions connected with the negotiations in both Vienna and Geneva. Representatives of the USSR Defense Council and Defense Ministry, the KGB, the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Military-Industrial Matters, the USSR Foreign Ministry, and other departments have been enlisted. The most important problems are studied by operational interdepartmental groups.

It is complex work. After all, the process involved the harmonization of the opinions and interests not of one but many states. They had to be interfaced. So the treaty was prepared by thousands of people and was the fruit of collective labor. M.S. Gorbachev's meetings with Western figures, top-level meetings particularly, were the engine.

Kuklev on Cuts in Army

91WC0029A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 48, Nov 90 p 14

[Interviews with Major General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kuklev, deputy chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff directorate, by correspondent Yu. Popov; place and date not given: "Not Enemies Henceforward—Partners"]

[Text] [Popov] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, many people believe that the military are always unhappy when it is a question of cuts in the Army. As a professional military man, are you distressed at the conclusion of the treaty?

[Kuklev] You are right, it is usually thought that the military are unconditional supporters of the stockpiling of arms and that their slogan is: The more, the better. Yes, the military's mission is providing for the country's defense capability and its defense. But in what way? The

answers here may vary. This is sometimes done with the aid of a stockpiling of arms. However, relations between the leading states of the world currently are assuming a nature that affords a new opportunity for the maintenance of the country's sure defense capability by way of negotiations on a limitation and, if possible, a reduction in armed forces also. This is all the more true in our time, when we have agreed that the Warsaw Pact and NATO are no longer enemies.

From this it is understandable why we military men also are making a positive evaluation of the treaty and see it as a step geared to assurance of our security. That I, a professional and specialist, may not care for certain aspects of it is another matter. But this is natural since any treaty is a compromise.

[Popov] What was the reasoning behind the "ceilings" on the quantity of conventional arms and equipment and how were they determined?

[Kuklev] You know that we have agreed to let each group of states in Europe have 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 pieces of artillery, 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 assault helicopters. These "ceilings" take account also of both a quantity of existing arms and defense requirements, since each country has its own opinion on how much in the way of its armament it needs for security under the terms of the treaty. Each group taking part in the negotiations had, therefore, its own discussion of the "ceilings" of each state. Sometimes agreement was reached easily, at times difficult debate flared up. That is, determination of the levels was a product of prudent compromise.

[Popov] You believe, consequently, that the treaty will not in any way harm our security?

[Kuklev] Some people are concerned about the disarmament process that has begun. Why? We are accustomed to a more traditional mode of defense against an external danger: the path of arms stockpiling. It is the most comprehensible and familiar. Nor does history have any precedents of such broad-based arms-reduction actions.

As a rule, arms limitation negotiations have been of a confidential nature. But the specialists are, of course, well aware of all the niceties and are carefully weighing each provision of the accords. Not to mention the fact that the leadership of the General Staff and the USSR Defense Ministry has gone over each figure repeatedly. Research institutions, representatives of the industry's defense sectors, employees of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Foreign Ministry—in a word, a wide range of professionally trained specialists—have been enlisted here. And they all had just one primary concern: how to guarantee the country's sure defenses given this arms level or the other.

It may be declared with every justification that, given realization of the treaty, our security will be ensured fully and that the established levels correspond to the requirements of our defensive doctrine and the principle of defensive sufficiency.

[Popov] Can we not, following such a large reduction in arms on both sides, dot the "i's" and consider the negotiations complete?

[Kuklev] No, the issue cannot be put in this way. We reached agreement with the NATO countries that negotiations would be conducted on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The USSR also supports the elimination of the imbalances in naval forces.

The point being that the NATO countries had constantly voiced concern about asymmetries taking shape on land in favor of the Warsaw Pact. The present treaty eliminates them. But they persist at sea. The United States and other Western countries say that negotiations on naval forces and the elimination of arms are inappropriate here because the NATO countries are situated on different continents and it is essential, allegedly, to guard sea lanes. But the naval forces of this alliance have considerable potential also for launching attacks against on-shore targets and could be seen as part of an assault grouping for offensive, not protective, operations. So they must necessarily be limited and reduced.

[Popov] What will be the fate of the people who fall victim to the cuts and what will happen to the equipment condemned to be destroyed?

[Kuklev] We have no intention of destroying the military equipment in toto. Some tanks and armored vehicles (refitted, naturally) may be adapted for economic needs. For example, according to the treaty, we may use for peaceful purposes 750 tanks and 3,000 armored combat vehicles located on the country's European territory. There have already been applications from various organizations and departments, that would like to take a considerable number of modified tanks and armored transport vehicles. Plans for a fire truck for extinguishing forest fires have already been drawn up for the T-55 tank. A pump that shoots a foaming liquid over a very great distance or an extendable jib longer than the regular one may be mounted on them. Mobile tracked cranes with a powerful jib and hoisting capacity may be built. Finally, good heavy scrapers and bulldozers may be made out of tanks.

Many people are being released, and this is a difficult problem not only for us but for any state. A 500,000-man reduction in the size of the Army, which we announced at the end of 1988, is now under way. Much has been said about this process: problems of housing, vocational reorientation, and a multitude of others are arising. And tackling such a task is simply beyond the capacity of our ministry alone.

On the other hand, a sizable group of highly educated workers could be entering the national economy.

It will be necessary, evidently, to overcome difficulties involving conversion also. Understandably, capital investments for its restructuring also will be required. There are no dividends without any outlays. But there will undoubtedly be such.

[Popov] How will the arms be eliminated—burned, buried, demolished?

[Kuklev] There are many methods. Tanks that cannot be refitted, for example, may be destroyed: broken up into parts or blown up, compacted or smashed by a heavy steel ball. The West's representatives even proposed burying the equipment, incidentally. But they subsequently deemed this inexpedient. After all, the purpose of the entire procedure is to exclude the possibility of this type of weapon or the other being restored. And the supply of metal left over may be used as one sees fit: shipped for remelting, say.

Experts, Officers Discuss Rocket Forces Role

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["Serving the Fatherland" program]

[Text] [Sergey Yurakov, journalist] On 7 October 1941, Academician Yangel, the founder of your ["Yuzhnoye"] association, wrote to his wife: "It is impossible to buy any food in Moscow at the moment. Sugar and sweets have disappeared completely. They are unobtainable even on coupons." If Academician Yangel were alive and writing today, he could use the same words. What is happening? Has time stood still in our country? Or has the war lasted for more than half a century? War against whom?

[Academician V.F. Utkin, general designer, general director of "Yuzhnoye" Science-and-Production Association] I believe that Mikhail Kuzmich [Yangel] would probably use similar words, not exactly the same words, but similar ones. But that does not mean that time has stood still. I believe that the main point does not lie in war but in the social issues which are currently discussed so vehemently and at such depth in the Supreme Soviet.

But since we are on the subject of war, I would like to mention the cold war that was waged between our countries, essentially from 1945 until 1980. It was this cold war which forced us, rocket designers, to concentrate our minds every day, the whole of the time, on how to prevent this cold war from deteriorating into a hot one.

I would like to draw your attention to this poster [depicting U.S. rockets, with relevant dates] which shows how energetically the Americans organized the cold war at the beginning.

Here you can see how we were forced to keep up with all this. I believe that thanks to the fact that the necessary measures were adopted at the time, everything was done to prevent a hot war, a terrible hot war. This is now obvious to everyone.

Here you can see something very characteristic [turns to another wall chart]. Here you can see the increase in the extent of weaponry [boyezaryad]. These are the U.S. ones, and these are ours. You can see that at that time we were still constantly slightly behind. But we managed to keep up.

[Narrator] On 6 August 1945 the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The explosion claimed the lives of tens of thousands of civilians.

Meanwhile in our country reconstruction of cities, villages, and enterprises devastated by the war had begun. Peaceful life was resuming. During the first post-World War II years the Americans built strategic bombers and rockets capable of delivering a nuclear strike against our country. This is how the cold war began:

[Caption on screen reads: "Joint Military Planning Committee, Directive No. 432/D, 14 December 1945. 'Using all 196 available atomic bombs, the United States could deal a devastating blow to the industrial sources of USSR military power, which would ultimately prove decisive...'"]

[Narrator] On 29 August 1949 the first experimental nuclear explosion was carried out in the Soviet Union, ending the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons.

However, as early as 1 January 1950 the U.S. military command elaborated a plan for a military attack on our country under the code name "Trojan."

The Soviet Government paid serious attention to the development of rocket building from the earliest postwar years. Engines were tested, control systems were created. In 1947 the creation of the Kapustin Yar test site began under the leadership of Lieutenant General of Artillery Voznyuk. A year earlier, at one of the Defense Ministry research institutes a new department was set up which served as the basis for the creation in 1950 of Special Design Bureau No. 1. Sergey Pavlovich Korolev was put in charge of it. The main task of the design bureau was the development of the "R" series ballistic missiles. Apart from Korolev, design teams led by Glushko, (?Filyubin), (?Bormin), and Kuznetsov took part in this work. The joint task which united the test site workers and designers was the creation of missile weapons. Eleven experimental launches were carried out during the development of the R-1 missile. As to their tactical and technical specifications the second series of R-1 missiles were already considerably superior to the V-2 rocket developed in Germany.

In 1953 the Soviet media reported that thermonuclear weapons had been developed and tested successfully.

Soon after, a new U.S. plan for war against our country appeared.

[Video shows map captioned: "'Dropshot' 1 January 1957"]

From the mid-fifties to the early sixties a number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles were developed in the Soviet Union. They were designed to resolve the country's main defense tasks and end the invulnerability of the territory of potential enemies.

This was achieved for the first time with the R-5M missile systems which were accepted into the arsenal 21 June 1956. The R-7 missile, the first successful launch of which was carried out in August 1957, resolved the main defense task even more reliably. As early as 1960 this missile system was added to the arsenal.

This documentary footage shows R-7 missile tests. As to its class, this missile already ranked among the ICBM's. In this context, the Council of Ministers approved a resolution on creating a Defense Ministry scientific research and test site on the territory of Kazakhstan 12 February 1955. This later became the Baykonur Cosmodrome. After the acceptance of the R-7 missile system into the arsenal, it was deployed in a combat group in a northern part of the country. The Soviet Union also used this missile as the basis for its exploration of near-earth space for peaceful purposes.

[Yurakov] How, in your opinion, has our country's military-strategic position changed of late?

[V.L. Lapygin, general designer, general director of "Avtomatika i Priborostroyeniye" Science-and-Production Association] I believe that the military-political position of our country has become considerably more complicated. A year ago many deputies in our legislature took the view that from the military viewpoint everything was in order in our country, that no one was threatening us, and that it was possible to substantially reduce military expenditure. There were even extreme opinions which called into question the usefulness of maintaining our army as such, and so on and so forth.

The first complication arose with the unification of Germany. As a result, the military and political situation in Europe has grown substantially more complex. As you well know, the GDR... [changes thought] well, the Germans have united and become part of NATO, no less. If, for instance, Germany had taken up a neutral position, separate from NATO, that, in my view, would make for a more tranquil situation in Europe.

Furthermore we are now witnessing the development of events currently under way in the Persian Gulf. It is necessary to mention here that the United States, when it did not like what was happening in Panama, established "order"—it is necessary to use quotation marks here—in that country in a matter of 24 hours. That is to say they carried out an armed attack. We denounced that affair as aggression. Prior to that there was a similar situation concerning Grenada. But when Iraq did something similar in Kuwait, we denounced it in unison as the aggressor, although we should bear in mind that we have a treaty with Iraq, a treaty of friendship and nonaggression, and, obviously, also other obligations, so to speak. We have to bear in mind that U.S. troops, to put it bluntly, have occupied, have established a grip, on the entire Arabian peninsula, and that the situation taking shape there is extremely complex.

[Yurakov] Is U.S. expenditure in the sphere of strategic missile development being reduced? How are they implementing the relevant programs?

[Lapygin] They are not cutting their expenditure. We know from the press, you yourself know, that apart from the new enhanced-accuracy MX ICBM, they are developing the Midgetman system. They are also developing the Trident-2 ICBM for submarines, and the B-2 bomber, the Stealth bomber, as it is called. That is to say, they are not cutting strategic forces in this respect.

In general, all the cuts in U.S. expenditure that are being claimed by certain ranking officials... do not exist, in my opinion. Take for instance the latest report which I have heard, claiming that the budget submitted by the U.S. Administration has been cut by $15 billion excluding the expenditure for the Arabian operation. But if you take into consideration that Saudi Arabia guarantees them $15-20 billion for funding this whole operation, for maintaining these troops, this balances the books, so to speak.

[Yurakov] Why are the Americans not cutting their expenditure on strategic arms, after all the situation in the world is changing, after all there is a thaw?

[Lapygin] You know that their stance remains nonetheless one of negotiating from a position of strength. To compare our doctrines, while ours is a doctrine of defense sufficiency, the U.S. doctrine is a doctrine of looking after their own interests. As for these interests, what they are and where, in what part of the world they are, is known only to themselves. Naturally, these interests can change. At present they have interests in Arabia, tomorrow they may crop up in other parts of the world. Therefore the doctrine to which they adhere is a doctrine which gives them a relatively free hand.

[Yurakov] Our country has adopted the military doctrine of defense sufficiency. Important cuts in missile arms are envisaged. Meanwhile the development of SDI continues in the United States. These circumstances make enhanced demands on the quality of missile arms. Enhanced quality in turn demands considerable expenditure. Will it be possible, nonetheless, to cut appropriations for missile weapons in 1991 and subsequent years?

[Army General Yu.P. Maksimov, commander in chief, Strategic Rocket Forces] You are absolutely right, given the quantitative reduction in strategic arms, the implementation of the task entrusted to the Rocket Forces is possible only by means of enhancing the qualitative

parameters of the arms. Furthermore, the implementation of the SDI program by the Americans cannot be ruled out. Incidentally, work on it continues according to statements made at different levels. Naturally, the deployment of a large-scale ABM defense system within the framework of the implementation of this program could seriously undermine strategic stability in the world, and disrupt military strategic parity in favor of the United States. For this reason we envisage perfecting... [brief break in transmission or tape] so as to keep abreast of contemporary requirements and retain the possibility of discharging the tasks entrusted to the Rocket Forces also under these conditions. Naturally, this requires a certain amount of expenditure. Given the cuts in USSR defense appropriations we have envisaged conducting research work to improve weaponry to the minimum level, the level necessary to improve arms so that our Rocket Forces are up to the tasks facing them.

I can now say here that our preparations for the 50-percent cut and the cut in defense appropriations as a whole have already considerably affected our plans to improve arms and we have already made considerable cuts. But you must bear in mind that there can only be cuts in appropriations and expenditure to a certain level, beyond which, if there are any further cuts, this will damage our country's security. That must not happen under any circumstances.

[Yurakov] What danger lies in store for our country if there are imprudent cuts in funding and research work on missiles?

[Utkin] First, I would like to say that in all our developments we always pay exceptionally great attention to ensuring that we can produce good, effective machines for little cash. This is, as it were, the foundation for design bureaus and workers, and we will continue this in the future. There is also very great danger. It will be very dangerous if we lose equilibrium in the course of this cut in systems. We must have enough systems for the new thinking and make very effective use of them. We must not lag behind here.

[Yurakov] The country's defense complex—like your association, moreover—is scattered throughout the country. How can we build the country's defense in conditions where the republics are declaring sovereignty and given certain initiatives, such as, say, the Leningrad Soviet's initiative to amalgamate defense enterprises outside the city?

[Utkin] This is my answer. It is simply impossible to organize defense when we are tearing the country apart, because the creation of complexes like the missile complex is work for the whole country. The whole country creates them both scientifically and technically, as a complete unit, the whole country alone. This cannot be done separately.

By the way, this by no means prevents each union republic from becoming autonomous and resolving its own questions. But everyone must tackle defense together. First, this will be far cheaper. Second, a reduction in nuclear potential can be organized. Lastly, we can therefore move on to something which we all dream of achieving—a nuclear-free world. You will not resolve that separately under any circumstances. But the main thing is that every republic in our country also has a great deal of scientific potential. It is only by putting it together that, rather than falling behind, but can keep pace with scientific and technical progress. We must all strive to achieve this.

[Yurakov] The Rocket Forces were set up by all the republics, but what is to be done if some of them want to secede from the Union and detach their part of the property, their part of the Rocket Forces, 100 nuclear missiles?

[Colonel A.V. Bal] The Rocket Forces are weapons for collective use, for collective defense. They are designed to defend vast territories and they can strike vast territories. If we split up these formidable weapons among various departments, etc., we deprive the Rocket Forces of their might. We deprive them of unity but we also weaken these Rocket Forces of ours against our enemy, against our potential adversary, who possesses these same nuclear weapons. That is why we are, of course, against private armies, we favor a united, strong army.

[Yurakov] How do you assess the domestic political situation within the country?

[Guards Major A.V. Lambin] Here in principle everyone has to form his own opinion, from his own standpoint. The situation is nonetheless very complex. Look, all this dissension has begun within our union. Everyone pulls their own way, everyone wants to secede, you know. There are, of course, demands for, say, economic independence and political independence. But the point is that due to historical development people in our country are not necessarily living where they were born; there has been a very great deal of migration. Therefore it's very difficult to say that these people live here, those people live there, this is their republic, this is someone else's republic.

[Yurakov] Are the emergent processes where economic ties between the republics are being severed disrupting Soviet missile building and threatening the very existence of the Strategic Forces?

[Lapygin] I would say that it is not only a question of missile building, the point is that there should be a Soviet Union, perhaps, a federation and there should be republics. There should be laws, which should be implemented at all levels, from top to bottom. Without this discipline and without this order there can be no serious discussion of policy or the state structure, much less of defense sectors of industry, in particular missile building. The appropriate order should be established, based on democracy, glasnost, respect for the law above all, implementation of the law, above all—the laws that we adopt at all levels.

[Yurakov] As a general designer of strategic rockets and as a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions, you are acquainted with the military doctrine of reasonable defense sufficiency, what is the essence of it?

[Utkin] Your question is very multifaceted. I can, of course, in this short time only say briefly that it resides in the fact that neither side must imagine that it will go unpunished after carrying out a strike.

[Narrator] The use of liquid oxygen as an oxidizing agent on the first Soviet missiles made it impossible to ensure combat readiness and the required performance characteristics. In this connection the "Yuzhnoye" special design bureau and an experimental production unit, the "Yuzhnyy" machine building plant, were set up in 1954 in the city of Dnepropetrovsk at an automobile plant and a series design bureau. The main task was to develop and manufacture highly effective live [boyevyye] ballistic missiles capable of remaining for a long time in a state of constant combat readiness. The transition to high-boiling fuel components also made it possible to guarantee supreme combat readiness and enable the missiles to remain on standby for a long time. The second feature of the new generation of missiles was the transition to an independent guidance system. A unique testing base was set up to flight-test the new missiles, where missile stages were tested. The "Yuzhnoye" special design bureau was headed by the 43-year-old chief designer, Mikhail Kuzmich Yangel. In conjunction with the people developing the system of missile complex components the design bureau's young collective successfully coped with its task and created the first live strategic missile, using high-boiling components, with a range of more than 2,000 km. The development and beginning of deployment of these missiles were ensured by the adoption 17 December 1959 of the decision to form the Strategic Rocket Forces as a separate branch of the troops.

While work was being completed on the first strategic missile, work began to develop on an intercontinental missile. The increased accuracy of U.S. missiles necessitated the development of new missiles and the construction of hardened launch silos.

The "Yuzhnoye" design bureau collective developed the first ICBM in parallel. It deprived the United States of the monopoly on possession of nuclear delivery vehicles. The further improvement of ICBM's necessitated the development of multiple reentry vehicles, orbital reentry vehicles, and radiotechnical defense mechanisms to surmount ABM defense. The introduction of the designers' technical solutions required the "Yuzhniy" machine building plant to master new technologies. Thus, for the first time in world machine building a missile was launched mortar-style from a transportable launch canister. The increase in accuracy and the development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles [MIRV's] necessitated the use of onboard minicomputers. The present-day capabilities of ICBM's are such that a retaliatory launch can be made even during a nuclear attack. This is a necessary characteristic in conditions of a defensive doctrine.

Our country also has to improve missile weapons in order to counter the threat linked with the deployment in the United States of the highly accurate MX ICBM's.

[Video caption reads: "Existing missile complexes were not only developed at the 'Yuzhnoye' Science-and-Production Association, but also at design bureaus headed by Academicians V.N. Chelomey and A.D. Nadradze"]

[Yurakov] What kind of combat vehicle is this?

[Doctor of Military Sciences Colonel General A.A. Ryazhskikh, deputy commander in chief, Strategic Rocket Forces] It is a new strategic missile complex making its first appearance in our parade. Under our defensive doctrine, it is a purely defensive complex. In connection with the 50-percent cut in strategic nuclear forces when every launcher, every warhead plays a large role, this complex performs this defensive task in a supremely reliable manner.

Of course, only high-class, high-level specialists could develop this complex. By the way, we had to train specialists, instruct them, provide them with vocational training in order to develop this complex. I must say that the standard of our military specialists fully accords with the development of this complex.

[Yurakov] Do you have any problems obtaining food, or as regards kindergartens and housing?

[Lambin] Bearing in mind that we have coupons for everything and that I am away from home for 10 or 11 days a month, basically we have enough food. There is no great variety. Take groats, for instance. Of late there was only pearl barley in our store. Sometimes they put out semolina. But that is for those who have children, small children.

[Yurakov] Does this mean that if your food was not taken care of while you are on alert duty, life would be harder for your family?

[Lambin] Without any question.

[Yurakov] In the event of strategic arms cuts, mass redundancies are in store for the rocket men. If this happened to you, would you be ready for it?

[Bal] Naturally, I have nothing much to fall back on. I have spent almost 20 years serving in northern regions. I have nothing. No car, no dacha, no apartment of my own. Should I personally be laid off, life will be difficult for me. I will have to begin from square one. This is a problem which all rocket men who have been living in remote garrisons and do not have their own housing are facing.

[Lambin] It could happen that I too am laid off. All this depends, of course, on your expert qualifications, your

skills, your standing with your superiors, your attitude to work... What else? Next year I will have done my 20 years. Then I will be entitled to a pension. Basically, I am not that afraid of being laid off. The only thing is that it will be very difficult to find a job in civilian life. My main speciality is here. In civilian life there no jobs like this.

[Yurakov] How can you explain that these Rocket Forces officers, who handle very powerful military equipment and do a highly responsible and difficult job, sometimes lack the barest essentials?

[Lapygin] This is a general shortcoming which applies throughout our country and our economy. I am somewhat surprised that such modest resources, even bearing in mind the reduced 1990 Defense Ministry budget, are allocated for the upkeep of the Rocket Forces which are the cheapest from the viewpoint of discharging their ultimate task. That is to say, it is a pity that we are economizing in the wrong place.

[Yurakov] What problems as regards social provisions for officers are characteristic of the Rocket Forces? What is being done to eliminate them?

[Maksimov] The Rocket Forces, just like the Armed Forces as a whole, are part of our people and therefore all the problems which currently confront our people and our country apply also in our Rocket Forces. More than 10,000 families of officers and warrant officers have no apartments. In view of the fact that these people are discharging their service and doing alert duty in special conditions, in remote garrisons, this situation is intolerable, of course. There are many problems, both general and specific problems. We are aware of them. There is no doubt that more energetic efforts are necessary to eliminate these problems. We cannot be satisfied with either the pace or the scale of the solution of these problems, and we hope that they will be resolved in the near future, both as a result of draft laws, the resolution on the discharge of military service by servicemen, servicemen's status, and so forth.

[Yurakov] What is your attitude to the upcoming accord on the reduction of strategic offensive arms?

[Lapygin] I have stated before that, unfortunately, we are making cuts in the combat arms where we look most up to date. This applies to the Strategic Rocket Forces, and also conventional arms forces—that is tanks, our (?tactical) artillery pieces, and also rockets... In my opinion they also look sufficiently advanced.

Other arms of the service, and in particular the Navy, are a different matter. The Navy is only just beginning to be mentioned, although the Americans are still a long way off understanding that it is necessary to cut back the Navy. This also applies to the Air Force and other branches. Although, I understand, negotiations have already gone beyond the original two categories, and further steps are being planned to introduce cuts in other areas.

Unfortunately, during the first stage, it seems to me—or rather it is not just an impression... I even wrote about this problem in an article in ZA RUBEZHOM... a situation has taken shape that even the Americans, an edition of THE WASHINGTON POST, I think it was in April, carried an article to this effect. They worked out at that time what they had gained from these [arms control] negotiations. The conclusion was: Not only have we not reduced our nuclear might, we have doubled it, among other things.

[Yurakov] Under the upcoming accord on the reduction of strategic arms, our country will have to spend large sums of money on the conversion to useful purposes [utilizatsiya] of highly (?toxic) rocket propellant, nuclear warheads, and so forth. Where is this money to come from? It seems that this treaty is not entirely advantageous for our country in economic terms.

[Utkin] I believe above all that it is necessary to spend this money. It is necessary to seek to lower the nuclear potential. It is true that this will cost money. Where is this money to come from? Well, it is a difficult process. The process of the arms build-down is just as difficult as the process of the arms buildup was. It is not a simple process, it is a difficult process, but we must go through with it. It is necessary to lower the nuclear potential. That is one solution. There is also another solution of which we are aware. It is necessary to agree on the utilization for the benefit of the national economy of missiles which are to be removed from alert duty.

We have a launch vehicle which was used for the first time 16 March many years ago. It initiated the "Kosmos" series. It was a combat system originally. It is necessary now to agree on utilizing former combat systems to launch satellites. This will be advantageous for the entire human race. It is necessary to do this, not to be afraid and to proceed with the implementation of this task. It will be beneficial. We may arrive at very interesting findings. For instance, launching the "Arcad" [Arctic auroral density] satellites in cooperation with France, we have obtained information which shows that it is possible to forecast earthquakes with the help of data obtained during studies of the magnetosphere and ionosphere. This makes it possible for us to advance in this direction and, if we manage to reach agreement under the treaty, we will utilize our weapon systems for this purpose. This is the second solution and it is most suitable. I believe that we will come to an agreement. We simply must. This will be a human solution.

[Yurakov] How much foreign currency could the country earn from the utilization of rockets subject to reduction under the treaty to launch commercial satellites?

[Utkin] I think that this will depend primarily on the number of rockets which we agree to utilize. But it could be anything up to R5 billion. This is a lot of money. However, there are other important uses. There is no need to translate everything into money. For instance, finding a way to send rescue facilities to a sinking ship,

or a submarine... Not everything can be expressed in terms of money. These systems make it possible to solve these tasks. I estimate the potential, depending on numbers, at up to R5 billion.

[Yurakov] What are the obstacles in the path of the utilization of rockets subject to reduction under the treaty for commercial launches?

[Utkin] There are no fundamental obstacles. It is necessary to reach an accord. What does reaching an accord mean? First, it is necessary to find the initial money necessary to launch this mechanism. Second, it is necessary to define in the treaty which of the systems that are to be reduced can be utilized. That is to say an accord must be reached. Third, and probably most important, it is necessary to lift the ban on launching other countries' satellites from the territory of our country. We are prepared to guarantee that we will not look under any seal. We have our own scientific achievements. We are prepared to share them. The time will come when we will discuss them jointly and share them. It is simply necessary to lift this ban. This will help to resolve many tasks.

[Narrator] Experience gained in the course of the destruction of intermediate-range missiles has shown that missile arms cuts are not a simple nor a cheap matter.

The upcoming 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive arms call for the destruction of missiles with a much bigger launch weight and dimensions. Therefore the search for optimum methods of the elimination of missiles is becoming a topical problem.

[Yurakov] During your time, and thanks also to your efforts, strategic parity between the USSR and the United States was achieved. Under the upcoming treaty on the reduction of strategic forces part of the rockets will have to be destroyed. Are you, as a designer, not feeling sad at the fate of your rockets?

[Utkin] I believe that they have fulfilled their main task. The task which was entrusted to us, the task of preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a hot war, as I have said before. This task they have fulfilled. It is also necessary to ensure that the cuts are balanced and that they go deeper and deeper. This is another task which these rockets must resolve. Their quality must be such that it facilitates a reduction, a lowering to the lowest permissible level. Most importantly, it is necessary to reach an agreement on utilizing them for useful purposes. Therefore, in reply to your question, I am proud of these rockets which have ensured the defense of the country, which have fulfilled their task, and I hope that they will help to resolve many more peaceful tasks benefiting mankind.

[Yurakov] Are you not a little sad all the same?

[Utkin] No, I would not put it this way. I am not sad. Thanks to the platform which I have described to you, I believe that they will serve useful tasks. We have peace. There is no war. About what is there to be sad? It is necessary to seek to ensure that there is no threat hanging over us for many years to come. This means great happiness for me as a general designer.

[Yurakov] What, in your opinion, is the impact of the conversion which is under way in the country, on Soviet rocket building?

[Bal] The idea of the creation of rocket technology has attracted its enthusiasts. When enterprises are told to produce meat grinding machines instead of rockets, this is bound to discourage skilled cadres. We are worried about our intake in the future, and about how our design bureaus will cope with their tasks in the future.

[Yurakov] Are you satisfied with the progress of conversion in our country?

[Utkin] No, I am not. It has proved to be an extremely complex process. I believe that at the beginning it was viewed in rather simplistic terms. I am dissatisfied primarily because we are told that it is necessary to transfer our entire scientific and technical potential to the national economy. That is to say, we must give everything that we have accumulated to the national economy so that the introduction of new developments produces the most advantageous returns there.

What we need is several major state programs, which must be funded, and for which key enterprises must be made responsible, responsible for delivering specific systems, just as we do, to clients. I will give you an example. It would be very advantageous, in particular for our country, to have an ecologically clean power generation industry. By the year 2000 some countries, Britain for instance, are planning to cover up to 25 percent of their energy requirement from such sources. The corresponding percentage in other countries totals 10 to 15 percent. In our country, according to our estimates it will total 0.03 percent. We need this kind of energy in the north and in many other places.

We built this first 100-250 kilowatt installation in Pavlograd. [video shows wind generator] It is undergoing tests and is attracting much interest. In this way we are retaining our production facilities and our entire skilled staff and specialists. We are making use of what we used on our weapon systems. This sort of conversion is useful.

I would also like to draw your attention to another matter. If, by creating launch vehicles on the basis of weapons systems we have made correct use of conversion in the original sense of the word, we have now moved a step further and built the "Zenit" launcher which uses ecologically clean components and compares favorably with launchers built in other countries. It has therefore generated great interest in Australia. We are currently conducting negotiations with the Australians with a view to launching our "Zenit" launch vehicle from their international space center. Allow me to reiterate that the rocket has many advantages thanks to its ecologically clean components, thanks to its super power

engineering which means payloads of up to 12 tonnes in our latitudes, that is to say per standard atmosphere [na standartnuyu atmosferu), standard specifications. Its launch is fully automated. During the launch, during fueling and preparation, no one is present, it is a fully automated process. The launcher also has many other qualities. The area allocated for the launch pad need be no bigger than what you see here [video shows aerial view]. The configuration of the system is very good. In short, it has generated great interest.

Thanks to the development of such rockets it is possible to earn money, and consequently it is possible to buy consumer goods. This is a solution which must be utilized. The big companies must carefully work out what is advantageous for the country. Only where it is advantageous—and this is the essence of the market system—efforts must be made to earn money.

[Yurakov] Tell me, how are the cuts in the appropriations for rocket building and our economy's progress toward the market compatible?

[O.N. Shishkin, USSR minister of general machine building] Everyone is familiar with our country's policy today, and the strategic arms cuts were an initiative put forward by our country. The program for 50-percent cuts in strategic arms, which is well-known throughout the world and which is to be agreed and approved in the next few months, will enable the Soviet Union on the one hand to cut back strategic arms, and subsequently, during the transition to the market to free certain resources which will make it possible for defense sector industries to find the money necessary for conversion without losing strategic parity.

The situation today is such that it is impossible to have two different parameters, so to speak, one for the defense industry and one for the market, for saturating the market. You cannot have defense industry operating according to one scheme and a market economy operating according to another scheme. In both cases economic incentives and the country's economic system must apply.

[Yurakov] Yes, but the defense industry is the most nonmarket sector of our economy.

[Shishkin] But it is a sector which is essential for the existence of any independent state. Therefore the state sector and the state economy, extending to the defense sector, must be able to rely on its operating according to the same schemes under which the entire economy of the whole country is operating.

[Yurakov] Under the conditions of new political thinking positive changes have taken place in Soviet-U.S. relations, and this includes the military sphere. Our countries have come a long way in drafting the strategic arms reduction accord. In this context, how do you assess the role, place, and prospects of the Rocket Forces in maintaining nuclear strategic parity?

[Maksimov] There is no more important task at the moment than the prevention of nuclear war. The main objective of our military doctrine is precisely to prevent war. This is to some extent facilitated by the course pursued by our state toward reduction of military confrontation and preservation of military strategic parity at the lowest possible level. This is particularly important now, in the conditions of the economic difficulties which our country is experiencing, in conditions of the need to cut back defense appropriations.

At the same time, the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons must take place on a reciprocal basis, ensuring the preservation of strategic parity at every stage of the reduction process without detriment to the sides' security. That is to say, strategic arms cuts are a two-way street, and this is how it must be. (?Lowering our guard) unilaterally could hardly be justified, especially in view of the fact that both in the United States and in a number of other Western countries strategic arms development programs are being consistently and persistently implemented. They remain committed to the concept of nuclear deterrence. Although international tension has somewhat subsided as a result of the practical implementation of the principles of new political thinking, there are as yet no guarantees that the positive changes in the world will prevail. Nor has the military threat to our country been eliminated.

In these conditions reliable defense of our country has been and remains one of the most important tasks for our people who lived through the grim war with fascism.

Against the backdrop of unilateral and treaty reductions of armed forces and conventional arms and important changes in our country's strategic position, the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the basis of the strategic nuclear forces has not only not diminished but has increased of late in questions of both deterrence and prevention of war.

At the same time the defensive nature of the military doctrine is making even tougher demands on the rocket forces. They must possess reliable stability, adequate combat efficiency, and also the necessary potential for retaliatory action so as scotch the temptation of any aggressor to unleash a war against our country.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to congratulate television viewers, all servicemen of the Rocket Forces, veterans, and rocket designers and builders on Rocket Forces and Artillery Day. I would like to say that the rocket men who are currently mounting the guard are continuing the traditions in worthy fashion, are augmenting the combat readiness and might of our Rocket Forces, and are vigilantly guarding the socialist gains.

Allow me, comrade television viewers, comrade scientists, technicians, and workers, creators of rocket technology and arms, and Rocket Forces and Artillery servicemen to cordially congratulate you on your holiday, Rocket Forces and Artillery Day, and to wish you good

health and further success in your work and service, happiness in your life, and all the very best!

'Studio Nine' Examines CSCE Meeting

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["Studio Nine" program, presented by Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of USSR Television and Radio, with Professor Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, advisor to the USSR president; Andrey Serafimovich Grachev, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department; and Professor Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, director of the Europe Institute of the Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] [Zorin] All those present around this table, during the days of the CSCE session in Paris, were there in the French capital and, one way or another took part in this conference. I think that you will already have guessed from that line-up that it is precisely to this problem that our discussion today will be devoted.

I think that this has to be done, above all for two reasons. First, what is under discussion is an event which has played and which will play, in a substantial way, an exceptionally large role now and in the future in the whole course of the international process—the political process in the international arena. Second, it seems to me that against the background of our worries, our concerns which we are now living through, this event of exceptional importance is nevertheless, in a way, fading into the background in public attention. Little is written and spoken about it, at least not enough. In the meanwhile, I, for example, am convinced that in 40 or 50 years—and perhaps they will not remember—our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will study history books at school about those concerns which stir us today.

Incidentally, I completely acknowledge that some of those who are listening to us now think that I am greatly exaggerating and are distrustful of such a statement. Indeed, on returning from Paris to Moscow, I encountered questions such as: are we not falling into inordinate euphoria, and are we not exaggerating the significance of what happened quite recently in Paris. I think that we ought to start our talk, our discussion on this, by answering the question: what is new and significant in the decisions adopted at the Paris conference? Andrey Serafimovich, I will ask you to start.

[Grachev] You know, Valentin Sergeyevich, history will of course, provide the ultimate assessment of an event such as the Paris meeting, in fact of any event of this nature. In general, certain, I would say some aberrations of vision are characteristic of contemporaries. We... some phenomena, events, figures, I am already digressing... we underestimate, and others, on the contrary, we exaggerate their significance. But to return to the Paris meeting: if one seeks to discover some kind of objective criteria by which it can and will be appraised, I would say the following. In Paris, speeches by most participants in that conference repeatedly spoke of it bringing a whole era to an end. The French president said and recalled that the end of the century is approaching in any case.

So it really seems to me that the Paris conference is remarkable and indicative in that it brought to an end an era, a century, a specific century, the 20th, which we have grown accustomed to calling, both with bitterness and sometimes with pride, the century of wars and revolutions. So I think that the Paris conference really contains what I trust is the completely realistic hope that many wars and even revolutions which related to a previous era have been brought to an end.

This meeting brought to an end the postwar stage of European history. It brought an end to the cold war, an era which took up a significantly larger period than the hot war—45 years. But it seems to me that two wars have been brought to an end: not only World War II, in connection with the fact that an appropriate, and I think final settlement has been reached on many issues which were left over from it—the German question in the first instance of course—but also another war, the psychological war, because, after all, the conflict which has separated Europe relates not only to the post war era. After all, Europe has been divided into the East and the West, in essence, since the start of the century, since 1917.

The ideological conflict which split it is in essence the first cause of the division of Europe into East and West. But the confrontation of these two parts took the form not simply of ideological conflict but also often of psychological warfare. So, it seems to me that in Paris there was no mention of Europe's having become linear and homogeneous, or of different social systems' having disappeared from it. Nothing of the sort. But understanding was reached in Paris that the differences existing in Europe, including differences in social systems, was not its problem but its richness, that the historical conflict which characterized its history cannot in any way be resolved, and is incapable of being resolved, by military means; and this applies not just to military warfare but also to what we could call psychological warfare which is unleashed according to the rules of so-called peaceful coexistence. Because, all the same, the aim that was set was just the same—one system had to overcome the other.

I think that an important result, an important significance of the Paris conference was that Europe moved out of this stage of prolonged and, alas, unproductive conflict and entered on the path of reuniting its history, European time, which Mikhail Sergeyevich mentioned in his speech, and entered on the path of searching, on the basis of its multiplicity of forms, for answers to those questions and those problems which face all peoples regardless of which part of Europe, East or West, they live in.

[Zorin] Well, I shall hardly be saying anything new or revealing some secret if I note that in some circles of our

society it is being said that regardless of what you have been speaking about, Andrey Serafimovich, and which is very much to the point, nonetheless, some people in this country consider that Paris was no victory for us but virtually a defeat. That the USSR has foregone its national interests for the sake of short-term advantages, including material ones. I am not exaggerating anything. I am basing this in particular on letters which have come in to Studio Nine.

I would like simply to quote to you one of the letters which we have received recently. This is a letter from Sergey Ivanovich Novikov, a Great Fatherland War veteran, living in Novosibirsk. He writes: I do not share your assessments of the Paris conference. In my opinion you are trying to put a good face on things, as the saying goes. In fact, we are giving up the fruits of our victory in the Great Fatherland War. Is this not shown by our agreement on the liquidation of the German Democratic Republic and its being swallowed up by West Germany? Is it not indicated by our role as passive observers of the collapse of the socialist camp?

Well that is an acute question and I think that it is one that has occurred not just to Sergey Ivanovich. Insofar as this question exists it must be given a reply. Vadim Valentinovich, will you please try?

[Zagladin] I shall try. Well, first of all I would like to say that I fully understand the feelings of Sergey Ivanovich Novikov. As a war veteran he is concerned about the fruits of victory. He wants what is best for our country. At this level, on this aspect, I understand him. But, all the same, I cannot agree with him.

Let us examine things. So, why did we wage war? In order to preserve the homeland, to defend it, to save it. In order to rout fascism which was threatening not only our freedom and the very existence of the country but also the existence of all the European democratic regimes and countries. Thanks to vast sacrifices, to the vast military, martial and civilian labor of the people, we won and gained the victory. So, here is the question: what have we lost from this victory, now? Nothing. Fascism was routed and we are not permitting its revival and I think that it will not revive, that everyone is interested in seeing that it does not revive. We saved our homeland, ensured its worthy existence. Now our task is to strengthen and develop it—which we link with perestroyka. So that I do not see, here, any losses in Paris or from other aspects of our policy.

Let us now take up what Sergey Ivanovich says. After the war we created a system for our security and the basis for this system then was the presence of our troops in the center of Europe, on the territory of the GDR and a number of other countries. We also saw the basis of our security in the fact that socialist regimes arose in a number of countries which were our allies and entered the Warsaw Pact. That was our security system.

Has anything changed since then? Yes, undoubtedly, because the GDR has ceased to exist. The regimes in the East European countries have changed and our troops are also gradually leaving. I understand that Sergey Ivanovich could understand this process as a retreat by us. But let us examine this again. Well, first of all, let us take these socialist regimes which were created. Were these regimes the result of the choice of the people? That is a question which arises immediately. No, because the regimes which arose at first in 1945 and 1946 were as a rule pluralistic regimes based on the alliance of some leftwing or democratic forces with the participation of centrists. Then they were transformed practically into one-party systems, copying our administrative-bureaucratic system. It was at times not without aid from us and pressure, even, from us that this took place.

[Zorin] To put it mildly.

[Zagladin] Yes, to put it mildly. Well, was this in accord with our principles? No, these actions were contrary to our own principles. The development of these countries which was linked with the same difficulties which we came up against, ourselves, in the final pre-perestroyka years led to crisis situations arising in all of them. They underwent our illnesses, they suffered our illnesses. The regimes which existed were unable to find a change of direction, or find the path to reforms and to changes which would have created a situation which was favorable for the people. People's trust in these regimes was undermined and the first free elections which took place in those countries almost everywhere led to the defeat of the ruling communist parties. Well, do we feel sorry about this? Of course, of course we do. So should we have interfered? Sent in troops? Have a repeat of Czechoslovakia or Hungary?

If we proclaimed freedom for our own people and freedom for our people to choose their own path as a principle—and this principle is in accord with Leninist principles and the principles of October—we should not have violated it over and over again and given all peoples the opportunity of living as they wished. We are now constructing new relations with them, relations based on a free choice of these relations on their developing along a new path. Are we weakening our positions as a result of this? No, we are not because any natural link, any natural alliance is much stronger than an alliance based on force or on the result of the use of force or violence.

Now the GDR; there was a quite specific question. I would like to remind you that right from the start of the war our side proclaimed that we were not waging war against the German people or against Germany as a country. There was the well-known phrase of Stalin's that Hitler can come and go but the German people, the German state remains. That was a credo. After the war, too, at Potsdam and later we came out for Germany being united. We understood very well and the Stalinist leadership understood it. Later, up until 1957 we proposed....

[Zorin, interrupting] Vadim Valentinovich, but Stalin often said one thing and acted quite differently.

[Zagladin] That is true, but the official position was as I said, and that position was correct. Why? Because we understand very well that splitting up a great nation, splitting up a great country into parts is in itself a source, and cannot fail to be a source, of crisis. Imagine if Moscow and Leningrad were separated and two states were created. Would that be a source of peace and stability? Quite the opposite. The same thing happened in Germany. Therefore, they came out for the unity of Germany. That unity has now been recreated. We are sorry that the GDR does not exist. Well, we are sorry since it was a state which had the chance to develop but did not make use of it.

[Zhurkin] Vadim Valentinovich, the majority of the population of the GDR are not sorry. One must go by them. It is their right to decide.

[Zagladin] Quite right. It is their right to decide and it is very important that this display of the will of the people of the GDR and the people of the FRG, together, took place in peaceful conditions, with the agreement of all European countries and not only European ones but also the United States. That is, the process of unification, itself, was, I would say, a sign of the new Europe which Andrey Serafimovich spoke about.

[Zorin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, I would like to respond to your remark. As the saying goes: Evening has not yet come. As far as concerns the population of the GDR, let us not be too hasty with our conclusions. Let us see how things develop and what the mood will be. The initial euphoria is one thing, but let us see how things develop. There is no need to be hasty.

[Zhurkin] Valentin Sergeyevich, all the same one must look truth in the eyes. The respectable political forces which were friendly to us and which we took our bearings from in those countries have, in general, today been swept from the political arena. It seems to me to say that in a year or two when the initial euphoria passes they will start....

[Zorin] I did not say in a year or two.

[Zhurkin continuing] ...to be restored. Well, on the level of such great political perspectives, I am prepared to speak about the 21st Century with you.

[Grachev] All the same, let us not just speak but perhaps debate it a little. You know the phrase "evening has not yet come" can be understood in two ways. I think that not only has evening really come for a certain type of regimes both in Eastern Europe and, I hope, in our country, too, but the morning, too, has already arrived, thank God.

If we are speaking of the historic importance of the Paris meeting, then it consists precisely in being the morning of the new Europe. Therefore, I think the population—and all the same we should speak of the population not of the GDR but of Germany—has made its choice. This choice was confirmed by the recent elections which were, by the way, all-German elections which took place, and their results are well-known to you. The fact that this country will develop by resolving its own problems including its internal ones, problems which will be characteristic, perhaps, of its different parts, that is natural. In this case it is not for us to teach anyone at all how to exist without problems, at any events.

But I think that in any case it is important to proceed from the fact that at the present period, when the 20th Century is drawing to a close, we can no longer, we simply cannot afford politically, or intellectually, or economically to conceive of the question of our security as the sum total of territories we currently control—territories which, into the bargain, are not ours—or as the sum total of the troops we keep abroad or as the sum total of resources we spend on arms, contrary to what we can afford.

[Zagladin] I would like to continue this topic. It is precisely what I wanted to end on, but Andrey Serafimovich began this topic very well and I would like to continue it. Well, this security which, as I have already said at the beginning, was built on the presence of a regime and the introduction of our troops there. Indeed, it did seem as though all this was very well. As time passed the very presence of our troops there created growing difficulties for us. Andrey Serafimovich spoke of one country but I would like to speak of another. Well, imagine any country on the territory of which are foreign troops from wherever. It is tolerable, for a time.

[Zorin] Imagine, say, it were our own country.

[Zagladin] Yes, let us say ours.

[Zorin] Where, thank God, there are none.

[Zagladin] If these troops start making themselves at home there, after staying for a very long time, friction appears. Friction did begin to emerge with the local population because, after all, how long can you remain on the territory of an alien country? Andrey Serafimovich has already spoken of the economic aspects here. The other side of the coin—this era of tension that lasted for 40 years—well, one of its sources which springs from ideology is precisely the presence of our troops side by side with the troops of another country in the center of Europe.

Could it have, as it were, gone on for long, for any further period? No, because of political reasons and economic reasons and reasons of our security. This did not strengthen our security but, in the final analysis, began to undermine it. All in all we got ourselves in an impasse by 1985. This is because if we had continued this line further, of keeping other people's countries and keeping our troops in these countries then the country would have gone bust economically, while politically our relations with the rest of the world would have been growing worse all the time. We could not have allowed that.

It is a huge achievement of the new foreign policy and the new concept of security we have put forward that we have put an end to it and converted to a new concept of security, based not on confrontation but on partnership, not on a narrow concentration of everything that is connected with security based on huge military expenditures and deploying troops, but on a broad approach to security as a process of political trust, political interaction, encompassing not only the military sphere, but also the economic, ecological, and human rights sphere.

To put it more briefly, this new turnaround of ours made it possible for us to improve both our own situation and to improve relations with all the European countries without exception—and not just European countries—and to create preconditions for the Paris meeting. It should not be forgotten that Paris was after all our initiative. It was no coincidence but a logical continuation of this entire policy of ours.

[Zorin] This all sounds very convincing. I just have to admit that what I said this evening did not so much reflect my position as was thrown in to liven up the conversation.

But now I want to ask another question which I have also taken from the "Studio 9" mailbag. It comes up in a number of letters, and although it is approached in different ways, the essence boils down to this: Why have the capitalist countries, who for a long time were our enemies and hostile to us, now decided to help us actively, and not only politically but also materially? What lies behind this and how can it be explained? This obviously interests a lot of people now. Of course we are greateful for help. We gratefully hear reports of solidarity with us—although, to be honest, sometimes when you hear this it is a bit humiliating, and you feel a bit uneasy. Nevertheless, a lot of people are wondering what lies behind this and how it is to be explained. Vitaliy Vladimirovich, will you have a go at tackling this question?

[Zhurkin] Well, Valentin Sergeyevich, it seems to me that first of all we have to begin from afar and from near, from the simple fact that the struggle we waged against these capitalist countries for decades, and which they waged against us for decades, ended with them having all-around prosperity, a good material situation. The terrible crises that they had before were behind them, and we have empty shelves in the shops.

[Grachev] A crisis of overproduction.

[Zhurkin] Yes, namely overproduction. A U.S. economist speaking in Congress actually said that there are two systems in the world: In one system there are a lot of goods, and people have comparatively little money. In the other system the people have a lot of money, but there are no goods. The result is the same: Goods do not reach the customers. He pointed his finger at himself, too. So that means that after all there are objective bases. It is impossible to replay the situation in a different direction. But I imagine... I would like the comrades who asked these questions.... They are reasonable questions. It is part of life. I asked myself: Suppose it had turned out the other way around, if we had prosperity, and let us say in France and Germany the shops were empty. Would these comrades, and you and I, have refused to help these countries for humanitarian reasons? So the first motive I think we should mention is a purely humanitarian, human motive, which is inherent in people as social beings.

[Zorin] But there are people here who out of habit see intrigues behind this.

[Zhurkin] Valentin Sergeyevich, I personally do not see any intrigues here but there are calculations and I would like to talk about them. It seems to me that we need to have an emotional and a rational attitude to these questions. Where are the calculations? It seems to me that the main calculation, or the main rational reason, is that people in the world are afraid of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, chaos in our country which has nuclear arms. They would like—many of them on (?rational) grounds, and on ideological ones at all—to do everything possible to prevent this, so that the Soviet Union can pass less painfully through this difficult period it is now experiencing.

It seems to me, too, that there is a third purely personal motive. Somehow we do not like talking about this subject, but it is a fact: They are often giving help under this slogan too: Help for Gorbachev. This is part of today's political reality, too. Help for Gorbachev because they see in him a person who has brought peace to the world and to mankind, and for that reason they support him actively. I believe that it is a political tragedy on a huge scale, the gap existing in the perception of our president in the world, and the perception of him by some forces in our country. They regard Gorbachev as a person who, not always successfully—there is no politician in the world who always does everything successfully—often failing to get something done, but nevertheless as someone who is aiming at the stability of the country. Everyone wants stability in the Soviet Union. They see in his opposition political figures who, out of both good and bad intentions—they make a difference between them—are working against stability, whether they mean to or not.

For this reason this is an aspiration to help, not simply the Soviet people, not simply the Soviet Union, but a Soviet Union that is going through a very difficult period of perestroyka, and is entering the world community, and to help the leader of this perestroyka. Actually there is another factor that I think we should mention openly. Quite often in a lot of discussions Western politicians say: We see other political figures in the Soviet Union but we know one thing—that Gorbachev is at the pinnacle of power and he started this perestroyka. Namely, he has been tested. Not one of the figures coming out against him has ever been in the same situation, where they could have made cosmetic changes to the existing

regime, and being a dynamic figure would have been very popular, and could have carried on fine with slightly glorified stagnation for some time yet. Nevertheless, not one of the other political figures, other than political slogans, declarations, proposals, demands—they say this very nicely in the West, very well—none of them have passed through the test of this temptation. He is the only one who has passed it.

Of course there is a hidden reproach in this question. Well, to put it bluntly: Are they not buying us off? Is the struggle not waged against us by political, military, and ideological means—incidentally, we gave as good as we got, and waged the struggle by the same means—do they not now want to achieve the same aims but by more noble means?

[Zagladin] Vitaliy Vladimirovich, I have received several letters from various listeners, various people in our Soviet Union, asking this blunt question: do you not think that the West's support for the Soviet Union and its leadership is an expression of the desire to direct the USSR onto thue path of development of capitalism? There is not just one, but several such letters, and this is also a reality which... in the West, even, in general, sensible politicans do not think like that, but in our country there are some people who come to this conclusion.

[Zhurkin] Vadim Valentinovich, I would also approach this question, but from a somewhat different angle. It seems to me that there are not enough resources in the whole world, among the whole of mankind, in order to, putting it crudely, rescue us. It is possible to help, it is possible to render some percentage of assistance, but in such a vast country, one of 300 million people, the world cannot maintain such a program of the kind of aid which would on its own lead to any radical changes.

[Zorin] There is no such buyer!

[Zhurkin] And never will be! [words indistinct] That is, we can help ourselves, and I think everyone understands this. But some kind of (?marginal) help, especially in a difficult period, can, I think, be a great positive influence, of course, and we should be grateful for it.

[Grachev] I would like to return to the original formulation of the question, because if you take as the starting point that in fact those who were recently our enemies, or opponents, have suddenly become our friends, then indeed you may get nowhere. But it is worth thinking, were we really genuine enemies, foes? Was there not, on both sides... because if we accept this position, then in just the same way we will have to accept the position of those who also considered the Soviet Union to be a threat to Europe, and evil empire. Because you must not forget that to a considerable degree, the policy, on both sides, I think, was based on production of enemies, on seeing in one's partner, something which the countries of East and West continued to be to a considerable extent for many years after the war, on viewing them as forces which were threatening and hostile to one another, and quite simply because this brought both political and economic dividends for many. It is not for nothing that there are forces at the moment, both in the West and, regrettably, in the East, too, which regret the passing of those times, when we did have an enemy, when everything was clear, and when, relaying on the fact that we were in hostile encirclement, we were in a besieged camp, it was possible to....

[Zagladin] Clamp down....

[Grachev] Quite so, to clamp down internally, and incidentally, to explain away every situation, the inexplicable and completely unjustified situation—the deprivations, the economic ruin, and all our other failures.

[Zagladin] In fact, let us return to our original theme, concerning the ideological confrontation. The thinking was, in practice this: if you do not share my ideas, then you are my enemy that I should destroy, if you do not give in, according to the well-known formula.

[Zhurkin] I would just like to say that it is precisely these forces which do not support at all the program for aid to the Soviet union. They are active opponents of this, and come out quite clearly against it. Well, at the moment I am talking about the other side. There, they do not support it, they have an interest in the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

[Grachev] As for aid, let us really look at things without ideological blinkers, without prejudice. You know, if a neighbor, seeing that you have found yourself in a difficult, desperate situation, you have lost everything in a fire or whatever, decides to come to your aid, and you start looking at him suspiciously, nevertheless, and thinking: what has he got up his sleeve?, the paradox of it is that perhaps many people in the West and in Europe have really adopted more promptly than we have the philosophy of the common European home. Neighbors, just think, must come to one another aid.

[Zagladin] Well, I can add to this that I have recently had occasion to travel around various countries quite a lot, just last week I returned from the Netherlands in connection with the problem of aid, in fact, the aid which our Netherlands partners are voluntarily giving us, gratis; first and foremost this aid will be given to citizens of our country who have a living standard or income lower than is necessary for a normal life, and, naturally, the question of why they are doing this kept coming up, and I was asking it myself, or they said it themselves, or the journalists were asking, and so on, and what they say is this: in the first place, we have realized that everything has changed in Europe and the position of our country, the Netherlands, has changed for the better because your policy has changed, because Gorbachev has proffered the new thinking, which we share, we agree with. Second, we want to come to your aid because we need you, you, the Soviet union, are necessary to us, Europe, necessary in order for Europe to develop as a unified, organic whole. You are part of Europe, you cannot get away from us. On the other hand, if you were artificially to be split away,

then the whole of Europe would suffer. As for the fact, as Vitaliy Vladimirovich was saying, that Europe needs a solid, unified Soviet Union, this is stated plainly, for all to hear.

Moreover, I can say that during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Italy, Andrey Serafimovich and I were there together, as well, at the news conference there after the talks, the spokesman for the Italian side, (Mastrubovini), said that the Italian republic has an interest in a unified union, it is against all kinds of separatist tendencies, because, in the final analysis, the whole of Europe is moving toward unity, the whole of Europe is moving toward a common home, and these tendencies run counter not only to the interests of the Soviet peoples, but also those of the rest of Europe.

Inally, there is this reason, which is stated particularly by people from the business world, but by politicians as well: You are experiencing difficulties at the moment, but who has not had difficulties? French bankers were telling me, literally two days ago, that: in France, too, we suffered these difficulties, the times after the war were very difficult for us. In Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, times were difficult everywhere, but they passed. Not one of these countries possessed such potential as the Soviet Union. We are convinced that the period will pass, that you will mobilize your potential, and we want to help you to mobilize it, because that is to our advantage, as well. That is, there are many motivations. The fact that there are certain people who would like to pursue their egotistic aims, well, of course, they exist everywhere, they have them there, we have them here, and there are also those who hope that we may take that path, but that it is a quite natural matter, the world has only just entered a new era, there are still, too, many people who live by yesterday's yardsticks, in our country as well, sad to say.

[Zorin] I think that of course we have to take into account what you said, Vadim Valentinovich, but the excessive suspicion that we sometimes show also comes, so to say, from our old education. From our old education. I want to put forward another question for us to discuss, connected with the Paris conference. I have had occasion to raise it on several television programs, but I think it is worth continuing to discuss it.

The Paris conference—this has been said several times—is among the historic events like the Congress of Vienna of 1815, which summed up the results of the Napoleonic Wars, then Versailles which redrew the map of Europe after World War I, and Yalta and Potsdam which determined the face of Europe after World War II. But look at what is special about Paris: Vienna and Versailles and Yalta and Potsdam were the results of war, when there were victors and vanquished; the victors had the force with which they foisted their peace conditions on the vanquished. Paris was the result of a five-year peace process, a process where there were neither victors nor vanquished, and consequently for the Paris decisions since there were no victors, there is no force factor, there is no factor with which anyone could impose the conditions or the agreements that were adopted. "Naturally the conclusions arising are not simply philosophical ones, they are very practical ones, affecting all of us: how then are the implementation of the decisions taken in Paris and their reliability to be guaranteed, if they are reliable at all? Andrey Serafimovich, what do you think?

[Grachev] You know, Valentin Sergeyeyevich, history teaches us—besides the fact that it teaches us nothing, as they say....

[Zagladin] No, apart from the fact that no one wants to learn from it....

[Grachev] Yes, well that is precisely what it teaches.... It shows that a peace built through force is a very conditional peace, and most usually not a longlasting one.

[Zorin] You said not longlasting, but the Congress of Vienna, the decisions of the congress of Vienna, remained in force for 100 years.

[Grachev] Well, fine. Let us leave the Congress of Vienna to the last century, but if you take the Treaty of Versailles, the Versailles system laid the basis for the second world conflict, and in the final resort World War II grew out of it.

I think that if the Paris conference enters history, which I am convinced it will, it is precisely because it stated the fact that peace can only be built by peaceful means, certainly not by using force as a lever.

Another aspect: many of the examples mentioned here boil down to this: strengthening what has been achieved, freezing the situation. I think the idea of Paris was not that, but to start a process, or more than that, to encourage a process. It was not for nothing that it was said in Paris that the idea of the Paris meeting was to catch up with the time, and if successful to try to stand at the head of these political processes which, one way or another, are taking place naturally in Europe, thanks to the Helsinki years which incidentally, stretch considerably further than their five-year period, and thanks to our perestroyka.

If we are to speak of the quarantees of its viability—to use a Paris expression—I would name several of them. For my part they include, of course, the need to maintain the momentum, that is to say to move along with the natural development of both the world and the situation in Europe. From this point of view, of course, the agreements reached in Paris are a starting point, the point of departure in order to move forward both on questions of disarmament, and on guaranteeing security. The results of the disarmament talks reached so far can certainly not be considered definitive. Indeed, I consider that at a later stage of this process we have the right to expect the West to synchronize its speed with our movement, because it seems to me that in this respect we have already exhausted our capabilities of outstripping the

West, goading it on, pulling it after us because now it is the turn of weapons which cause us concern.

[Zagladin] And not only weapons, Andrey Serafimovich. If you look at ... you have raised a very important subject, really, which immediately (?comes to) (?this conclusion). Well, take something like this. The Warsaw Pact is disappearing: As a military organization it practically no longer exists, but the military organization [as heard] is being maintained. Why? Very many people ask me during all sorts of meetings they ask this question: Why, on what grounds? For the basis for the blocs, that's to say, confrontation, has disappeared. Well, alliances, treaties (?that they should exist) is natural, political agreement is natural. But what is a military alliance for? They say that stability has to be preserved in Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union, but forgive me, that isn't NATO's affair. It's not very likely that the NATO leaders will want to get involved in the policing game on a European scale. That's not what it's about. They even say that NATO should turn its attention to the motive forces of instability in other areas of the world. But NATO has its own sphere of activity defined by treaty. But other countries of the world have their own states which have an interest in maintaining stability. In Europe that's actually what was discussed at Paris.

Other parts of the world have their own organizations. Furthermore there is the United Nations, which has the duty of seeing to this on a world scale.

Or the bases around our country. As long as Malta, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev gave President Bush a map of the U.S. bases around the Soviet Union. Not just anywhere in the world, but round us. And asked: how far does this map accord with reality? The president quite quickly said: Yes, in general it does. Well, fine, but what are bases for if we have stopped being enemies?

So such questions do exist, and it seems to me that from the point of view of our state interests, the continuation of talks on disarmament, (?naval) disarmament, let's say, is an essential condition for our state interests to be strengthened, and in fact I think this will be in the general interests of the Europeans and the Americans themselves, so your question was (?relevant).

[Grachev] And NATO itself, it seems to me, with all the understandable alienation which no doubt exists in the evolution of that alliance with respect to the Warsaw Pact, certainly cannot remain as it was.

[Zhurkin] Andrey Serafimovich, indeed, NATO not only cannot remain as it was, but NATO is beginning to transform itself. The first attempts to transform the strategy of NATO are now being made. Look, a reduction in Armed Forces by virtually all members of NATO is now taking place, though admittedly it is one that might not be to our satisfaction insofar as its size is concerned.

[Grachev] In questions of security, of course, one has to proceed from the fact that we are talking about a process, a process which not only cannot be frozen or fixed at the level that has been reached, but which moreover has to be continued without fail.

The second point, the second set of issues which I would include in the guarantee that the Paris accords will survive is the thing that we in fact started with, that we should not go into euphoria, we should not think that we have supposedly resolved the main or removed the pressure from the main hotbeds of European conflict and European tension by resolving a number of global and major issues, issues of historic importance, of course. The paradox, you know, might amount to this: that having started to build a European future we might find ourselves in a European past, to be precise in a pre-nuclear past. Now that the threat of a nuclear conflict between the great powers has apparently been removed, we might find ourselves faced with the threat of conflicts that might arise upon grounds of nationalism, extremism, separatist currents of various kinds, and even nonmilitary aspects of the situation, economic inequality. If the European East becomes the European South and if the problem changes from being one of East-West conflict into one of North-South conflict, but within the dimensions of the continent of Europe—with all the processes of instability and with the crisis which is now effectively characteristic of the situation in all East European countries—then this can indeed become a source of serious instability, tension, and even of threat to security. At any rate, this is what the West perceives.

The third point, I think, concerns us to a considerable extent. Perhaps this is yet another of the explanations of why the West is so interested now in giving us support in helping us to get through our present phase of crisis safely both for ourselves and for them.

This is the question of how we are going to get out of our political and economic crisis. Will we not have a paradox whereby having cleared the minefields, so to speak, on the external front in the East-West conflict, we will transfer the clarification of these relationships into our own country? I am thinking of the conflict between communism and capitalism: what if it now began to take on dangerous forms in our country? This, too, is understood in the West. I do not think that everyone in our country understands it fully, particularly those who operate quite easily by threatening each other, so to speak, with internal political arguments and the threat of civil war. It is a question of our responsibility, not just to ourselves and to our peoples, but to the whole world, a responsibility which we took upon ourselves when we began these historic and beneficial changes and a responsibility which continues to be with us, because perestroyka has to remain a stabilzing factor, one that eases the international situation: under no circumstances must it be one that increases tension in it.

[Zorin] Andrey Serafimovich, you have said and you have stressed once again that we have no grounds for

giving in to euphoria, you have mentioned the dangers of the situation and that is a realistic view of the situation. In this connection the question arises—Vitaliy Vladimirovich, I would like to put it to you—that there are indeed factors of instability, destabilizing factors, within the country: and let us be realists and speak in direct terms—not everything is going smoothly either in Europe—both in East Europe and not just there, and taking all of this into consideration do the decisions that have been adopted and the agreements that have been adopted in Paris have a long life ahead of them in your opinion?

[Zhurkin] Valentin Sergeyevich, we began our discussion by saying that the answers, the fine detail will be filled in by history, the answers to everything will be provided by history. But if one is to talk about my personal opinion I consider that, yes, they do have a long life ahead of them, and in support of this I would like to advance a number of arguments. First of all both history and the past speak in favor of this. After all, the history of the Paris meeting itself goes back 15 years durings which this new stage was taking shape and those 15 years passed successfully.

[Zagladin] But they were not even....

[Zhurkin] But they were very... I am talking about the overall balance, Vadim Valentinovich, I am talking about the result, although they were very uneven and overall, of course, the first period of the Helsinki process was very difficult, that is a fact. Nevertheless we do have Paris. It seems to me that we also have to take into consideration the fact that there are no major political forces in Europe today which would oppose this process, because all the main political forces—even those struggling against each other in certain other dimensions and in other parameters—have accepted Paris and are willing to enter this new period of history.

Now about the problems. There have been problems in Europe, there are problems and there are going to be problems. They are going to transform themselves, old problems will acquire some new kind of aspect, but nevertheless I think—and I cannot help going back to the point where we started—I think that these problems in their sharpness, in their scale and in what is the main thing, their possible consequences, are nevertheless an order of magnitude lower and an order of magnitude less dangerous than the threat of war, the threat of nuclear war, and the threat of an enormous confrontation that we are moving away from.

But there is one problem which it seems to me personally is capable of upsetting this process. This is the uncontrolled and negative development of processes in the Soviet Union, because if things do not go well in our country and the process of disintegration begins, then of course this will be reflected not just upon Europe but upon life as a whole throughout our planet. And here I would like... for some reason or other we do not have much pluralism here today but a great deal of agreement, well that is how it is, we are indeed talking about a great event in European history, I agree with that. But I would like to get back to what Andrey Serafimovich said today we bear a responsibility not just to our country, not only to the future generations which will live in this vast territory, but to the whole of mankind, too.

[Zagladin] I think we should add two somewhat more philosophical considerations to what Vitaliy Vladimirovich said. I think that the new European order which was born in Paris has a chance of being longlasting and stable and of developing. First, because in Paris all those attending came having realized that there is no other way but to remove the military threat to ensure the physical survival of mankind. This awareness was strengthened by Paris. This awareness will go on being there. Even in their reaction to various international events— like the Persian crisis, the crisis in the Gulf—show that the majority of Europeans, and not only of Europeans, have this awareness. This is already a good basis for the future.

A second element is the fact that they are aware (?in general) of the other side of the matter. There exists a mass of problems which probably truly threatens us less directly than wear, as Vitaliy Vladimirovich said, but which are very dangerous. Let us take ecology, too. According to scientists, both ours and U.S. ones, the biosphere has reached such a stage of development when its last reserves are running out. It cannot reproduce itself or cure itself any more. This... the greatest awareness of this is in Europe, the developed countries, and the gradually developing ones, too. Here we need to be very strong to get out of this situation. We can only do this together. For this we need the common European process.

Recently Netherlands prime minister Lubbers, put forward a plan for the energy development of Europe as a whole, taking into account both the energy and the ecological aspects. So it is an important initiative.

But of course I fully agree there is nothing automatic about it. It is impossible to be a boundless optimist here and even less to be a fatalist. Everything depends on specific actions, on the continuation of a process—Andrey Serafimovich has already spoken about this, and to a huge extent indeed it depend on us. I am quite in agreement with that, although it would seem that pluralism is essential, but in this case it does not exist.

[Zorin] Well, let us try to draw some conclusions, since our time is coming to a end. Well, of course in our conversation today we did not touch on, and could not touch on, some important aspects, but we shall return to this problem many times, but what we spoke about today shows that we have all witnessed an event of truly immense significance, which on the one hand summed up a whole period of history, and on the other hand was the beginning of a completely new period in international relations. If we are to speak not of the future, but of today, of the fact that the peoples, including we Soviet people, have already had results from Paris, I would

stress the main thing: the sword of the immense military, fearful, catastrophic, military danger that has been hanging over our heads for 45 years has been removed. Of course the military danger still exists, and this threat is there, but what we lived through throughout the whole postwar period is receding into history before our very eyes, and this, really, is the main result of the Paris conference.

On that I will end our talk today. It remains for me to thank my colleagues who took part, to thank you, comrade viewers, for your attention, and say goodbye until we meet again in this studio. Thank you.

Seminar Views Warfare's Humanitarian Aspects

PM1312164790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Dec 90 First Edition p 7

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel I. Yesyutin: "Seminar on Humanitarian Law"]

[Text] "Humanization of combat operations," "Tactics and international law," "Protection of the civilian population in time of war...." These and some other combinations of words, which were heard yesterday in one of the lecture rooms of the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, struck many people as unusual. Problems of implementing the norms of international humanitarian law in troops' practical activity were examined for the first time at a seminar of Soviet Armed Forces leading personnel with the participation of representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Institute of Humanitarian Law.

It is well known that last year our country ratified the Supplementary Protocols to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims. The USSR minister of defense said that he would be guided by those documents. The norms of international humanitarian law must now be taken into account by a commander when planning an operation, by a commanding officer when assessing a situation, by a soldier in specific battlefield situations.... These documents' requirements must also be reflected in the drafting of legislative acts and general military regulations and in the preparation of orders and directives.

The seminar was addressed by representatives of the Executive Committee of the Union of USSR Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The results of the seminar were summed up by Colonel General B. Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

WFTU Congress Final Report, Elections

914F0054A Moscow TRUD in Russian 23 Nov 90 p 3

[Report by R. Puchkov: "To Be and Serve the Working People: 12th World Trade Union Congress, the Last Day" published under the "Pulse of the Planet" rubric]

[Text] Sentence on the question: To be or not to be for the WFTU [World Federation of Trade Unions], has been passed. The congress gave an unequivocal answer: There will be a federation, and it will continue to serve the working people on the basis of renewed principles of action, expanded dialogue, and revised structures.

It is notable that this answer was heard on behalf of 405 million members of trade unions, approximately half of whom belong to organizations which are not a part of the WFTU. "An effective class-based organization with a political orientation"—this is how the federation is seen by C. Cameron, leader of one of Britain's trade unions, which, as is known, are not members of the WFTU. "The transnational corporations would be very happy if the WFTU disappeared," he added. "But, to judge by the course of the congress, they will hardly live to see this. The WFTU needs only to act more vigorously."

Opinions to the effect that the disappearance of the WFTU would only increase the monopolization in the international trade union movement and limit freedom of choice for the members of the unions and their organizations was clearly seen in the speeches of the conferees and in conversation with them in the lobbies. Even the mere fact of the existence of the WFTU, I was told, forces the other world trade union centers to lend an attentive ear to the needs of the working people and struggle more energetically for their interests.

Summary reports on the work of the various commissions were heard at a concluding plenary meeting. Our newspaper has already reported on their activity, and for this reason I would note merely that the commissions' conclusions contain much that is entirely new. For example, the system of command-bureaucratic socialism also was cited as being among the culprits of the calamitous situation of the working people in addition to the customary transnational corporation and the governments of a number of developing countries directing the economy ineptly.

The congress adopted 36 documents altogether—messages, appeals, resolutions. Some of them have already been mentioned in TRUD. It should be noted that the majority concern situations at "flash points" of the planet and the position of the working people there. They were drawn up with regard for different viewpoints. Thus the "No to War—In Favor of a Peaceful Settlement of the Persian Gulf Conflict" resolution on the one hand demands the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and on the other rejects the possibility of the use of a "food war" against Iraq since it would be turned primarily against the working people of this country.

The congress adopted a "Message of Solidarity to Soviet Working People and Trade Unions" (it is carried on the front page).

In the "Appeal to the Working People and Unions of the World" the participants in the 12th WFTU Congress stated their belief that the unions, as organizations of the democratic expression of the working people, should play an irreplaceable part in the changes which should be accomplished in the modern world.

We all, the appeal says, have welcomed the positive trends in international relations toward substitution for the policy of confrontation between the superpowers by a growing recognition of the need for international cooperation. In this connection democracy and human rights, the full participation of working people and their organizations, and also the right of all nations, large and small, to freely choose their own form of development should be generally recognized principles. Only the working people's joint actions with other public organizations can guarantee a peaceful solution of the continuing conflicts in a number of regions.

The working people and the unions, the appeal emphasizes, must step up the struggle for satisfaction of their demands for an improvement in the working people's living conditions and in defense of their rights; and increase their actions for ensuring supervision of the arbitrary activity of big capital and the monopolies and also the transnational corporation in each country. It is essential to develop on this basis the international solidarity of all working people and unions of the world.

An important instrument of the achievement of these goals is extensive, open, and constructive dialogue between different detachments of the international trade union movement. This dialogue should be developed without any prior conditions on the basis of mutual respect excluding any interference and contributing to exchange and cooperation on a basis of tolerance. The congress advocated unity of action with the participation of all interested forces, particularly the three international trade union centers—the ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions], WCL [World Confederation of Labor] and WFTU—and also numerous organizations without an international affiliation.

The "Declaration of Trade Union Solidarity" was one further important document adopted at the congress. It notes that the congress itself was a powerful expression of human solidarity transcending national borders and ideological, religious, or political differences. The congress declared its profound conviction that the international solidarity of the working people, as a most important singularity of the trade union movement throughout its history, is needed today more than ever.

The international solidarity of the working people, like their unity of action also, is essential for the consolidation of peace, disarmament, and conversion in the interests of the working people, victory over poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy, for the establishment of a new economic order, decisive defense of human and trade union rights, and for the achievement of all other goals set by the world trade union movement.

The final meeting within the framework of the congress of delegations representing the unions which are members of the WFTU was held yesterday. It confirmed the admittance to the WFTU of 14 new members, approved the report of the auditing commission, and elected the new WFTU General Council. The main document of the congress "Trade Union Strategy for the 1990's. Democratic Alternative in the Interests of the Working People and Mankind Through Trade Union Dialogue and Action" was then confirmed. Amendments to the WFTU Charter, which concerned primarily changes to the concept of its actions in connection with the end of the "cold war," and also the creation of new structures, in individual regions in particular, were also approved. A presidential council will henceforward be a directive body of the WFTU. A president of the federation, vice presidents from various regions of the world, a general secretary, his deputy, and secretaries of the WFTU were elected at a session of the new WFTU General Council. Ibrahim Zakharia is president of the WFTU, A.N. Zharikov, general secretary.

Brief closing speeches were delivered at the final plenary meeting of the congress by V.P. Shcherbakov, a vice president of the WFTU from European trade unions, and WFTU President I. Zakharia, who declared the international trade union forum closed.

A meeting was held between I. Zakharia, V.P. Shcherbakov, A.N. Zharikov, and A. Stern, deputy general secretary of the WFTU, and Soviet and foreign journalists. Numerous questions were put to the WFTU leaders.

Answering one, I. Zakharia emphasized that the WFTU was today ready in the interests of defending the working people's interests to sit down at the negotiating table with the other world trade union centers—the ICFTU and the WCL—whenever and wherever they pleased. A. Zharikov specified that the WFTU and the ICFTU were not absolutely divided and non-contact-making trade union centers. They cooperate within the framework of the International Labor Organization. The congress just ended was itself an example of the participation of organizations which are members of the ICFTU and the WCL in an undertaking organized by the WFTU. It is a question of fuller, more active cooperation in mutual interests.

V. Shcherbakov observed that the renewal of the WFTU would be judged, of course, not by documents but by its deeds. So the federation had now been granted a large advance payment. According to him, much will depend also on the progress of perestroyka and the renewal of the Soviet trade unions, which, as is known, constitute a substantial detachment in the ranks of the WFTU. A. Stern dwelt on the significance of the current European

settlement for the international trade union movement. Comprehensive answers were given to other questions also.

Europe 'Balkanization' Fears Voiced

PM0412123390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Nov 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "Light and Shades"]

[Text] The funeral of the "cold war" conducted in Paris recently by the participants in the all-European process undoubtedly deserves the sonorous epithets bestowed on that event. But in my opinion it is premature to consider that without the "iron curtain" which used to divide the continent into East and West the European horizons will immediately become cloudless. Bloc antagonism could be replaced by different dangers which should not be ignored.

Since the time of October European history has been tinged with ideological intolerance. From the "cordon sanitaire" once erected along Soviet borders to the Berlin wall, from the "Truman doctrine" to the "Brezhnev doctrine," there have been constant attempts to block a different social system and consign it to the garbage heap of history. The futility of these illusions would seem to have been realized.

But the clouds are gathering again on the horizon. Having begun to move toward the Europe of the future, there is a danger of finding ourselves in its prewar past. That was darkened by the interethnic hostility and economic strip farming of a "Balkanized" continent. Instead of antagonism between East and West, Europe could be divided by different antagonisms—along North-South lines. Even in the united Germany the inhabitants of the former GDR are starting to be viewed as a colonial workforce, as "second-class Germans."

Warnings on this score were already heard in Paris. "New socioeconomic gulfs should not yawn to take the place of the ideological ditches which have been overcome," said FRG Chancellor Kohl. "Unless economic and technological reunification take over from ideological division, what will we gain?" French President Mitterrand asked rhetorically.

The transition of the Soviet Union and the East European countries to political pluralism, a mixed economy, and market relations and their growth into the European organization are a complex process. It will be fruitful only with an understanding of two realities of the world today. First, of the multiformity of sociopolitical development, without a respect for which freedom of choice is devalued. Second, of the need for partnership, the need to adapt to each other, which is incompatible with national egotism and the provincialism of isolation. To ignore multiformity, to try to impose a specific way of life as a condition for cooperation, USSR President Gorbachev noted at the all-European conference, means giving rise to suspicion and distrust. While bellicose nationalism and heedless separatism are fraught with the danger of conflicts and hostility, of the "Balkanization" and, worse, the "Lebanonization" of whole regions.

At the meeting of six left-wing parties in Moscow recently one more term was heard: "Latin Americanization." It was said that the difficulties of the transitional period in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states could isolate them from the integration processes that are gathering momentum. That would turn the Eastern part of Europe into the continent's economic backyard, a market for the sale of second-rate goods, and a permanent debtor—in brief, into a subject of neocolonialism. As a result the region once called the powder keg of Europe could become even more dangerous to world peace.

So after the funeral of the "cold war" other dangers have moved to the fore. They can be neutralized only by preserving the universality of the all-European process, by preventing any discrimination and contrasts between oases of prosperity and zones of recession.

The universality of the CSCE process is important on both the regional and the global plane. As UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar put it, this process is transcontinental. Not only because nearly one quarter of the world's states with a population of over one billion are taking part in it. Thanks to the USSR and the United States the Helsinki process goes beyond the geographical framework of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It essentially encompasses the entire northern hemisphere from Kamchatka to Alaska. Europe has become for mankind the main testing ground of political and military detente and the creation of collective forms of security. But the European system of security and cooperation cannot be closed. It should be linked with similar structures in other parts of the world. If we rightly think of Euro-America, which essentially is what the CSCE embodies, then we cannot forget Euro-Asia either. For the Soviet Union the European salient is naturally linked to policy in the Asian and Pacific region. This global approach is also important for the success of the Helsinki process itself.

Use of European Security Model in Asia Viewed

SK2911014690 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 24 Nov 90

[Text] Following the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] which was held in Paris with heads of state and government from 34 European countries attending, energetic debates on regional security matters were heard even in Asia, on the other side of our planet.

Commenting on this, station commentator Aleksey Nikolayev wrote the following:

Thanks to joint efforts by many countries, the example set by Europe which brought an end to the cold war has

clearly begun influencing Asia as well. Things could not be any other way, in today's world where the fate of people in many countries are so closely interwoven.

It is really different, that one has to take into consideration one's own uniqueness while at the same time paying attention to the experiences of other people. It is widely known that the Soviet Union, which called for a collective discussion of such issues as security, confidence, and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific four years ago, opposes a blind emulation of the European model.

Nevertheless, we believe that the example set by Europe can be accepted for planning purposes. Of course, lip service alone on the need to use Europe's guiding example convinces no one in Asia. It is far easier to understand it than to put it into effect. In this case, I can cite as an example the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have declared an end to their confrontation in Asia.

It is no secret that this fact has generated not only all the affirmative elements that influence the atmosphere of this region, but also some embarrassing ones. Since the so-called military threat from the Soviet Union—the excuse under which the United States has been defending its troops stationed in this region—has disappeared, there is no need to keep U.S. troops in this region.

On the other hand, if U.S. troops withdraw, will there not be (?progress) for security in this region? For one reason or another, the U.S. troops refuse to leave this region. Their explanation for their position is another thing.

At this juncture, I would like to say that I cannot agree to the U.S. view that only U.S. troops can guarantee security in Asia and the Pacific, especially because other countries in this region also are engaged in beefing up their defense capabilities. Although such a tendency raises the level of militarization in Asia and the Pacific, the sense of stronger stability has not (?grown accordingly).

Then, would it not be wiser for all the parties concerned to discuss ways to strengthen stability as a whole, based on their common effort? One of the proposals advanced by Moscow in this regard is to hold a meeting of the Asian countries' foreign ministers in Vladivostok in 1993.

This meeting could be attended by the foreign ministers of all the countries that want to participate. There can, of course, be some other proposals, like an Asia-initiated conference.

The security structure in Europe has been built with difficulty, one step at a time. The Helsinki process in Asia may take much longer to become effective than in Europe. It is about time to put this process in motion, however.

Station commentator Aleksey Nikolayev wrote: To speak of Asia's uniqueness, we should think about whether we need to repeat what others have experienced in order to prove that later we can live without such things as weapons stockpiles, stronger military alliances, and maintaining military bases in other countries. Europe has survived such an experience.

U.S. Military Intentions in E. Asia Queried

PM2611132590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by A. Golts "Observer's Notes": "Going Or Staying?"]

[Text] After the latest round of talks on bases Philippine Foreign Minister R. Manglapus said that the United States would be quitting six of its outposts in the country next year. It would also be leaving the enormous Clark Field airbase, which, according to Manglapus, will be converted into a major international airport.

Here we have another report—on the results of the U.S.-South Korean consultations, which took place in the Pentagon. They were also about the proposed reduction of the U.S. military presence. At the first stage 7,000 servicemen will be removed from the 42,000 strong grouping by 1993.

So Americans also intend to leave Asian countries, hard on the heels of the Soviet servicemen leaving Mongolia and Cam Ranh Bay, do they? But will they go? After all, the Pentagon intends to have the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines, which is a very important support center for the U.S. 7th Fleet, in the next century. A base which can accommodate an entire aircraft carrier group at its docks. A base which has stocks of all the requisite arms and equipment for a marine formation—from guns to canned food.

Moreover, the Pentagon has only just been authorized to use new military facilities in Southeast Asia. U.S. Vice President D. Quayle and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew signed a document that significantly expands the sphere of bilateral cooperation. Henceforth U.S. military aircraft will be able to spend several weeks a year at the island republic's airfields. U.S. warships will be authorized to increase the number of times they call and the duration of their stay at Singapore ports. At the same time, the number of U.S. servicemen in Singapore on a permanent basis will increase somewhat. One has to agree with the opinion of Japan's YOMIURI, which wrote that as a result of the agreement the United States is able to strengthen its control over the strategically important Strait of Malacca, which links the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

As for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, a "Treaty on support in the event of the commencement of hostilities on the territory of one of the sides" has already been devised and is ready for signing. It envisages the creation in the south of the Korean peninsula of

all the requisite conditions (siting of ammunition dumps and military hardware depots, creation of logistic support bases, and so on) for the rapid deployment of U.S. troops.

Thus, on the one hand, for economic reasons and also because of the altered situation in the region, the Pentagon is considerably reducing its, so to speak, physical presence. On the other hand, fully in line with the new concepts, it is creating throughout Asia the infrastructures that are required for the rapid deployment of military groupings.

At the same time, it has to be said that a significant number of countries in the region have been more positive than negative about the new options for U.S. military control. For instance, the leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore's neighbors, said that, in principle, they do not object to the agreement with the United States. The sole condition is that U.S. Armed Forces should not be deployed in Singapore on a permanent basis. After all, the appearance of new U.S. bases would nullify the ASEAN countries' idea of creating a peace zone in Southeast Asia.

The long years of U.S. military hegemony in the region have given the leaders of a number of countries the feeling that U.S. might guarantees stability. They are frightened lest the Americans' departure create a "power vacuum" and result in regional conflicts. Washington is encouraging this mood in its own interests.

United States & Canada

Army Paper Hails Houston, Washington Talks

PM1712152390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Dec 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by observer Manki Ponomarev under the rubric: "World Today: Problems and Views": "USSR-United States: Dynamism and Openness"]

[Text] A top-level meeting will take place in Moscow 11-13 February 1991 between USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and U.S. President G. Bush. An accord to this effect was reached at the talks which USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze had in Houston and Washington.

First of all, I will venture to cite from the annual report of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University (United States): "Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the two countries' discussions of questions relating to the military sphere and to arms control are characterized by a new dynamism and openness."

In what way did that statement attract attention? Because it reflects in an aphoristic manner what is probably most important in relations between the two great powers. With, in my view, just one obligatory addition: Dynamism and openness today characterize the two countries' policies not only in the military sphere but also in many other spheres.

This was graphically confirmed by the just-ended meeting in Houston between the leaders of the Soviet and U.S. foreign policy departments and E.A. Shevardnadze's conversation with President Bush. The Houston meeting was the 23d between U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker and the USSR foreign minister in less than two years. Simple arithmetic attests to how intensive and unfettered the Soviet-U.S. dialogue has become. If you recall that it is developing in circumstances which we can with good reason call extraordinary—it is sufficient to name, for example, the crisis in the Persian Gulf or the difficulties which our country is experiencing at the peak stage of perestroyka—then the very great responsibility demanded of the partners at once becomes particularly tangible. For even a seemingly insignificant slip could have unpredictable consequences.

It is not possible here to dwell on all the serious problems discussed in Houston and Washington during these days. Not that there is any need to do so—the Soviet mass media covered Shevardnadze's U.S. visit in some detail. But these problems include ones that today appear determining not only for Soviet-U.S. relations but for the whole situation in the world, and they simply cannot be overlooked.

The first is the preparation of a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. Work on it began back in 1985 and has now entered the final stage. A firm accord has already been reached that the sides will reduce their strategic offensive arms to a precise level of 1,600 carriers and 6,000 nuclear charges on them, and other quantitative parameters have been defined for strategic arms. The draft treaty has also resolved and recorded such questions as the phased nature of the reduction of strategic offensive arms, the rules for counting ICBM's and warheads for them, the procedure and sequence for converting the arms to be reduced, and the main elements of verification of the treaty's observance. There is agreement to limit long-range sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles.

Thus, there is every reason to maintain that the treaty was already ready in principle even before the Houston and Washington meetings and that there are no insurmountable political or any other obstacles to signing it. But there were certain outstanding technical issues which the immediate participants in the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva were unable to cope with. In particular, details connected with the ban on basing strategic offensive arms outside national territories, heavy ICBM's, access to telemetric information on missile launches, continuous observation of their production facilities, and heavy bombers.

As a result of intensive talks many of these problems have been removed, or approaches to resolving them have been found. But not all. There are still 10-12 questions which need to be agreed on. As the USSR and U.S. presidents agreed, the treaty's preparation must be completed at the start of next year. It is possible that it will take another meeting between Shevardnadze and Baker to finalize it, at which concessions on one side will be exchanged for concessions on the other side.

The second very acute problem is the crisis in the Persian Gulf. By adopting resolution 678 at the end of November, the UN Security Council issued a final warning to Baghdad on the inadmissibility of continuing to ignore the will of the world community and on the need to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait by 15 January.

Some people perceived that resolution as a green light for resolving the crisis by military means. That is wrong. In reality, the Security Council decision accorded a "good-will pause" and provided a real opportunity to avert the worst option—a military explosion. Subsequent events have proved that this is so. Washington has suggested to Baghdad the holding of U.S.-Iraqi consultations, for which the leaders of the foreign policy departments are to exchange visits. It is impossible not to see this initiative as the concrete embodiment of the Soviet-U.S. mutual understanding on the preferability of surmounting the crisis by peaceful means.

Although the United States and Iraq have not yet reached a final accord on this, as Baghdad, to all appearances, wants to gain time, an important step has been taken there, too—the foreign hostages have been allowed to leave for home without hindrance.

The situation in the Persian Gulf was a topic of careful and comprehensive discussion at the Houston meeting. It was pointed out that the most important task is to fill the time remaining until 15 January with active diplomatic efforts. The sooner contacts are made between the United States and the Iraqi leadership, the better. At the same time, the Soviet minister particularly emphasized once again that the USSR does not intend to send its troops to the Persian Gulf, and he voiced the hope that the U.S. troops will not have to fight there either.

Another problem has arisen in connection with what was stated above—setting the date for Bush's visit to the Soviet Union. It had been proposed that it would take place in January, and one of the tasks for Shevardnadze and Baker had been to do the necessary preparatory work and ensure favorable conditions for the solid political substance of a future meeting. This work was carried out. The strategic offensive arms treaty is still not finally ready, however, but it must be signed during the top-level Moscow meeting. In addition, mid-January is a critical point in the development of events in the Persian Gulf, when neither Bush nor Gorbachev will feel like making visits. All this predetermined the decision, announced in Washington during this time, to hold the next summit meeting in Moscow 11-13 February 1991.

Finally, Soviet-U.S. economic cooperation should be mentioned. This problem, too, was the subject of detailed discussion. The chief difficulty lay in the fact that the United States had still not repealed the so-called "Jackson-Vanik amendment," which put the USSR in a plainly inequitable position and hindered the development of trade between our countries.

But now, after the meeting in Houston and Washington, Bush has announced the USSR's exclusion from the amendment, thus opening up the way to granting the Soviet Union both U.S. credits and humanitarian assistance in the form of food and medical supplies. True, it should be pointed out that, in addition to supporters of such assistance, there are quite a few opponents of it in the United States. Some of them believe that no assistance will be effective because of the collapse of the distribution system and the dominance of the "black market" in our country, owing to which it is faced with the threat of famine despite a very rich harvest and other resources. Others adhere to the opinion that foreign aid will only benefit opponents of reforms in the Soviet Union. But the continuing danger of famine will make those reforms absolutely essential.

Nevertheless, the administration has decided to give assistance, having granted the Soviet Union between $500 million and $1 billion in credits for the purchase of agricultural output. That decision reveals an obvious desire to support Gorbachev's policy and to help strengthen the stability of the USSR as an important factor of the whole international system. For, whatever people there might say, our country is still a great power. Precisely at the time of the Houston meeting 12 people were, for the first time, in space simultaneously—seven Americans, four USSR citizens, and a Japanese (on board the Soviet orbital station Mir). This in itself is highly noteworthy and graphic.

Within the framework of the space allotted to me in the newspaper's pages it was simply impossible to examine all aspects of the talks in Houston and then in Washington. But whatever they touched on—bilateral relations, arms limitation problems, regional conflicts—their participants displayed high responsibility for the destinies of their countries' peoples and of all mankind. History itself has imposed this responsibility on them. Its commands must not be disregarded.

Voronin, Ambassador Matlock Discuss U.S. Aid

LD1912185490 Moscow TASS in English 1648 GMT 19 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow December 19 TASS—First Deputy Prime Minister Lev Voronin, heading the commission to distribute foreign humanitarian aid, today met U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock.

The ambassador conveyed a decision by U.S. President George Bush to render humanitarian aid to the Soviet Union. They discussed technical issues concerning the kinds and directions of such aid, participation of public and charity organisations and ways to organise its delivery and distribution.

They noted that this is a purely humanitarian action proceeding from the wish to render assistance to the Soviet Union during the difficult transitional period of radical reforms.

Voronin expressed gratitude for the sincere sympathy of U.S. citizens towards the Soviet people. He said the situation in the country is not so difficult as the mass media often describes it to be.

But he noted that humanitarian aid would be helpful to some categories of the Soviet population, including children, disabled and sick people and pensioners, who find themselves lacking foodstuffs and medicines.

U.S. Peace Corps Prospect in USSR Examined

PM1712163590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Leonid Kuznetsov: "Viewpoint": "A Plus or a Minus?"]

[Text] Soon, it seems, I will be seeing an old acquaintance of mine again. Not in the jungles of Asia or the African savannah, however, but on Red Square. The man I shall be seeing is a corpsman, that is, a volunteer of the U.S. Peace Corps. As is now known, talks are being held on sending corpsmen to the USSR, Romania, and Bulgaria. They currently operate in 54 countries.

The corps was created on the initiative of John Kennedy as part of his "New Frontier" doctrine to enhance U.S.

prestige abroad. Primarily by personal example. Young American men and women, fired by missionary and philanthropic ideas, traveled to the remotest parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Leaving comfort and money behind, they lived like their hosts—they slept in shacks, they cooked on camp fires, and so on. The young Americans' readiness to give what help they could, their modesty, and their diligence earned them affection and thus earned kind feelings toward the United States.

Very soon the Peace Corps became known as the "wunderkind of U.S. foreign policy." U.S. embassies, American propaganda organizations, and special services, especially the CIA, were delighted with it. Incidentally, the covert affairs department's particular love for the "wunderkind" at one time seriously harmed the corps' reputation.

As processes developed in our world, so the content and form of the corps' work changed. The volunteers began to include more specialists in the "green revolution," technicians, trainers, nurses, collectors of stories and legends, and production organizers. The geographical spread of the Peace Corps' operation expanded. Now the Soviet Union is on the list.

What is the volunteers' aim this time? To bring to the Russians the image of prosperous America? Well, our own writers, journalists, and TV correspondents are already doing that. To teach people how to use a mowing machine or how to apply fertilizers...? It is being said that the corpsmen can help students of English in the USSR. But even that is quite naive if you bear in mind that higher education establishments in the USSR turn out thousands of foreign language teachers. Then why are they coming? Are they going to work for the special services? The last question reminded me of a meeting with a corpsman in Uganda, a man of left-wing views and an opponent of the cold war, which was raging particularly fiercely at that time.

"You Soviet journalists," the young man said to me, "are wrong to accuse us of working for the CIA and of collecting espionage information for it. Tell me what information I can get from pygmies who engage in slash farming? The more realistic likelihood is different: that the corpsman may influence the CIA's work in the future. He is an invaluable recruit for the agency, he knows the local customs, traditions, languages, he has inside knowledge of the country. That is why corpsmen were in demand everywhere and are eagerly hired by the State Department and the management of firms and companies...."

Indeed, the opinion of those who think it advantageous to have the Soviet Union as a friend and partner has grown stronger in the process of establishing the new thinking and new approaches to international problems in the United States. The positive pragmatists (positive toward the USSR), however, are countered by negative ones. They are still dubbed "supporters of Kissinger," who believes that the cold war continues, but in a different form.

A few years ago the waging of the cold war was justified in the United States by the need to contain communism and prevent the growth of the Soviet Union's influence, especially in the developing countries, and the strengthening of its role in the socialist community. The situation is completely different today. Who is there to be contained? The processes taking place in the former colonies have dispelled many of Washington's fears and somewhat reduced its interest in them as a supplier of raw materials. In the East European countries forces have appeared which are now operating under slogans which are anything but socialist. Soviet troops are leaving the territory of those countries. "Nevertheless, it should not be thought that the policy of deterrence is a thing of the past. The Soviet Union remains the main adversary of the United States." That is the opinion of W. Hyland, the well known U.S. political scientist and editor of the influential political journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Is that not the reason, as the SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER attests, that, instead of burying its bayonet in the ground, the FBI is still sitting in the cold war trenches and is continuing to produce variations on the "Soviet threat." Recently the U.S. special services kicked up a new wave of spy mania organized by people who want to stop any attempts by "Soviet agents" to get hold of high technology secrets.

It makes sense to view in that light the role assigned to the Peace Corps by certain forces in the United States. I read in Hyland's publication that "the United States has limited potential for influencing the USSR's domestic policy." But why try? That would be interference. If that is the reason why the volunteers are coming, we do not want them.

On this occasion if the creators of the "wunderkind" organization have no ulterior motives or evil intentions, however, and if we are talking about cooperation (in the study of languages, traditions, and so forth), then I am in favor. That would be wonderful.

U.S. Company To Bring Western TV To Moscow

PM1912114990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Dec 90 Union Edition p 2

[Report by V. Belikov under the rubric: "Details for IZVESTIYA": "Foreign Television in Muscovites' Homes"]

[Text] A news conference held at the Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] on 16 December was devoted to the reception of international satellite TV in the capital.

A parabolic satellite TV aerial (in common parlance, a dish) is an expensive pleasure. In addition it has to be

accurately tuned into the television satellite, which transmits half-a-dozen different programs. But, as we know, there is no shortage nowadays of enterprising American businessmen willing to help us, given the prospect of entering the whole vast Soviet market in the future.

R. Schmidt, president of ICI, is such a business partner. He was introduced to journalists by Moscow Gorispolkom Chairman Yu. Luzhkov, who noted that the American company boss' proposal makes it possible to increase considerably the number of channels which can be received reliably and without interference on the three million TV sets in Moscow. It will be possible to feed the satellite-relayed internationational programs via the existing network of collective block aerials.

V. Misyulin, chief of the Ostankino TV transmitter station, reported that two fixed parabolic antennas have been set up in the all-Union television center area to receive foreign satellite signals, replacing a multitude of individual aerial-dishes. The signals are then broadcast via a number of transmitters. The transmitters have been delivered by "I.C.I." and installed in a new control-room at the center.

How is payment for the use of the extra television services to be collected? These services will only be provided to subscribers who agree to pay extra—the payment being included in the monthly apartment rent. It is also significant that our industry does not produce cable capable of carrying the much-enlarged range of television programs from the block aerial to each apartment. R. Schmidt proposes to overcome this and other technical difficulties by involving a consortium of major West European companies in the joint Soviet-American venture that is being set up.

China

Commentary Praises Improved Chinese-Lao Relations

OW1612011290 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0700 GMT 13 Dec 90

[Commentary by Danson]

[Text] According to a news report Chinese Premier Li Peng, who is visiting some Asian countries, will arrive in Vientiane on Saturday, 15 December. Danson, a commentator of this station, has the following comments on the event:

The Chinese leader's visit to Laos will be a summation of the development process of Sino-Lao relations which began in October of 1989. During his visit, the two sides will also set the orientation for the development of bilateral cooperative relations in the future. It will be a return visit to reciprocate Lao leader Phomvihan's visit to Beijing in the fall of last year. During Phomvihan's visit, both sides agreed that the abnormal tension which existed for several years between the two neighboring countries was over, and that bilateral relations had been normalized. Of the three Indochinese nations, Laos is ahead of the two others in restoring good-neighborly relations with China.

The friendly relations between Laos and China were undermined at the end of the 1970's, mainly because the two countries took different positions on the Cambodian conflict. While the Cambodian issue still obstructs the development of Sino-Vietnamese relations, it no longer hampers the normalization of Sino-Lao relations. Neither has the normalization of Sino-Lao relations cast any shadow on Vientiane's relations with Hanoi and Phnom Penh. This is indeed an experience worth learning from.

Of course, some problems still exist in Sino-Lao relations. However, the practice of Laos and China has proven that the problems can be completely solved if the two sides make concerted efforts. It is important that the two sides adhere to a principle of good- neighborliness in conducting affairs. For instance, the situation on the Lao-Chinese border was once quite tense. However, later on, the two sides alleviated the tension, reached agreement on disputed matters in a calm atmosphere, and decided to turn their border into a region of all-around bilateral cooperation. At present, the peoples of the two countries are noticeably active in making contacts with each other in the border region, and development has been made in their border trade. In short, the Sino-Lao cooperation, which, objectively speaking, is enhanced daily, is a factor promoting stability in the Asian-Pacific region.

I firmly believe that Chinese Premier Li Peng's forthcoming visit to Laos will enable the factor to play an even greater role. The Lao-Chinese summit meeting shows that good-neighborly and friendly relations can be restored completely in a short time. Such relations are cherished by all Asian-Pacific countries.

Northeast Asia

Mongolian Public Wishes To Provide Aid

LD1912174690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1458 GMT 19 Dec 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 19 Dec (TASS)—The inhabitants of yet another country, Mongolia, have expressed a desire to provide real aid to the Soviet Union in overcoming the difficulties which face it. The MONTSAME agency reported today that in Ulaanbaatar a bank account has been opened to which money is coming in from labor collectives, organizations, and individuals.

The majority of donations do not exceed one day's wages for a Mongolian worker or a white-collar worker. But there are also more significant contributions: The teachers and students of a building polytechnic institute in the central Gobi settlement of Aymak for example, have already paid 2240 tugriks into that account, while

the fourth grade of one of the capital's schools, Ts. Batlayz, have collected 50 tugriks.

Profitable Health Venture With DPRK Introduced

SK2012122490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 16 Dec 90

[Text] Very rare medicinal herbs and herbal health goods are on display in the Health Center at the Museum of the Soviet People's Economic Accomplishments.

These are the goods produced by a Soviet-Korea joint venture, (Piton). This joint venture was established in Chita located in eastern Siberia early last year.

A Moscow weekly (NUDZILYA) tells of this joint venture's special products.

Goods produced by (Piton) have very fantastic effects. Extracts of medicinal herbs improve eyesight; ease stress; cure arteriosclerosis, liver inflammation, and cholecystitis; control blood pressure; cure alergies; ease diseases caused by radioactivity; and promise favorable function for the human constitution.

In an interview given to the magazine (NUDZILYA), the joint venture's general manager (Larrissa Shagayeva) said the following about the special products of (Piton):

[name indistinct] can be said to be the only botanical garden in the global village that grows the rare species.

The decision to establish a Soviet-Korean joint venture in Chita was made in 1988, with its proficiency in producing the extracts of medicinal herbs. Rare medicinal herbs are brought from the DPRK and in exchange for them, the Soviet side sends second-hand military vehicles to the DPRK.

The joint venture began producing goods in 1989. Along with the traditional extracts of the medicinal herbs and export goods, (Piton) produces a variety of vitamin-rich products, such as teas that dissolve quickly in water, jam, cookies containing ginseng, goods made with honey, and milk products containing pine nuts.

(Piton) is a reliable partner. Our firm is registered in the international joint venture organization, participates in international exhibitions, and has received applications for mutual cooperation.

For instance, we have received a proposal from Germany for barter trade, meaning that the Germans want our teas and medicinal herbs in exchange for disposable syringes and wood-processing ships.

People in Chita call this business firm (Larrissa Shagayeva) company. Last year the company recorded total sales of 1.3 million rubles and this year it has sold goods worth 1 billion rubles every month.

According to the provisions of the joint venture, the Soviet side takes 51 percent of the profits and the rest goes to the Korean side."

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Philippine Economic Problems Scrutinized

HK1712063690 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 16 Dec 90

[Commentary by Vassily Harkov]

[Text] Reports from Manila say that, because of a series of protest actions not just in Manila and other cities over the increase of prices due to the oil price hike resulting from the Persian Gulf crisis, the Aquino Government has had to make some Cabinet changes. The tension in the Gulf may be several thousand kilometers from the Philippines, but moves by Bagdahd have impacted not just on the Philippines but also on other continents. All of which goes to show that the world is closely interrelated.

According to the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, the Persian Gulf conflict is like a safety fuse that could explode on the Philippine economy. If the conflagration is not put out, the situation in the Philippines will be like that in the middle of the 1980's.

The end of this year brings numerous problems to the Philippines. It began with the aborted coup d'etat launched by some elements of the Armed Forces. During President Corazon Aquino's term, seven coup attempts have taken place and all have been thwarted.

In the middle of this year, a strong earthquake occurred which affected Central Luzon, for which the government had to appropriate large amounts for reconstruction work. While Manila had been given pledges of financial assistance under the program termed the Mini-Marshall Plan, this has been like the saying: a small hole has produced a large rat. The United States, which is one of the countries which has promised financial assistance, is facing its own financial problems, thus the Philippine program has been affected. The Philippines was due to receive $200 million in aid.

Events in the Persian Gulf have added to the Philippines' woes, especially since its economy depends on oil imports. Previous oil imports at low prices helped the country's economy in the second part of 1980, so the new oil price hikes have had a decidedly negative effect. Even though the Philippine has its own oil mines [as heard], these have produced only 2.5 percent, which cannot meet the country's needs.

Oil production last year went down, resulting in lower electricity supplies. The government has had to use generators which consume oil. Estimates of oil consumption show a 40 percent increase in the volume of imported oil.

Foreign companies like the American companies Caltex and (Pogentrix?) have added to the country's problems by not being able to fulfill pledges made to set up two hydropower plants. A Taiwanese company has likewise

suspended construction of an oil refinery in the country because of various problems.

Are foreign investors, even though they are being offered favorable conditions, wary about investing money in industries which President Aquino has been trying to promote?

What is the effect of the new oil price on the Philippine economy? It is estimated that economic growth has fallen from six to two percent, while inflation has reached 15 percent. Meanwhile, plans to raise taxes on certain products are under way, while the rate of the peso to the dollar has gone down 25 percent. The value of the peso has definitely gone down.

Economists say that the trade deficit may reach $3 billion, since the country needs to pay its foreign debt. Meanwhile the International Monetary Fund has urged the Aquino Government to cut $13 million in government spending and to impose new taxes if it is to obtain new loans.

In the face of all these problems, the Aquino Government is doing all it can to minimize the effects of the crisis. It is asking creditors to allow longer terms for repayment till December of this year. Furthermore, in the face of the foreign capitalists' urgings, some limitations have been invalidated. Foreign companies can now buy land. The government is also tightening regulations on the outflow of hard currency, since remittances from overseas have been affected by the Middle East crisis. Moves against tax evaders are also being made, since these cause the government to lose billions of pesos.

It is hard to say if all these regulations will help the Aquino Government and if the people will still display their support for the regime. The problems should unite the people in efforts to solve them, all of which should end the present social and political tensions in the Philippines.

Cambodia's KPRP Goals, Successes Noted

PM1312150790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent P. Tsvetov: "Cambodia: A Time of Hope and Anxiety"]

[Excerpts] Phnom Penh—When the last units of the limited Vietnamese contingent left Cambodia a year ago, the inhabitants of that country were gripped by two conflicting feelings: First anxiety—what if, following the withdrawal of the Vietnamese, the capital is seized by Pol Pot's followers and the bloody genocidal regime restored! But coexisting with that anxiety was the hope that this important step would advance the reconciliation of the warring Cambodian sides. [passage omitted]

It is possible to say without any exaggeration that the main credit for the State of Cambodia's successes on the military, diplomatic, and economic fronts is due to the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP]. But it has had to fight to maintain its sovereignty and strengthen its positions as the ruling party.

Som Kimsuor, chief editor of the party newspaper PRACHEACHON, describes the difficult situation within the KPRP: The events in East Europe have had their impact upon Cambodia, too. Certain forces have begun to make attacks upon the party, and ideas of a multiparty system and pluralism have begun to circulate among the intelligentsia. Several figures inside the government and party (including Ung Phan, former member of the KPRP Central Committee and minister of transport) tried in the spring of 1990 to create a free democratic party and remove the KPRP from power. The attempt was thwarted, and the KPRP leadership stated that it will not permit a multiparty system in the country.

The KPRP Central Committee and the government of the State of Cambodia have issued an appeal to leaders at all levels to launch a campaign against corruption and to eradicate negative phenomena in society. The document points out that "if we do not take prompt measures to remedy the situation, the life of our nation, the people, and the revolution will be in danger." The KPRP Central Committee has not restricted itself to mere declarations: Certain leaders of Takeo Province and the capital city party committee, guilty of abuse of office, were removed from their posts and expelled from the party. "Our party is not afraid to lose a few members," Som Kim Suo commented. "Losing the people's trust is far worse."

Lao Ties, Vietnam Interest in Russian Noted

LD1512051690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 14 December, in its "Vremya" newscast, carries a five-minute report on the conclusion in Vientiane of the 12th session of the intergovernmental commission on economic and scientific and technical cooperation between the USSR and the Laotian People's Democratic Republic.

Correspondent Galkin explains that these meetings are held annually, alternately in Moscow and Vientiane. The latest one dealt with cooperation over the past five years, the "exceedingly impressive" fruits of which are a hospital, polytechnical institute, a large bridge across the Xedon River, a circus, an educational complex with hostel to house a higher economic school for students throughout Indochina, and an automobile route to the Vietnamese maritime littoral.

Galkin continues: "The prospective part does not look so impressive on the face of it, however. But in it is based the powerful potential of the development of our relations on a new basis, on the basis of mutually beneficial cooperation."

V.K Gusev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, then says: "Whereas before deliveries from our country to Laos constituted a large part of the total

goods turnover, now, as I have already said, this is assuming the nature of parity. This is the first thing.

"Secondly, the very form of mutual relations is changing. Now, the activity of joint ventures, as well as the production of jobs and the construction of roads and bridges, is assuming more and more importance. Now, we are studying the setting up of a potent power industry base for Laos. The development of electricity could also grant it significant export opportunities."

The Laotian People's Democratic Republic minister of foreign economic relations says that the times dictate new forms of economic cooperation. Three joint ventures are already in action and an agreement for setting up several more has been signed. Laotians are reliable partners, he says.

This is followed by a report by correspondent L. Krichevskiy in Vietnam: "Several years back, when the idea of studying the Russian language in Vietnam was mooted, it seemed as though interest in it was inexhaustible. But today, the picture is different. The attraction of studying the Russian language is noticeably decreasing. There is no shortage of reasons for this. They were also discussed at the conference of Vietnamese teachers.

"Now, Vietnam is initiating trade relations with many countries and is transfering to market relations. Therefore, interest in English has increased dramatically. Dissatisfaction with the present state of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation is also making itself felt." There are not enough textbooks, he explains. The teaching program is outmoded, "and our side far from always fulfils its obligations."

Over a video of the Hanoi Institute of Foreign Languages, Krichevskiy notes that the Russian faculty is still the largest, but complains that its building is old, non-purpose-built and has become "totally inadequate." Nevertheless, there are many devoted teachers of the Russian language in Vietnam who make their lessons interesting.

Near East & South Asia

Post-War Conditions in Afghanistan Examined

91UF0251A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by A. Pravov, IAN and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent, under the rubric "Reporting from Afghanistan": "The Earth Is Tired of the Fire"]

[Text] Jalalabad-Kabul—The helicopter speeds ahead as it flies just above the road. It is flying low enough to seem to touch its belly any minute on one of the numerous wattle and daub walls. Then as the craft flies up into a mountain gorge it almost brushes the sides with its blades. This kind of flying is a special feature of Afghanistan. It is harder to hit a low flying helicopter from a machine gun; it is harder to get it from a "Stinger."

The mountain slopes on both sides are marked with deep holes. They are entrances to a well-developed system of caves that still recently served as reliable protection for the armed opposition groups that were active to the northwest of Jalalabad. Have all the mujahidin gone? Or did some remain here anyway? It is hard to say. In any case, in one of the tunnels I noticed a discarded metal triangle for a machine gun. The chopper soars up in the air, flies over the crest and we are above the road again.

As recently as several months ago, journalists could hardly hope for this kind of travel to Jalalabad. It would have been an act of unjustified risk. It was only at night time that we could fly to this city in the east of the country, near the Pakistan border, and then our plane could have no onboard lights.

Now, as I am looking down at what has been left by the war, I understand that all these precautions were far from unnecessary. As the highway nears the city, it gets literally jammed full of burnt military hardware—carcasses of tanks and helicopters. Most of the bridges are in ruins. In other words, what you see through the open door of the chopper is visual proof that severe battles have only just ended here.

The battle for Jalalabad was really very serious. It required the full effort of the Armed Forces and of the entire population of the city. I first came here in September of last year as the city was recovering from the fierce battle that just finished or, rather, was just finishing.

You can still see marks of destruction on the city streets today. Practically every house bears scars left by shelling. Many structures glare at you with empty holes where window panes had been. The homemade air shelters survived, too. They were built in the backyards of institutions, residential houses, schools, and hospitals. But the tempo of life here has grown much more peaceful compared to the last year.

"We can live and work in peace today, we can trade in peace," says the owner of a tavern located in the city center. I met with this middle-aged man last year. His name is Omar Singh; he is 61. He has spent all his life in Jalalabad; for over 40 years he has been trading.

"A year-and-a-half ago I was so scared that these barbarians could burst into the city," says Omar Singh. "I was afraid for my children and grandchildren; I was afraid for my property. I am grateful to the government troops that they managed to protect us."

Omar Singh's origins are in India. There are quite a few Indians, or rather Sikhs, in Jalalabad. Most of them are traders or tavern owners.

As we were told by the current governor of Nangarhar Province, Colonel General Mohammad Ludin, life in Jalalabad is gradually coming back to normal. The university and a medical institute are functioning. They opened 20 schools and 530 centers for educating the

illiterate. They harvested three times. Four state-owned and 11 private factories resumed their work.

"If not for military interference by Pakistan, the war would have been over long time ago," says General Ludin with confidence. "Local people who live around Jalalabad do not intend to fight with us. The people are going back to their occupations of the peaceful time and the authorities do not interfere with their lives. On the contrary, it is almost every day that we meet with the field commanders who still recently were fighting against the government forces. Today they promise us their cooperation and do not let outside armed groups pass through the territories under their control."

"How do you explain such changes in the mujahidin behavior?"

"Everybody understands that no talk about any "jihad" can be taken seriously now, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Why should Afghans kill Afghans? It is only the outside forces and the leaders of the armed opposition who profit from the war, that are interested in continuing it. It is a lot quieter now on the positions around Jalalabad."

We had a chance to see the proof of the general's words rather soon. Two APCs brought our group of journalists to the position located some 30 kilometers east of the city, closer to the Pakistan border. Gol Habib, deputy corps commander, who was escorting us on the trip said that as recently as several months ago he could not even dream about the situation being that peaceful. The ring of the city defense expanded considerably also. However, only comparison can show it all. It would be incorrect to say that the war is completely over near Jalalabad. Skirmishes do take place and they are fierce. The opposition groups are constantly trying to capture the positions.

"Are attacks on the positions frequent?" I ask the general.

"Small ones are frequent. But if you mean major ones, we repelled four within the last six months. As a result of our operations, over 4,000 enemy troops were killed or wounded."

"Which groups attack your positions?"

"Only the ones from Pakistan. Mostly, they are the people of Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, in other words the "uncompromising" groups that refuse to negotiate with the government. They are usually headed by Pakistanis. There are a few Arab military advisers also."

"What is the attitude shown by the local population towards those groups?"

"It used to be that many of them would join the groups to fight against us. The situation has changed now. People are basically dissatisfied with the continuing fighting around the city. They do not like the fact that the road from Jalalabad to Towr Kham is still closed. It was a traditional trade route from Pakistan used for transporting the necessary commodities to our city. It used to bring considerable profits to the local population. The road is not functional now or, rather, it is used by the "uncompromising" to carry weapons and ammunition. People's dissatisfaction is mounting and the time will come soon, I think, when the local residents will take more active measures against the "uncompromising." The latter are already trying to skirt any area lying in close proximity to the city; they are trying not to annoy the local residents. Basically, they are left with just a few narrow corridors for attacking our positions. These are the places that were abandoned by the residents long ago. We are in control of these corridors as we use our warning artillery fire."

Several guns barked loudly from neighboring positions, as if in illustration of the general's words. About 30 seconds later clouds of smoke and dust rose on the slopes of the far mountains. Soon after that something exploded rather near to where we were. In any case, the general got obviously nervous and started pointing at his watch, letting us know that it was time to go back. Raising enormous clouds of dust, our APCs rushed back to the city.

Later, after we had returned to Kabul, I learned that the positions we had gone to experienced a serious attack of the enemy several days later. Both sides suffered considerable casualties. But the armed opposition groups could not seize any of the positions. Moreover, the government troops managed to move forward and to expand the ring of defense around Jalalabad some kilometers more.

CPSU Secretariat Greets Algerian Party Congress

PM1712102790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Greetings message from CPSU Central Committee Secretariat to the First Algerian Socialist Vanguard Party Congress; date not given]

[Text] To the First Algerian Socialist Vanguard Party [PAGS] Congress

Dear Comrades!

We warmly greet your party's congress and wish it fruitful work for the sake of the friendly Algerian people.

The CPSU favors active cooperation with the PAGS and Algeria's other national-patriotic forces in the name of peace, democracy, progress, and the further strengthening of Soviet-Algerian cooperation.

[Signed] CPSU Central Committee Secretariat

Sub-Saharan Africa

Commentator on Reopening Ethiopia's Mitsiwa Port

EA2012184490 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 19 Dec 90

[From the "World Events Today" program]

[Text] The Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front [EPLF] have reached an agreement to reopen Mitsiwa Port for international food aid to be taken to the famine- stricken people. Our commentator Aleksandr Mikhaylov says:

[Mikhaylov] This is good news for all the people—the Ethiopian Government, rebel supporters, and nonaligned people. The EPLF capture of the seaport was not an isolated success attained by the rebels because they also effectively controlled it.

This agreement should be considered a goodwill gesture by both parties. Hopes are once again raised for thousands of would-be famine victims. The move also raised the hopes of 120,000 soldiers sent to the region to defend Asmera.

It was agreed that UN flagged ships will deliver food aid. Both Ethiopia and the EPLF will be in charge of the food delivery on an equal basis. It was expected that nearly 1 million tonnes would be unloaded at Mitsiwa. It is also possible now for foreign diplomats to monitor [words indistinct].

Besides saving the starving people in the northern regions of Ethiopia, the agreement has a far-reaching benefit: It has shown that the government and the EPLF were capable of achieving a political breakthrough. Commentators are now asking themselves whether this agreement could result in other political breakthroughs for the sole purpose of arriving at [words indistinct].

The signatories of this agreement say that mediation has taken place by the United States. I would not be tempted to hastily conclude that after this agreement it will be easy to attain political achievements. In a closed-door meeting at which this agreement was reached, the government and the rebels could not agree on the terms for restarting peace negotiations.

The rebels are pressing for a referendum on independence to be held in Eritrea. The government dismisses all proposals inclined toward dividing the country. However, the agreement, which enables the reopening of Mitsiwa Port, will bring some changes in the areas experiencing civil war. To implement the agreement, the government and rebels are expected to refrain from military activities, though a cease-fire agreement has not been reached.

The government should not carry out aerial bombardment of Mitsiwa and its environs, and the rebels must relax their harassment of Asmera. The EPLF and government should jointly raise issues of lasting peace for the sake of avoiding recurring famine.

Recent Developments in South Africa Viewed

MB1412211090 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1830 GMT 13 Dec 90

[Commentary by Aleksandr Fedorov from the "South Africa Today" program]

[Text] Much has squared up in South African politics in recent days. The conference of the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] and the Inkatha congress have been held. The tide of the ANC [African National Congress] political activities has brought with it the earlier undeclared meeting between Nelson Mandela and President de Klerk and, finally—later in the week—the African National Congress will convene a conference. Aleksandr Fedorov gives the following view of the events:

I am not inclined to explain these activities, [words indistinct] of various timetables. Inkatha for one, did not announce its forthcoming congress virtually till the opening day. The dialogue between the ANC and the government also calls forth extensive comment. Explanations for its failure are now shallow. Even prior to that one could have made out that the sides that started the matter spinning would see it through to the end. The African National Congress commands the authority it has earned in the decades of armed struggle. Africans support the provisions of the Freedom Charter. The government has tangible powers and the credibility of the whites have [words indistinct] that bloodshed is senseless and [word indistinct]. To stay away from dialogue under such conditions means to display one's feebleness in influencing the developments, and unpopularity.

Of course, this is a simplistic view that takes no account of all the political, economic and ethnic subtleties in the wake of which, the Pan-Africanist's decision to continue the struggle was no surprise, although, as REUTERS notes, that struggle has been scarcely reported on in previous months. The conditions the Pan-Africanists put forward include the return of historical lands to Africans, the abrogation of racist, laws and the transitional government, and are hardly accomplishable without a dialogue. Still they sound as a decisively worded ultimatum.

Meanwhile, many blacks, and not only the PAC supporters, have a liking for revolutionary phrases. Chris Hani, who heads the military staff of the ANC's military wing Umkhonto We Sizwe [Spear of the Nation], has called for stepping up the liberation struggle. Addressing a mass rally, he said that blacks were still suffering from oppression, and the best way to fight the enemies was to hate them. I would not be surprised to learn supporters of that view will be found in the Pan-Africanist ranks, and I am 100 percent sure there is no [words indistinct] in the timing [words indistinct] to the forthcoming ANC conference. As has been announced, the conference will

discuss the ANC's strategy and tactics under current conditions, some organizational matters, and the prospects of a peaceful dialogue.

There is a possibility of a split in the ranks of apartheid opponents given the Pan-Africanist revolutionary calls and Inkatha's appeasement calls. We should also take notice of the escalating clashes between the ANC and Inkatha supporters against the background of which, political life is invigorating, and the liberational organizations are holding their forums. If success does not crown the joint trip of Johannesburg's townships by the black majority leaders, it will [words indistinct] antidote in the force of the ANC conference, then the right, and left wingers who claim a special role in defining the country's future, will act likewise in decrying the ANC's ability to keep control of the situation. All this can sharply aggravate the state of affairs in South Africa. If earlier everything could be regarded as just a preparation for a political fight, now the fight itself is on. If you do not have much to hope for, then cherish the traditional hope for realism.

Angolan, Mozambican Peace Initiatives Examined

MB1912092290 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1830 GMT 19 Dec 90

[Commentary by (Oleg Sholopin)]

[Text] From confrontation to partnership and cooperation: The formula that is now determining Soviet-American relations is beginning to function in the south of Africa as well. USSR-United States contacts on the peace settlement in Angola and Mozambique have opened up promising prospects. (Oleg Sholopin), of our staff, has contributed the following comment:

Developments on the domestic political scene in Angola and Mozambique, following independence in 1975, were very similar. The common and tragic thing is that for 15 years those countries have been torn by civil war. To some extent the armed conflicts in Mozambique and especially in Angola reflected the harsh confrontation between the two superpowers in Africa.

The improvement in Soviet-American ties is furthering the solution of conflicts on the African Continent. While speaking of the Angolan problem, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the United States Secretary of State James Baker favored an agreement between the conflicting sides, including the signing of a cease-fire, the free participation of UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and other parties, and the transition to multiparty democracy in that country.

For the first time the sides produced such a similarity of viewpoints on so wide a range of problems. There can be no doubt that the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States, who for 15 years supported the participants in the conflict, raised the chances of progress towards a peace settlement. The top priority in my opinion, however, should be a mutual commitment to end Soviet and American military supplies to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] Party of Labor and UNITA, respectively.

There can be no doubt that Eduard Shevardnadze's meetings with the leader of the Angolan opposition, Jonas Savimbi, was very important. Though such a high-speed diplomacy caused dissatisfaction in Luanda, I will be so bold as to state that contacts with UNITA on such high levels were quite justified. The meeting may dissolve into a good basis for a dialogue with Mr. Savimbi in future.

The diplomatic advance towards peace is on in Mozambique, too, with the participation of the two superpowers. An official ceremony was held in Rome to set up an international commission to monitor the partial cease-fire in Mozambique. Besides the warring sides, the commission will have a membership of nine countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States. A full cease-fire is a thing of the future in Mozambique as yet.

My impression is that Washington could play a positive role in achieving this end by using its influence with the Government of South Africa to cut off all possible channels of aid to Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance]. If that is done, full-scale peace talks for Mozambique, which are to resume in the second half of January, could lead to a solution of the conflict in that country.

CPSU Secretariat Greets ANC Conference

PM1712103390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Greetings message from CPSU Central Committee Secretariat to the Third African National Congress (South Africa) Consultative Conference; date not given]

[Text] To the Third ANC [African National Congress] (South Africa) Consultative Conference

Dear Comrades!

We cordially greet you and through you all fighters against apartheid.

The very fact that the ANC, which was outlawed for 30 years, is holding a conference shows the profound changes that are taking place in the RSA thanks to its people's courageous struggle and to international solidarity.

We reaffirm our solidarity with the course pursued by the ANC and its allies of creating a united, democratic, nonracial South Africa and eliminating apartheid by political means.

[Signed] CPSU Central Committee Secretariat

East Europe

Reports View Troop Withdrawal From CSFR

CSFR Fears 'Mass' Immigration

LD1812093990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 18 Dec 90

[Text] [Announcer] Soviet troops are pulling out, yet the Czechoslovak newspapers are reporting that the Russians are returning in civilian clothes. Yes, that is what the newspapers in a number of Eastern European countries are writing, as they continue the lively debate on the possible mass emigration of Soviet citizens westward, and more specifically across the territory of the CSFR. Our correspondent Vladimir Taranov reports from Prague:

[Taranov] Anxious notes are sounded more and more frequently, and all sorts of figures are being quoted, which build up the apprehension of the local populace. Some accounts indicate that, once the law on exits is adopted in the USSR, Czechoslovakia could find itself with two or three million Soviet emigrants within a few months. Official Czechoslovak spokesman are closely studying all the consequences of this for their country, and are testing the water for possible help from the developed Western countries.

Only recently a seminar was held in the CSFR with foreign participation on the theme "The consequences of a law on exit from the USSR." It discussed the problems that could arise in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the event of mass emigration from the USSR. It was stressed that those countries are experiencing economic difficulties and have no opportunity to render long-term aid to the Soviet emigrants. Some Czechoslovak spokesmen have proposed introducing a visa exchange system, thus heading off any illegal crossing of the Soviet-Czechoslovak border by Soviet citizens. The participants in the Prague international seminar stressed that they have insufficient information as to the true situation in the Soviet Union. They have only a very general notion of the proposed Law on Exits.

The Western participants in the seminar came to the conclusion that it is essential to coordinate on the issue of emigration from the USSR. According to their forecasts, in the 1990's there will be a number of waves of emigration from the Soviet Union. It is expected that there will be difficulties with the paperwork and transportation of those people who wish to leave for other countries.

The participants in the Prague meeting voiced their willingness to cooperate with the official bodies and the various movements in the USSR which will be helping the emigrants. Czechoslovak official spokesmen make no secret of their concern that the worry of emigres from the Soviet Union could swell the already numerous domestic problems.

Property, Other Agreements Eyed

PM1912084590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Answer to reader's letter by USSR Foreign Ministry under the rubric "From Authoritative Sources": "There Are Still Differences of Opinion"—paragraph in italics is reader's letter]

[Text] *During a meeting of the heads of the USSR and CSFR governments, satisfaction was expressed at the way in which the timetable for the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia is progressing. Prior to this, however, the discussion centered around the fact that the inability to solve property questions may complicate or even halt the process of troop withdrawal. Therefore, has a solution to the problem been found? V. Solomin, Brest.*

On 26 February 1990 the USSR and CSFR governments signed an agreement on withdrawing Soviet troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia. This agreement comprises two parts. One part concerns the timetable for the withdrawal of troops, and the second concerns the settlement of property and financial questions arising in this connection. From the agreement it is clear that this set of questions must be dealt with in a separate document. Today, there is a definite gap between the two parts of the agreement. Those troops leaving CSFR territory are leaving behind real estate (homes, warehouses, other properties), the realization (sale) of which is taking a long time. Is this affecting the troop withdrawal? No. The troops will leave Czechoslovakia in strict accordance with the timetable, and maybe even faster. For example, by 24-25 December not a single Soviet soldier will be left in Slovakia.

It is expected that the process of selling Soviet property will also get underway soon. Soviet and Czechoslovak experts have twice held talks in Prague (5-10 and 19-30 November 1990). Every aspect to do with realizing assets—legal, economic, banking, organizational—was examined. A combined working commission will be set up to deal with the given question. Even before the official signing of the agreement, the sale of properties to Czechoslovak legal entities and individuals will begin, and an account will be opened at the CSFR State Bank. It was agreed to continue work on the text of an agreement to settle all questions in the given sphere. This work is tricky insofar as both sides hold different views on the value of the property, its use, and the question of compensation for damage caused by our troops, including in the sphere of ecology. The atmosphere surrounding the examination of these questions gives rise to the hope that a sensible compromise will be reached in solving all of these complex and, at times, highly politically sensitive problems.

Answer supplied by the USSR Defense Ministry.

'Mutual Trust' Seen

PM1912133590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Troops Being Withdrawn to Plan"]

[Text] Prague, 18 Dec—"The Soviet troop withdrawal is proceeding according to plan. Sufficient good will and mutual trust is being displayed on both sides, and this is an important contribution to the development of future mutual relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union," M. Kocab, chairman of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Federal Assembly commission to monitor the Soviet troop withdrawal, emphasized on meeting with the command of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in the city of Milovice.

The last Soviet garrison, quartered in Slovakia (Roznava), will leave the CSFR 22 December, CTK reports.

Soviet Involvement in CSFR Events Speculated

LD1912182290 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 19 Dec 90

[Commentary by Aleksandr Shakhin]

[Text] Was the Soviet Union involved in the events of 17 November 1989 in Czechoslovakia? That rather unexpected question was put on Tuesday to an official representative of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in connection with the campaign started by the mass media in Czechoslovakia.

It is claimed that the Soviet Union interfered in the affairs of Czechoslovakia and that Soviet services were involved in preparing the events of November last year. The Soviet representative qualified the campaign as a political speculation. Here is what Radio Moscow commentator Aleksandr Shakhin writes:

The velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia had a rather grim beginning. On 17 November there were bitter clashes between the students and the police in Prague, resulting in casualties. Later the authorities described the action of the police as a political mistake, but, as it does happen in history, it was the sort of event that started the process of renovation. The country embarked on the road of democratization and joined the general process of change in Eastern Europe, and I believe it would be quite in place to recall that the whole process was actually stimulated by perestroyka in the Soviet Union. New thinking made it possible to do away with Brezhnev doctrine once and for all.

The time when the Soviet Union dictated what road to choose should not come again, said Mikhail Gorbachev. As for Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership has on many occasions demonstrated its attitude of a respectful and honest partner toward that country and its people. Even such grim recollections of our common history as the events of the Prague Spring of 1968 should not cloud our relations today. The Soviet Union has denounced the introduction of troops, publicly and officially.

What could have been the logic of the Soviet Union's interference in the general and objectively growing process of renovation in Czechoslovakia and also other countries? One should have an exceedingly rich imagination to suppose that the Soviet Union intends to freeze the course of events or even turn them back, and one should not look for some kind of an international plot in that respect because that would be a plot against oneselves.

Reports Assess Troop Withdrawal From Hungary

Property Dispute Continues

LD1612181190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 16 Dec 90

[Interview with I. Tot, deputy of the Hungarian Democratic Forum by V. Fadeyev, place and date not given, from the "Vremya" newscast—Tot speaks in Hungarian with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] Soviet troops are leaving certain foreign countries where they have been stationed. Such is the demand of time. Just the other day, yet another train carrying staff and combat equipment left a small Hungarian railway station for home. The troops are leaving; however the problems of mutual relations with the Hungarian side remain. Here is V. Fadeyev:

[Fadeyev] This kind of farewell is an occasion for reminiscences and contemplation: for the town's residents—about those days connected with the Soviet soldiers; for our soldiers, it means the continuation of their Army service, but now nearer to home.

The feelings of the officers and warrant officers are more complex. Part of their life is connected with Hungary. Now there will be new appointments and new worries, first and foremost, everyday ones. Today, these are being resolved with great difficulty back home. This in particular was discussed at a news conference for local journalists, deputies of the Hungarian legislature, and foreign military attaches, by Colonel-General Burlakov, commander of the Southern Group of Forces. He recalled that the installations left by our troops—and these include housing, canteens, store buildings, and garages—are reckoned by the joint Hungarian-Soviet commission to be worth 1.2 billion foreign-currency rubles. It is precisely these installations that are lacking in the places to which the soldiers are returning.

The dispute over property with the Hungarian side still goes on. For this reason, the commander made a proposal to the Hungarian Government, the essence of which is that our Army would like to purchase construction materials here for half the afore-mentioned sum, to provide amenities for the troops, and to freeze the remaining half for the final settling of accounts. What is the attitude of legislative deputies to this proposal?

[Begin Tot recording] We understand that back home the officers will face many problems connected with resettlement. Personally I believe that they can be partially solved through joint efforts. For this purpose, our bilateral talks on the matter of property, which have so far become deadlocked, should be continued. But General Burlakov's proposal today is already a resolute advance in the position of the Soviet side, and we will inform the State Assembly of this. [end recording]

Compromise Sought on Payments

PM1812100190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent V. Gerasimov: "Troops Leave, Problems Remain...."]

[Text] Budapest, 14 Dec—Units of the Southern Group of Forces [SGF] are departing on schedule.

"Some 70 percent of the ground forces and 60 percent of the materiel have already returned home," [SGF Commander in Chief] Colonel General M. Burlakov announced.

"Some 91 military townships have been handed over to Hungarian representatives," he said. "The property we have handed over is valued at 1.2 billion rubles [R]. It includes barracks, housing, mess halls, schools, clubs, sports areas, and storage facilities."

"From the outset the Soviet side has insisted on payment for each facility left behind. The Hungarian side wants to settle up following total withdrawal, while demanding the rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of fines."

The SGF commander believes that a compromise must be sought. Interim payments, for example. Indeed, it is hard to explain why apartments are standing empty for months, are being looted, and are becoming dilapidated, when thousands of people in Hungary do not have apartments. What is more, there is not enough housing and schools for the Soviet units that are being relocated. We could buy many things in Hungary to develop our new accommodation. But the decisions have been deferred until the middle of next year.

Hungarian President A. Goncz and Prime Minister J. Antall were informed of the SGF commander's proposal at a farewell meeting with him the other day. Col. Gen. M. Burlakov has been appointed commander of the Soviet grouping of forces in Germany and a new commander—Lieutenant General V. Shilov—is taking over the SGF.

Complications Noted

LD1712153990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0930 GMT on 17 December carries a three-minute report by Budapest correspondent V. Fadeyev on Soviet troops withdrawal from Hungary. Fadeyev says:

"By the end of this year 70 percent of our ground troops and 60 percent of all material assets will be withdrawn from Hungary and by March next year 90 percent of Soviet troops will already have withdrawn. In this way the withdrawal timetable is being precisely and strictly adhered to today but problems connected with property disputes between the two sides remain."

The Hungarians are glad to see the troops go, he reports, and Soviet soldiers are sincerely glad, too, as they will do the remainder of their service nearer home. For officers and warrant officers, however, many of whom are burdened with families, the situation is more complicated as housing and other amenities are much worse in the USSR. Everything, according to Fadeyev, has to be erected anew there and building materials are a problem. Meanwhile, the property being left behind here has been assessed by the Hungarian-Soviet Commission at 1.2 billion foreign currency rubles, he claims.

At a news conference Colonel General Burlakov, the commander of the southern group forces, proposed that the abovementioned amount be used as follows: For half of it the withdrawing army could purchase building materials here in order to build facilities for the troops and the remaining half could be frozen for final clearing after withdrawal has been completed. This is a current issue also, Fadeyev says, because today many foreign firms and organizations, and Hungarian ones, too, are proposing to the USSR that the buildings being left behind for opening joint enterprises.

Fadeyev then interviews MP Istvan Tod on what he thinks about the latter idea. Tod says Burlakov's statement is a resolute advance on the Soviet side's position.

Hungarian Bank President Views Future Accounting

LD2012101190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0900 GMT 20 Dec 90

[Text] In Moscow, the president of the Hungarian National Bank has agreed with the president of the Soviet Issuing Bank that the two countries will resolve differences on the clearing accounts monthly or perhaps quarterly in the future.

According to the contracts signed up till now, deliveries to the Soviet Union for rubles can still be carried out until the end of March. The new contracts will have to be in convertible currency. So far no agreement can be reached about over how many years the Soviet Union is to repay the accumulated debt to Hungary. The Soviet party would like to do so over five years, the Hungarian side thinks the outstanding amount should be received within two years.

Walesa's Presidential Future Assessed

91UF0248A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 50, 15 Dec 90 p 12

[Article by TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis specially for SOVETSKAYA KULTURA: "The Second Leap of Lech Walesa"]

[Text] The newspaper TRYBUNA, the press organ of the Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland, wrote several days ago: "The nightmare of the presidential campaign is over. The president has been elected. Lech Walesa's dream has come true. In keeping with Polish originality, a president has not become a symbol but rather a symbol has become president. His most difficult test still lies ahead."

This is a brief but apt statement!

Lech Walesa is fond of repeating, both to his entourage and in public, a phrase about him leaping over the fence of the Gdansk shipyard and organizing first a strike and then a movement which was called Solidarity. This time, on 9 December of this year, he took another leap thanks to this trade union association... to Belweder Palace.

Readers of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA are already aware of the election results. They are not the issue here, but rather what is in store for Poland, its people, and the new president who, incidentally, was elected in a general election for the first time in the history of the country.

What do we know about Lech Walesa? Both much and little. At one time they did not like talking and writing about him in the USSR; however, he is enormously popular in Poland and throughout the world. Lech is 47. He graduated from a vocational school and worked as an electrician. He organized, together with a group of independent activists, an alternative trade union which went down in the history of Poland under the name Solidarity.

L. Walesa was a proponent of moderate behavior in conflicts with the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland. He co-chaired roundtable negotiations (between February and April of 1989) which were followed by the legalization of this trade union headed by L. Walesa and a change of the social system of Poland. On 4 June 1989 elections to the Sejm were held which resulted in the victory of Solidarity and utter defeat of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party].

L. Walesa offered the post of head of the Polish cabinet of ministers to one of his closest associates, nonparty member T. Mazowiecki.

L. Walesa is a Nobel Prize winner. Without as much as a complete secondary education, he has honorary doctorates from 14 foreign institutions of learning. As they say in his entourage, he is an energetic political figure with a firm but difficult character who persistently proceeds to the goals set. Many people note the keen political instinct of the new president of Poland.

It was exactly this political instinct "bordering on Providence" (the words of Walesa himself) and knowledge of life and people that prompted him, as they say, to once again roll up his sleeves and get going.

Of course, L. Walesa could not but notice how the confidence of the populace in the government of T. Mazowiecki was dwindling: The harsh current reality undermined the myth of the prompt advent of universal affluence and prosperity. Despite controlling hyperinflation, stabilizing the zloty, and making it convertible, a market economy in the environment of which Poland already lives reduced the rate of social production by 30 percent and spawned an army of unemployed 1 million strong. "The Balcerowicz plan," that is, the government plan to invigorate the economy, began to be distrusted by the people.

L. Walesa's camp put forth the slogans of speeding up the reforms and stepping up the struggle against the communist nomenklatura entrenched in many institutes of power; it openly criticized the actions of the T. Mazowiecki government. Solidarity itself split into proponents of a moderate policy in the economy and proponents of accelerating reforms. L. Walesa bet on "acceleration" and won. He won with great difficulty, however, losing in the preelection marathon many of his closest friends and associates of yesterday.

Going to the elections, Walesa believed in having the support of 80 percent of the electorate, due to which he intended to play the role of "father of his people." It turned out differently, however—he won only in the second round, gaining merely 11 million votes out of the total of 27.5 million voters, which puts him in a very difficult situation. He entered Belweder Palace riding the wave of the myth of the Solidarity movement, which is still powerful but is losing strength virtually with every passing day and hour. The split Solidarity camp, the Catholic Church, and the press temporarily rallied behind Walesa during the last decisive battle for the office of president out of fear of "the Tyminski phenomenon." He won. The clamor raised by the presidential campaign in Polish society, however, still has not died down. Political figures and parties of various directions are still shocked by the latter-day contender.

Several days ago, the newspaper ZYCIE WARSZAWY, which is respected in the country, wrote: How could it happen that a man absolutely unknown to the people, a man who had lived away from his motherland for 20 years, gained more than 3.5 million votes? The newspaper, and not alone, called him "an impudent liar," a primitive demagogue who promised the people quick riches. Nonetheless, this man, S. Tyminski from Canada, attracted a considerable number of Poles.

There was everything in this presidential campaign—promises not backed up by promissory notes, including the promises of Walesa himself, blackmail which S. Tyminski sometimes resorted to, anticommunism, and

in part anti-Sovietism. During a televised news conference, S. Tyminski displayed his black briefcase and said that it contained data compromising L. Walesa. The latter demanded that the entire TV audience be familiarized with them, threatening that if not, Tyminski would not be allowed to leave the country after he [Walesa] became president. It appears that L. Walesa intends to keep his word. The Procuracy of the Republic of Poland has brought a criminal suit against Tyminski for insults in the heat of election battles against Prime Minister Mazowiecki, whom the former accused of "betraying the interests of the Polish people."

The Procuracy has already called Tyminski in for an interrogation and is considering the issue of delaying his departure to Canada, despite Tyminski having bought a ticket for a flight on 12 December. For his part, Tyminski has communicated at a news conference that he only intended to leave for three days with his wife in order to meet his children in Canada, and would come back to Poland again in order to set up a political party; he has not thought of a name for it yet....

What is going to happen to Poland, its people, and President Lech Walesa if he fails to keep his promises to the voters, including that of a transfer of 30 percent of the country's national wealth to their discretion?

I do not know whether the former personal adviser to L. Walesa, one of the creators of Solidarity, and current Minister of Labor and Social Policy of the Republic of Poland Jacek Kuron was right or not when he stated the following in an interview to GAZETA WYBORCZA several days ago: "Having seen that the trade union association Solidarity vigorously participated in the presidential elections and won them, the people will cart Solidarity and its leaders out in wheelbarrows for failing to keep their promises in four days or four months, but no longer than that... Solidarity has decided to become a ruling party, and has already followed the poor example and models of the former PZPR."

Political Profile of Lech Walesa Published

91UF0259A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Dec 90 Second Edition p 7

[Article by M. Tretyakov: "Portrait of Lech Walesa in the News"]

[Text] *At first glance his destiny reminds one of a beautiful American fairy tale about a person who wanted everything and got everything he wanted. But behind the apparently easy success lies the difficult life of an individual who managed to work his way up from the lowest strata of society into the highest echelons and become the president of the Republic of Poland.*

Hundreds of articles have been written about and kilometers of movie film have been shot of this person. He is the winner of many prizes, including the Nobel Peace Prize. Although he does not have a higher education, Walesa has honorary doctorates from dozens of universities.

Lech was born in 1943 into a peasant family. He had six brothers and sisters. His father was sent to Germany during the occupation of Poland. He returned home in 1946 and died soon thereafter. His mother, who remarried in 1975, went to the United States where she died in an automobile accident.

In 1958 Walesa completed school and than studied in a vocational and technical school. He went to work as an electrical mechanic and served in the army. In 1967 he came to Gdansk and found a job as an electrician at the V.I. Lenin Shipyard. Two years later he was married. Now Lech and his wife Danuta have seven children. The youngest is three years old and the oldest is 20. The Walesas, like the majority of Poles, are believers. Lech goes to church regularly and always wears on his lapel a pin with a picture of the Virgin Mary.

He was an active participant in the strikes in December 1970 and in June 1976. In May 1978 Walesa became a member of the illegal "Free Trade Unions."

...August 1980. A wave of strikes was sweeping to the coast, and it flowed over the Gdansk shipyard as well. Walesa ended up in the thick of things; he headed the strike committee and then Solidarity, the independent trade union that was formed.

During those days I frequently had occasion to meet with Walesa and, along with other foreign journalists, to attend meetings of the leaders of the trade union association. The first thing to catch my eye was his ability to find compromises in difficult situations, his colorful language, which all Poles can understand, and which frequently saved him in what seemed to be impossible situations.

I recall that the situation in the country had become much worse in the spring of 1981: The majority of Solidarity leaders were demanding a nationwide strike. This meant that the extremist wing had decided to go for broke and begin an open confrontation with the authorities. The atmosphere was incandescent at the meeting of the leaders of the trade union association held at that time. Suddenly he leapt up from his place on the stage and ran across the entire hall to the place where the foreign journalists were sitting. Walesa came up to us and said: "Should we hold a strike or not?"

I cannot hide the fact that we were dumbfounded, but then we expressed our opinion. Having heard it, he returned to the stage, took the microphone, and announced to the entire hall:

"I was just speaking with correspondents from the Soviet Union, the United States, and France about the subject of a strike. I hope you will trust them. They were against it.

Walesa's words had an effect.

Now, ten years later, I frequently recall the chronicle of turbulent events in Poland at the beginning of the eighties. The situation has changed before our eyes—from a relative calm in the country's political life to a sharp aggravation of the situation. Many of Walesa's steps and statements were received with understandable caution in our country. But when a wave of anti-Sovietism rose up in Poland and there were more and more frequent cases of desecration of the graves of Soviet fighting men who had died to liberate the Polish land from Hitler's oppressors, he stated publicly that he would personally take a bucket of water and a rag and wash the obelisks which had been smeared with paint by hooligans. This statement was received with a great deal of understanding in the society.

After martial law was introduced in Poland during the night of 12-13 December 1981, Walesa, like other Solidarity leaders, was incarcerated and isolated from society for 11 months. In April 1983 he started working at the Gdansk shipyard again, while at the same time leading the underground activity of the trade union association.

In 1989 Walesa participated in preparing for and conducting the roundtable discussion between the government and the constructive opposition. As a result, Solidarity was legalized. In June 1989 it won in the parliamentary elections. A coalition government was created and was headed by one of Walesa's former advisers, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In the summer of that year there was a split in the Solidarity camp.

According to Walesa's statement, the cause of the split was that the Mazowiecki government was too slow in carrying out reforms.

It is still difficult to say which course the new president will suggest for the country. But here is what he said on television after the elections: "Poland is now faced with difficult tasks—to believe in itself and achieve appreciable progress, progress for everyone." He offered to cooperate with all who want to build Poland and continue the reforms. As for Soviet-Polish relations, Lech Walesa places the focus on the principle of friendship.

Yugoslav Election Results Summarized

91UF0241A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Dec 90 p 5

[Article by Yu. Kornilov, TASS and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent: "Yugoslavia After the Elections—Separate Torches?"]

[Text] Belgrade, 11 December—The buildings of Belgrade are still plastered with vivid preelection posters, but the cold winter wind is already ripping them from the walls of the buildings. The longest "election marathon" in Yugoslavia's history, which began in the spring in Zagreb and Ljubljana and was continued in Sarajevo and Skopje in the autumn, ended in the winter in Belgrade and Titograd in December. In the elections of members of legislatures and presidents, six Yugoslav republics were represented by candidates of more than 220 parties, unions, and movements—from socialist and communist to adherents of the "Women's Party" and supporters of the restoration of the monarchy.

Who received the fruits of victory? To answer this question, we will mentally take a trip to the capitals of all six of the Yugoslav republics.

It should be started, perhaps, in Ljubljana and Zagreb. There, to the north of the country, the communists suffered a defeat in the elections for the first time, and the opposition that came to power declared for a confederative structure of the Yugoslav state. The voters came to the election districts in Macedonia later. The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization came out there as one of the main political forces. Its leaders, subjecting the communists to criticism, gave assurances that in the event of victory they "will transform Macedonia into a new Denmark or Holland." After Macedonia came Bosnia and Hercegovina, which is situated in wooded mountains. Three parties ended up at the top after the preelection battles, one of which represents the Muslims, the second, the Serbs, and the third, the Croats. In Kosovo Kray, a big part of the Albanian population boycotted the elections. In Montenegro, where they were held on 9 December, the republican Union of Communists received the overwhelming majority of votes. Finally, the country's largest republic—Serbia. The presidency was won by 49-year-old L. Milosevic, a lawyer by training, and a competent and sensible politician, he was an important figure in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in the past. A positive victory was also won by the socialist party that directs it, which was created on the basis of the eself-dissolved League of communists of Serbia and which came out in the elections under the slogan "For freedom and democracy, for peace, prosperity, and equal rights of all peoples."

Analyzing the results of these competitions at the ballot box, it is possible, perhaps, to trace a certain "common balance." The people voted for the democratic future of the country. For their own national interests—in a way that they understand them. Of course, for changes for the better in the economy and in the social sphere.

An overwhelming majority of the Yugoslavs welcome abrupt economic reforms. They clearly realize to what grave excesses the "state model of socialism" has led, and they are aggressively for a rejection of the dictate of the state in economic and other spheres and for a strengthening of democracy and self-government.

At the same time, the experience of conducting radical economic and political transformations in the SFRY also confirmed the fact that the policy of a free market, as well as a rejection of centralized planning, is not a panacea against negative manifestations in economic development.

The policy, which is directed at an accelerated development of the inadequately developed republics and krays, has not had an effect thus far.

Many Yugoslavs who are inhabitants of the "developed republics" see this unevenness as the reason for their own economic troubles. The fact itself of such a regional disproportion is one of the sources and incentives of nationalism and separatism. There, where the living standard is higher, demands are made not to pay subsidies to the fund of the federation for financing those republics that are "inadequately developed." As previously, slogans are put forth to transform the Yugoslav federation into a confederation, and appeals can be heard for secession from the SFRY structure.

The Yugoslav experience, of course, indicates that in the conduct of reforms there should be no haste to repudiate the primacy of Union laws over republic laws and that it is not possible mechanically to "cut off" the functions of many public-state structures. It is no longer a secret to anyone today that increasing the role of republic and local organs in the SFRY, after weakening the "state bureaucratic grip of the center," simultaneously strengthened the bureaucratism at the republic community level noticeably. But this, of course, promoted the expansion of that "nourishing environment" that germinates the seeds of localism.

...The state seal of the SFRY symbolizes the unity of the republics that make up the country with six torches, whose fire fuses into a common flame. Recently I saw a sketch of this seal in one of the Yugoslav journals, but two of the six torches in the sketch were extinguished. Can something like this actually happen? The situation in the country, and also the ambiguity of the results of the just finished "electoral marathon" indicate that such a danger cannot be excluded.

NEW TIMES Views Changes in Albania

PM1712170090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 50, 11-19 Dec 90 pp 26-27

[Article by Gennadiy Sysoyev: "Alia Breaks With the Stalin Legacy"]

[Text] A notice saying "Closed for redesigning" hangs above the entrance of the National Museum of History in Tirana. It is a symbolic detail. The whole society is now undergoing a thorough change. Albanians are renouncing much of what was inculcated in their minds in the distant and recent past.

Progress is slow

Last spring, the Albanian leadership announced its intention to carry out reforms, first of all in the economy. The main purpose of reforms is to provide a decent living for the people. Judging from what is sold in Tirana shops, the economic reform has not yet brought tangible results. Meat, milk and now vegetables are in short supply. Several brands of cigarettes and Skanderbeg cognac, the pride of Albania, have disappeared. All these goods are exported, because the country needs foreign currency.

Ordinary Albanians also need foreign currency because in special shops they can buy with it what is not found in other shops. Foreign currency is sold in Tirana streets at a black market exchange rate. Some Albanian economists assert that the economic reform is not producing results. The leadership is introducing market relations very timidly, not daring to give up the levers of power guaranteed by regulation from the centre.

There is also another point of view. Its advocates explain the absence of results by the fact that radical changes cannot be brought about overnight, all the more so as Albania has for decades been separated from the outside world.

Several privately-owned meat shops have already been opened in Tirana. Xhavit Gazheli, 50, who owns one such shop, told me that he buys meat from cooperators or directly from peasants (the authorities recently allowed them to raise livestock on their own subsidiary plots) and sells it at prices double the official ones. Gazheli's meat sells out before lunch-time. He is not allowed to set a higher price, however, because the ceiling is fixed by the state.

During one month, Xhavit told me, he earns about 1,000 leks, or almost double the average wage. "But I have to work four times as much as in a state-owned shop," he added. True, the Albanians I met told me Gazheli was evidently ashamed to mention his exact income which amounts to 2,000 and perhaps 3,000 leks. The authorities know about such incomes, but they let enterprising people do their business and do not impose high taxes on them.

The Tirana authorities have reopened the market which they considered harmful for many years. True, I did not see an abundance of fruit and vegetables there.

With the permission of the Tirana authorities, a shop selling Yugoslav goods has also been opened in the capital. These goods can be bought for leks, too. Prices are incredibly high, however, and for most Albanians a visit to Yugoslav shop is more like a visit to a museum.

Monuments to Stalin quietly disappear from Albanian cities. Some are pulled down because they "do not blend with the architectural ensemble of a square" while others are sent for "restoration." True, a monument to Stalin in the central part of Tirana has been preserved. People seem to regard it as one of the sights attracting foreign tourists, however.

One sees more foreigners today in the streets of Albanian cities. On hearing a foreign speech, Albanians now come up and enter into a conversation, quietly and in a friendly manner, without fearing "undesirable consequences," as happened in the recent past, when contacts with foreigners were not allowed.

The thirst for communication is particularly felt among young people who are not very optimistic about the prospects of their country. According to official statistics, young people constitute a majority of the roughly 16,000 Albanians who have been permitted to go abroad in the last three months.

Kadare Changes His Views

The news that the eminent Albanian writer Ismail Kadare asked for political asylum in France came as a bolt from the blue. Kadare, 54, was also deputy chairman of the Democratic Front of Albania (the organization is led by Nexhmije Hoxha, widow of Enver Hoxha). He was a sort of ambassador of Albanian culture in Europe and the world and was considered a loyal advocate of the regime. Five years ago, when perestroyka began in the Soviet Union and then spread to Eastern Europe, he said in an interview: "In our country there can be no dissent of the type that has appeared in the Soviet Union."

In my conversation with Ismail Kadare last May, he welcomed the new course of the Albanian authorities. "The process of democratization has embraced all spheres," he said. "The current changes are more profound than could have been expected." On becoming a dissident himself, Kadare wrote a letter to Albanian leader Ramiz Alia. The writer explains his request for political asylum by "his lack of belief in the possibility of democratization of Albania from within."

Many people in Tirana think that Kadare would do more good if he stayed in the country, both as a writer and an active champion of democratization of society, the more so that the political activity of Albanians has noticeably increased, especially after the "refugee crisis" last July, when thousands of people burst into the grounds of some embassies asking for political asylum.

The authorities have drawn lessons from these events. On the one hand, the embassy district is now tightly guarded and only foreigners can walk freely into it. On the other hand, reforms and the liberalization of society have been stepped up.

To Europe on Foot

At a meeting of the Party of Labour's Central Committee Ramiz Alia came out in favour of the pluralism of opinions. He said that the party should give up its command methods of leadership and excessive concentration of power in its hands. The present interpretation of pluralism in Albania does not include the concept of a multi-party system though, as Albanians told me, it is not ruled out in the future.

The first elections on an alternative basis will be held in Albania in December. No fewer than two candidates will run for every seat in government bodies. The constitutional provision outlawing religion will apparently be repealed soon. Ramiz Alia admitted that it violates the freedom of conscience. The Albanian leader seeks to keep the reform initiative in his hands. Judging from his statements, he intends to carry out reforms gradually, step by step, in order to avoid conflicts and clashes. It seems that many Albanians are prepared to adopt such a tactic, because they do not want a repetition of the events in Romania.

One more factor of democratization—this one external—also operates in Albania. Tirana is now knocking at the door of Europe, expressing its readiness to fulfill all the demands needed for the country's inclusion in the European processes. It is necessary for Albania mainly for economic considerations. Funds are needed for radical changes in the economy, and they can be obtained only if Albania establishes normal relations with its European partners. Albania has already restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Deputies of the foreign ministers of their countries, Yuliy Kvitsinskiy and Sokrat Plaka, met in Tirana to sign a protocol which put an end to decades of alienation. "It is good that both peoples have been able to preserve feelings of friendship," Sokrat Plaka told me. "The possibilities for economic cooperation are also favourable, all the more so as Albania has many Soviet-designed enterprises."

Obstacles have also been removed towards restoring relations between Albania and the United States. It may be supposed that Albania and Britain had found a compromise for solving the problem of Albanian gold taken out to Britain during the Second World War. London seems to be prepared to compensate for the cost of gold by rendering technical assistance to Albania, just as was done by West Germany several years ago.

The steps taken by Tirana are producing different results. They have one purpose, however: Albanians are trying to rid themselves of the dubious reputation of being "the most closed" country in Europe and to become a normal European state.

PRAVDA Notes Albanian Leader's Thanks to Gorbachev

PM1812160790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

[Message from Albanian People's Assembly Presidium Chairman Ramiz Alia to USSR President M. Gorbachev thanking him for holiday congratulations; date not given]

[Text] To USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Sincere thanks for the congratulations you sent on our national holiday. I would like to see mutually advantageous relations constantly developing between the two countries in a variety of spheres and being implemented in concrete action for the benefit of our two peoples and of peace and cooperation in Europe.

[Signed] Ramiz Alia, chairman of the Socialist People's Republic of Albania.

Romanian President Thanks Gorbachev for Message

PM2012135590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Message from Romanian President Ion Iliescu to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev thanking him for national day congratulations; date not given]

[Text] To USSR President M.S. Gorbachev.

I express sincere gratitude for the congratulations and wishes on the occasion of 1 December—the Romanian national holiday.

I share your belief that all the conditions now exist for the comprehensive development of the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between Romania and the USSR. We are prepared to act together to that end.

I will use this occasion to wish you good health and success in your activities to provide well-being and progress for the Soviet peoples, in the interests of peace, security, and international cooperation.

Romanian President Ion Iliescu.

West Europe

Housing Plan for Troops Signed With Germany

LD1412195490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1321 GMT 14 Dec 90

[Report by Viktor Levin, from the "International Panorama" program]

[Text] A protocol has been signed in Bonn between the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, on the one hand, and the FRG's Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs, on the other, to a bilateral agreement on certain transitional measures connected with the presence of Soviet troops in Germany. This agreement has laid the fundamental groundwork for cooperation between the two countries in this sphere.

It is envisaged, in part, that the German side will allocate 7,800 million Deutsche marks for the implementation of a housing program. Around 2,000,000 sq m of housing is to be built in the European part of the Soviet Union in the period 1991-1994 with the direct involvement of Western firms. This is roughly 36,000 separate flats. In addition, Germany is going to finance and build four house-building combines in our country.

In a conversation with TASS correspondent Viktor Chistyakov, Army General Kochetov, USSR first deputy minister of defense, who is the head of the Soviet delegation, noted that the implementation of the planned measures would be an important element of the largescale social program being pursued in the Soviet Union in the interests of servicemen of the Western group of forces.

It is a well-known fact that housing provision is now the chief social problem in the Soviet Army. Around 173,000 officers and warrant officers are without apartments at the moment. These figures are cited by General Kochetov. So we cannot allow the forthcoming return home of servicemen of the Western group of forces to aggravate the existing situation. In this connection, the general said, we are very grateful to the German leadership for understanding our problems, and for showing willingness to give the USSR substantial assistance in the construction of flats.

Incidentally—If I may add my own comment—this also has a direct bearing on the question of trust toward a united Germany. Difficult work still needs to be done following the signing of the protocol. The ministry of defense, as the customer, has to pick contractors—foreign firms—which are going to build housing on the most beneficial terms for us. The creation of large house-building combines on USSR territory, planned for 1991-1992, is very important in this regard. They are to provide the basis on which we are subsequently going to increase the amount of housing we bring into use.

General Kochetov stressed sensibly, that outside assistance, however substantial it may be, is not capable of solving the task that faces us. The main burden of our vast and very difficult work falls on our own shoulders. Taken as a whole, the social program we are going to be implementing in the interests of servicemen, said the first deputy minister of defense, is to be one of the most important components of the coming reform of the armed forces. to fulfill the program, the ministry intends to mobilize all existing resources.

At the same time, the Ministry of Defense believes that the burden of implementing the program should not just lie on the shoulders of the military. We are counting on help from other ministries and departments, and the local bodies of power, Kochetov said. It is important primarily to cooperate with the soviets at the local level. Without their committed involvement, it will not be possible to resolve important matters such as the allocation of land plots, the supply of building materials, and many other things.

In the three republics where housing is to be built—Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine—the work has been actively underway for several months now. We are meeting with full support from the local authorities, said the USSR first deputy minister of defense. I think this will not only come as good news to servicemen, but to everyone, since social provision for our servicemen is our common affair and concern, a problem that must be tackled as well and as rapidly as possible.

FRG Accepts Some, Destroys Other Former GDR Arms

LD1412174990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 14 Dec 90

["International Situation, Questions and Answers" program, presented by All-Union Radio commentators Kazbek Basev, Boris Pakhomenko, Vladimir Pasko, Konstantin Patsyuk, and Sergey Pravdin]

[Text] [Basev] The town of Orenburg. (Sergey Vasiliyevich Pichurskiy): I would like to know how it is that our latest aircraft, the MiG-29, is now with the Bundeswehr. It has about 30 aircraft there. Is this not giving away the secrets of our inventors, and what will be their fate? Konstantin Patsyuk, my colleague, a commentator, replies to your question.

[Patsyuk] Allow me to preface our conversation with a small introduction. I think that without it it would be less understandable why MiG-29's have finally turned out to be with the Bundeswehr. Naturally, we all know quite well that all this is linked first and foremost with the fact that Germany has united.

[Basev] And with the fact that the military equipment which belonged to the GDR has naturally passed into the hands of the master.

[Patsyuk] And he, this new master, was confronted with the question of what to do with it. A few years ago this issue would probably never have even been mentioned. Would the FRG have turned down handed-down weapons? Times have changed. The unification of Germany has become possible on the strength of the big changes in Europe and in our country. They have also affected the views on the masses of weapons that have been accumulated by many countries, including the FRG.

[Basev] Well, you are obviously trying to say that if the FRG had retained all the arms and combat equipment of the former GDR in the given situation, including in the Bundeswehr, automatically, then no one would understand it at the present time.

[Patsyuk] Naturally.

[Basev] Then why is it that the FRG is keeping the MiG-29's?

[Patsyuk] Incidentally, there are not all that many of them—24 aircraft—and they have been taken into the armament of the FRG Army by virtue of a number of reasons. But to start with, a more extensive description of the fate of the combat equipment of the former GDR.

[Basev] I think that would be interesting to hear.

[Patsyuk] I also think so. Before deciding this issue, the FRG military and authorities thoroughly weighed all the pros and cons. In each specific case they defined their attitude to one type of weapon or another. Here they were guided—and I think it would be appropriate to speak about that here—both by foreign political considerations, as well as by considerations as a purely internal order.

[Basev] Probably considerations of an internal order prevailed?

[Patsyuk] I do not think one can say that. Both the former and the latter were taken into account.

[Basev] And what was the result?

[Patsyuk] And the result was the following. The FRG Bundeswehr, judging by the pronouncements of those in high-placed military ranks, are rejecting the tanks, for example, of the former GDR People's Army. They, like the enormous reserves of other combat equipment and armaments that have accumulated on the territory of the former GDR, will be destroyed. Ships from the former FRG [as heard] Navy will go for scrap. Only 12 will remain in service for some time. Part of the arms may be reexported to the countries of Eastern Europe, but part will be retained.

[Basev] One must suppose that this will include the MiG-29's.

[Patsyuk] And those as well. But those are the only aircraft belonging to the GDR National People's Army that have been taken by the Bundeswehr into their arms arsenal.

[Basev] As far as I know, other aircraft—the MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-22 bombers—will be left for (?scrap), will they not?

[Patsyuk] Yes, that is quite right. In making such a decision, naturally the capabilities of the aircraft were taken into consideration. As stated by Henning von Ondarza, chief of state of Bundeswehr ground forces, the FRG would also like to retain the 122mm Howitzers, since there are large stocks of ammunition for them; some models of automatic firing weapons, in particular the AK-74 machinegun; and to use MI-8 helicopters for transportation purposes. And naturally, the MiG-29 fighters.

[Basev] You have to agree that it is not a bad present for the Germans.

[Patsyuk] Yes, but the designers are constantly working. In my opinion, if my memory does not deceive me, the Soviet fighter became part of the GDR's arsenal about two years ago. Its technical specifications are high. This is recognized by the German military. In their opinion, the MiG-29 is superior to similar aircraft in the West. Much praise has been heaped on the MiG. It is probably for this reason, judging from the pronouncements of the German press, that the reaction of our top brass to the handing over of up-to-date aircraft to the Bundeswehr was fairly restrained.

[Basev] In general, the acquisition made by the FRG Army cannot be referred to the category of being unnecessary.

[Patsyuk] But, still I think—if one is to speak from a wider point of view—no one has lost. The FRG is becoming involved in the disarmament process. Now our countries regard one another as partners, and not as opponents. The relations between them are build on the basis of the treaty on goodneighborliness, partnership, and cooperation. And the loss of the MiG-29 is probably not the one that belongs to the number of irreplaceable ones.

[Basev] Thank you.

French, FRG Leaders Discuss Soviet Aid Prospects

PM1212162990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Dec 90 Union Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "EEC Will Give Aid. New Meeting Between Mitterrand and Kohl"]

[Excerpts] Paris—The talks in Paris between French President F. Mitterrand and FRG Chancellor H. Kohl focused chiefly on European integration issues [passage omitted]

Mitterrand and Kohl also discussed the question of aid to the Soviet Union and other East European countries. The talks that have just ended among the heads of the EEC countries' foreign policy departments focused on this question, and it will be specially considered at the Rome summit.

According to French Foreign Minister R. Dumas, the EEC intends to assist the USSR in four areas: provision of foodstuffs and allocation of credits for that purpose, assistance in settling bills and in turning the ruble into a convertible currency, and the preparation of a major trade agreement with Moscow.

Having examined the long list of essential foodstuffs presented by Moscow, the EEC countries' foreign ministers offered to allocate between five and 10 billion francs for this purpose in the very near future.

The foreign ministers were also in favor of doing everything to promote the Soviet Union's membership of the IMF and the World Bank. According to Paris press reports, the IMF is prepared to grant the East European countries credits of $24 billion over the next three years. Finally, the EEC is is favor of arranging extensive cooperation with our country in the energy sphere and of expanding purchases of fuel from the Soviet Union.

Food Aid From Germany Arrives in Smolensk

LD2012101990 Hamburg DPA in German 0523 GMT 20 Dec 90

[Excerpt] Smolensk (DPA)—The first convoy of lorries with CARE packages from Germany has arrived in the Soviet Union. Five lorries carrying 8,000 food packages in all reached Smolensk on the morning of 19 December. In a few hours a little more than half the packages had been distributed to the sick, the elderly, orphans, and large families, representatives of the "Help Russia" campaign said. Smolensk is a city of 350,000 people, lying about 300 km south west of Moscow. [passage omitted]

French Communist Party Congress Opens 18 Dec

LD1812221490 Moscow TASS in English 2049 GMT 18 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Batyrev and Vladimir Shvets]

[Text] Saint-Ouen Seine-Saint-Denis December 18 TASS—The 27th Congress of the French Communist Party opened in a Paris suburb today. Nearly 2,000 delegates converged on Saint-Ouen to discuss the Communist Party's role and place in French society and its attitude to changes in the world.

The French Communist Party is now supported by about eight per cent of voters, recent public opinion pools have revealed. Communists have 25 seats in the National Assembly and head more than 1,000 municipalities in different parts of the country.

Foreign guests at the congress include a delegation from the Soviet Communist Party. It is headed by Politburo member Galina Semyonova, who is also a Central Committee secretary.

Soviet Communist delegates conveyed to the French Communist leadership a message addressed by President Mikhail Gorbachev to Georges Marchais. The message contains wishes of success to the congress and congratulations to the French Communists on the occasion of their party's 70th anniversary.

Georges Marchais addressed the congress today. He made a report entitled "Communists Serve the People in the Name of Justice, Freedom and Peace and Advocate Changes in Politics and Power Structure in Society".

How should changes in Europe be regarded? How can the large part of mankind be rid of poverty? How can disarmament be facilitated? What is socialism with its realities, triumphs and defeats? What is its future? Is a non-capitalist solution possible of problems facing mankind? These are the questions confronting each and every communist today. The search for modern, progressive and realistic answers to them is a high priority task.

Under present conditions, the speaker said, the French Communist Party is "not Stalinist and not social democratic, but communist, that is democratic, modern, innovative and revolutionary".

Assessing the present situation in the world, the French Communist Party chief pointed to the universal nature of demands for peace, justice, freedom and disarmament, as well as for the use of scientific and technological achievements for the benefit of man.

"The striving for democracy is at the basis of all these demands. A society which seeks to ignore them is in a deep crisis. The situation in France is an example. This applies to an even greater degree to what happened in the East European countries in the recent past.

"The leaders of these countries saw in challenges of modernisation and consequently of democratisation only a threat, while they presented a great chance for socialism. The leaders were afraid of their own people. They feared granting them the rights, freedoms, responsibilities and opportunities for the involvement in social life characteristic of modern society. The dominant regimes in those countries were overthrown within a few months. Capitalism is now being restored in them," Marchais said.

"We do not regret the fate of those regimes", the French Communist Party leader said. "We regret that the policy pursued by the former leaders of those countries resulted in their people's opposition to socialism."

On the situation in the Soviet Union, the speaker said: "The Soviet leaders, while democratising their society and pursuing the bold policy in favour of disarmament, have removed the major obstacles which hampered the creation in the USSR of a system worthy of being called socialist i.e. democratic and humane. Today, communists and all supporters of socialism and democracy in the Soviet Union are facing considerable problems. We express our solidarity with them," Georges Marchais said.

After the report by the French Communists Party general secreary, deputies spoke.

The congress will continue until December 22.

French Communist Party Official Interviewed

PM1912135590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

["Topical Interview" with M. Gremetz, secretary of the French Communist Party Central Committee, by correspondent V. Bolshakov; in Paris; date not given: "Beneath the Banner of Tours"—first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Excerpts] At the French Socialist Party congress in the city of Tours 70 years ago, 18 December 1920, a revolutionary majority resolved to form the PCF [French Communist Party] and to join the Third International. A minority headed by Renaudel and Blume restored the Socialist Party.

On the eve of the PCF's 70th anniversary and its 27th congress Vladimir Bolshakov, our correspondent in France, met in Paris with Maxime Gremetz, secretary of the PCF Central Committee. We offer for our readers' attention M. Gremetz's replies to our correspondent's questions. [passage omitted]

[Bolshakov] During the period of stagnation the CPSU leadership criticized the PCF's "Eurocommunism." And the PCF in turn criticized us. What is the situation now? Does understanding exist between the CPSU and the PCF? Do you support perestroyka?

[Gremetz] What was called "Eurocommunism" at that time was the measures taken by a number of parties to elaborate their own programs for the building of socialism in accordance with the developed countries' national peculiarities and their own path and with due regard for the established realities. I have already said that we embarked on this at our 22d congress. At that time, the CPSU and other parties actively criticized us for revisionism. As the result of an anlysis which we made, we concluded that we had disagreements with those parties over the "component element of democracy" which, so we believe, is inseparable from socialism. Ultimately we concluded that these were disagreements over the very nature of socialism. We then advocated the democratization of all spheres of life in the socialist society.

After 1985 we noticed changes in the CPSU and a rapprochement of the concepts of socialism. It is a society of democracy and freedom, created by man and for man and meeting his material and spiritual needs, a society where there is no unemployment, a society of progress and social justice protecting man's dignity and the nations' independence and sovereignty. We stated this at the time of the September 1985 meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Marchais.

Since 1985 we have supported the aims set by perestroyka. Today the USSR is experiencing extraordinary difficulties, and a strenuous struggle is being waged between those who would like to reduce to naught the influence of the October revolution and also of the Tours congress, who want a return to capitalism and to man's exploitation of man, and who campaign for the USSR's collapse and those who advocate the renewal of socialism by means of reforms capable of resolving the accumulated problems. We support all reforms aimed at creating modern, effective, and humane socialism.

[Bolshakov] The PCF remains loyal to Marxism, whereas East European communist parties no longer speak of the class struggle, the crisis of capitalism, or imperialism. Our opponents are trumpeting victory, announcing that "Marxism is dead." Do you see a future for Marxism?

[Gremetz] We have renounced dogmatic concepts and ossified Marxism. Having done this, we have concluded that the fundamental tenets of Marxism are perfectly suitable for analyzing contemporary reality in all its dynamics, complexity, and contradictoriness.

We encounter capitalism every day. Poverty, unemployment, marginalization, a lack of security and confidence about tomorrow, and the decline of millions of people exist in such a developed country as ours. But capitalism also means the shameless plundering of third-world peoples: extreme indigence, famine, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy.... These peoples have only to raise their heads for imperialism to resort to military intervention.

Of course, in several countries capitalism has attained high development of productive forces thanks to scientific and technical progress. At the same time, the accumulation of fantastic wealth at one pole of society leads to deprivation, inequality, and growth in the number of people discarded by life at the other pole.

The question is how to put an end to this, how to use scientific and technical progress for the good of man, to meet his needs.

The class struggle? It is the U.S. occupation of Panama without any response whatever from the UN Security Council. It is pressure on Cuba, whose people courageously counter the U.S. blockade. It is the peoples' struggle against the growing debts which crush them. It is the start of resistance by the people of the eastern part of Germany to the destruction of its economy and society.

The class struggle is also manifested in the strengthening of NATO at a time when the peoples are demanding the disbandment of blocs. This is the reality which the peoples encounter. Marxism helps to understand the reasons for this. It also teaches us that the peoples, having united in struggle, can change the existing reality, since nothing is eternal, including capitalism. I have called this role of the peoples the "Third Great," making these words the title of one of my books. And, in order to play this role, every people must have a political vanguard, a modern revolutionary party. Marxism teaches this, too. [passage omitted]

Cooperation Treaty Planned With France

LD2012101290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2310 GMT 19 Dec 90

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Summary] Paris, 20 Dec (TASS)—Members of the Commission on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Armed Forces of the French Senate heard a report on Soviet foreign policy and the situation in the USSR made by Yu. V. Dubinin, Soviet ambassador to France. This can be explained by the fact that the French Senate will very soon have to ratify the treaty on concord and cooperation between the USSR and France which was signed by the two president during Gorbachev's visit to France earlier this year. In the course of the discussion which took place after the report, senators asked Dubinin about the difficulties which the Soviet Union has to face. The situation in the Gulf was also discussed.

European Community Leaders View Food, Other Aid

PM1912143790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Dec 90 Union Edition p 4

[Report by M. Ilyinskiy and V. Pershin under the rubric "Panorama of International Life": "Roman 'Forum of the 12'"]

[Excerpts] The European Council held its 44th session at the level of Common Market heads of state and government 14 and 15 December in the building of the Italian Legislature Chamber of Deputies. [passage omitted]

Relations between the EEC and the Soviet Union were given a special place at the forum. G. Andreotti, head of the Italian Government, asked the participants in the forum the following question: "Do you agree to give Gorbachev your full support?" and he received unanimous approval. Assistance must be given urgently—the aim is to help supply food products to the Soviet Union and East European countries, particularly Bulgaria and Romania. Andreotti did not specify the sum of money, but he qualified it as significant. Part of this assistance will be free of charge and part will be in the form of credits.

At the briefing Italian Government spokesman P. Mastrobuoni stressed in particular that this assistance must not fall into possession of the black market. But what is the size of the assistance allocated from the EEC budget? A total of 750 million ecu's [European Currency Units] is being allocated (around $1 billion). Of these 250 million ecu's is in the form of a donation and 500 million are guaranteed credits. These resources will be spent on developing infrastructure, trade, transport, power engineering, and communications in the Soviet Union. The question of cultural cooperation with the USSR was also discussed.

Now something about a few subtle distinctions in the positions of the community's heads of state and government, which journalists accredited at the forum noticed. G. Andreotti believes that assistance to the Soviet Union must be dispatched urgently to the USSR central organs of power so that they distribute it. FRG Chancellor Kohl stated that there are "maneuvers against Gorbachev." This means "internal maneuvers and not an external plot"—Italian state television reported in the news bulletin. New British Prime Minister John Major is expressing the opinion that everything in the USSR hinges on "the system of distribution" and "more assistance must be given to private enterprise." The head of the French Republic F. Mitterrand is affirming that Gorbachev must be assisted urgently not so much with food supplies as by allocating resources for industrial purposes.

The question of urgent supplies of food products from EEC stockpiles has been reflected in concrete figures. Here are some of them: 500,000 tonnes of meat, 200,000 tonnes of butter, 100,000 tonnes of powdered baby milk, 500,000 tonnes of olive and corn oil, 100,000 tonnes of grain products, and so on.

During the Rome forum's first day of work we asked European Legislature Chairman E. Baron Crespo how he assesses Community aid to the Soviet Union. The chairman of the European Legislature answered that all the Community leaders are unanimous in their intention to give urgent assistance to the USSR, and this meets the spirit of the times, the interests of cooperation, and the nature of the new East-West mutual ties. [Passage omitted]

Italian Envoy Delivers European Community Papers

LD1812201190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1925 GMT 18 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 Dec (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today received Italian Ambassador Ferdinando Salleo at the latter's request. Acting on the instructions of the Italian Government, which holds the chairmanship in the European Community, the ambassador handed over documents from the session of the Council of Europe, which met in Rome 14-15 December at the level of heads of states and governments of the 12 European countries. They deal, specifically, with decisions concerning the provision of assistance and help for the economic reforms being carried out in the Soviet Union. Gratitude for the solidarity being displayed was expressed by the Soviet side.

Gorbachev Supports Scientific Ties With Italy

LD1312191990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow, 13 Dec (TASS)—The USSR president today received in the Kremlin Antonino Dzikiki, a well-known scientist and president of the international non-governmental organization "The World Laboratory." It was set up with the active support of Mikhail Gorbachev and Chairman of the Italian Council of Ministers Giulio Andreotti.

Antonino Dzikiki and Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who took part in the conversation, told the Soviet leader of the joint projects drawn up by scientists from many countries under the aegis of the World Laboratory. Special attention was devoted to the large project which proposes the creation in the near future by Soviet and Italian scientists and engineers of an efficient and ecologically clean source of energy.

Antonino Dzikiki delivered a message from Giulio Andreotti to Mikhail Gorbachev. In it the prospects for Soviet-Italian cooperation within the framework of the World Laboratory are touched upon.

The USSR president thanked Dzikiki for the message, noting that he shares the Italian premier's approach toward the development of scientific ties between the Soviet Union and Italy.

Mikhail Gorbachev welcomed the activity of the World Laboratory and the growing interaction between the scientists of various countries in the interests of peace and mutual understanding. He supported the specific projects and expressed wishes for success in their implementation. In today's world, he said, politics, which is not enriched by science and morality, or by a humanitarian content, has no prospects.

The conversation was characterized by openness and amicability.

Gremitskikh Updates Dmitriyev Case in Italy

PM1712155590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Dec 90 Union Edition p 5

[Report by G. Charodeyev: "Soviet Trainee Accused of Bribery"]

[Text] Yu. Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, has addressed a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. He recalled that Soviet citizen V. Dmitriyev, a USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations staffer who was in Italy as a member of a group of trainees at the firm "Olivetti," was arrested 10 July in Turin. He was charged with bribery with a view to obtaining access to secret information.

The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations issued a statement 16 July stressing that the charges against V. Dmitriyev are totally based on false premises. The Soviet Embassy in Rome and the USSR Foreign Ministry via the Italian Embassy in Moscow have made the appropriate representations to the Italian side, pressing for V. Dmitriyev's release from custody.

In November our embassy handed the Italian president a petition from V. Dmitriyev himself for his release. The Italian president received a similar letter from V. Dmitriyev's wife. An attorney went to Italy in early December to study the facts of the case on the spot and defend the Soviet citizen's interests.

The hearing of V. Dmitriyev's case, which began in a Turin court 3 December, is taking place in an objective, unbiased atmosphere. It has been decided to release him from jail and put him under house arrest until the end of the judicial investigation (see IZVESTIYA, No. 345).

"The Soviet side is convinced," the briefing moderator stressed, "that V. Dmitriyev's innocence will be proven and that he will be able to return home in the immediate future. This decision would accord with the spirit of

accord and cooperation that is traditional of Soviet-Italian relations and with the new principles of relations between our countries enshrined in the recent Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. Since the day that the Soviet citizen was arrested the USSR Foreign Ministry and our Rome embassy have done and are continuing to do everything they can to secure his release and ease his lot. This subject has been discussed on several occasions in detail during conversations with representatives of the Italian leadership. I must also note the readiness displayed by a number of high-ranking officials in Italy to take an objective look at the so-called 'Dmitriyev case' and with their desire to prevent these vestiges of the 'cold war' adversely affecting the development of Soviet-Italian cooperation."

Gorbachev Sends Condolences to Italy's Cossiga

PM1712155190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Dec 90 Second Edition p 1

[Message of condolence from USSR President M. Gorbachev to Italian President F. Cossiga on occasion of Sicilian earthquake; date not given]

[Text] To His Excellency Italian President Mr. Francesco Cossiga

Soviet people have reacted with pain to the news of the severe earthquake on Sicily which entailed loss of life and considerable material losses.

On behalf of the Soviet people and on my own behalf I express my profound condolences and feelings of sincere solidarity with the friendly Italian people in their misfortune.

[Signed] USSR President M. Gorbachev

Western European Union Assembly Reported

PM1312120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent V. Bolshakov under the rubric: "Details": "Western European Union in New Europe"]

[Text] Paris—The 36th session of the Western European Union [WEU] assembly has ended in Paris.

I recall that it was created in accordance with the 1955 Brussels treaty and with time was transformed into a military-political organization under the "Common Market." It now includes nine of the 12 EEC countries: Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal, France, and the FRG. The members of the legislatures of the countries belonging to the union [as published] represented in the WEU draw up recommendations in the field of defense policy and mutual relations with the East European countries, including the USSR. But since, unlike NATO, it has no armed forces of its own, for many years the WEU was doomed to be just a legislative echo of NATO. Recently, however, this role has begun to change. The WEU lays claim to increasing independence in resolving questions connected with European defense and with regard to mutual relations with East Europe.

It is no accident that the session discussed in such a lively fashion the question of creating European "rapid deployment forces" which, following the example of the U.S. forces, could be rapidly sent to any region of the "third world" in the event of the emergence there of a conflict "threatening European interests." And although there are so far no specific plans to create such forces, there are many supporters of their creation in the WEU. At the same time, the union is prepared to act in the political field in the settlement of the conflict not only with Iraq but also throughout the Near East. This was confirmed by the support received by the proposal from French Foreign Minister R. Dumas, who spoke at the session, to hold an international conference on the settlement of the Near East crisis in its entire complex, including the problem of the Palestinians, the occupied Arab lands, and Israel's security.

In recent years the WEU has sought to set up dialogue with Soviet legislators and has directly promoted the success of disarmament talks in Europe. In a talk with your correspondent R. Pontillon, president of the WEU assembly, said: "For several years now we have been conducting fruitful discussions with the USSR Supreme Soviet. Now we hope that the legislatures of all East European countries which have embarked on the path of democracy will join in this dialogue. Of course, we cannot fail to consider the new realities, the provisions of the Paris charter for a new Europe, and all the documents signed here, including the treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Next year we intend to hold a colloquium in Palermo (Italy) from 25 through 28 March devoted to all those problems of European security which were discussed at the summit of heads of the CSCE states in Paris. We hope that representatives of the USSR will as before take an active part in this dialogue with us." Incidentally, USSR representatives have frequently taken part in the work of the WEU assembly. The present session was no exception—a Soviet representative spoke during the debates on conversion in the USSR.

Finnish Contract Sought for Nuclear Reactor

PM1712151590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Dec 90 Union Edition p 5

[Report by S. Leskov: "Export Reactor. Finland Discusses Plan for Construction of New Nuclear Power Station"]

[Excerpts] Helsinki-Moscow—Soccer passions are muted compared with the ferocity of the debate about the market economy. Amid the conflicting opinions there is one point on which everyone agrees: Without major export contracts it will be heavy going for our market. But despite the mighty potential of certain

sectors of our industry the deals that have been concluded so far are modest in world terms. For example, the cost of taking a foreign cosmonaut on board the "Mir" orbital station, for all the uniqueness of this type of "service," is somewhere around $10 million.

So the plan for the construction of a Soviet nuclear power station in Finland is bound to arouse great interest. Experts put the cost of the planned nuclear power station with a 1,000-megawatt reactor at $1.5 billion. Naturally, the USSR cannot expect the whole order. It is realistic to expect the same proportion it had some 10 years ago, when the first Finnish nuclear power station was constructed at Lovisa, where we did one-third of the work and which, incidentally, is the projected site for yet another reactor. So the new order, if it is implemented, could be a record one for our country.

A Soviet delegation headed by V. Konovalov, USSR minister of atomic power engineering and industry, visited Finland recently. The plan's final details were discussed. The Finnish side was supposed to receive in December the documents required for the consideration of the matter in legislature.

But perhaps it would be more honest if we were to forget about the money and restrain the Finns? Throughout the USSR there is a rising wave of distrust of nuclear energy and the construction of new nuclear power stations is being halted. No, the Finns must not be considered: after all, there are Soviet VVER-440 reactors operating at the Lovisa nuclear power station. So? They are operating continuously, like clockwork. Lovisa takes first place every year in the unofficial nuclear power station world championships. The coefficient of capacity utilization at it never falls below 90 percent, while the leaders of the world nuclear power industry regard 70 percent as a success. The average number of unscheduled stoppages at either of the two Lovisa units is less than one. Incidentally, in our country the same reactors stop on average five-six times a year. (In the United States the figure is 3.5). Finnish experts are confident that the Soviet reactors meet world standards anyway, and it is a question of operational quality, of providing nuclear power stations with modern electronics and ancillary equipment. [passage omitted]

For the first time in the history of the construction of Soviet nuclear power stations abroad we are faced with competition. We have three rivals—West Europran companies with very strong nuclear energy credentials. One of them, "Siemens," needs no recommendation. Another one, the Swedish firm AVV, constructed a second nuclear power station in Finland, which is as good as the Lovisa one. Competition will be all the greater in view of the fact that the victorious plan will be used to melt the ice of distrust of nuclear power.

A large proportion of the technical documentation and the budget proposals from the competitors are to be assembled in Finland before the end of the year. Of course, the plan itself represents a considerable outlay. The total cost is put at 10 million rubles. It is another law of commerce that in order to make a big gain at the finish you have to learn to take a risk at the start.

The uncertainty will not last for long. The final decision on the construction of the new nuclear power station in Finland is to be made during 1991. But regardless of the outcome of the competition, it is clear that cooperation with Finland, with its extremely high demand for nuclear energy, will benefit Soviet experts.

Rykhkov Sends Greetings to Austrian Chancellor

LD1812131990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1025 GMT 18 Dec 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 Dec (TASS)—Nikolay Ryzhkov has sent his congratulations and best wishes to Franz Vranitzkiy, federal chancellor of the Republic of Austria, on the occasion of the latter's appointment to the post of the head of the republican government.

I hope, the message of Nikolay Ryzhkov says, that relations between the Soviet Union and neutral Austria, permeated with the spirit of accord, cooperation, and goodneighborliness, will continue to develop successfully for the sake of the peoples of our countries, and in the interests of strengthening peace and stability on the continent.

Latin America & Caribbean

Central American Leaders Plan To Invite Gorbachev

PM1812160990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Dec 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report from TASS "News In Brief" column]

[Text] Costa Rica, 17 Dec—The ongoing meeting of Central American presidents in Puntarenas has decided to send a message to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev inviting him to pay an official visit to the region's countries in 1991. There is some evidence to suggest that the invitation will be conveyed to Moscow during Nicaraguan President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro's visit to the USSR next February.

PRAVDA Reviews Bush's Latin America Visit

91UF0238A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with PRAVDA correspondents Sergey Svistunov, Andrey Zagorskiy, and Vadim Listov under the rubric "View From Three Capitals; On the Results of G. Bush's Latin American Tour"; place and date not given: "The Marathon Is Over But the Problems Remain"]

[Text] **Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Venezuela—that was the itinerary of U.S. President G. Bush's recently completed trip through the countries of Latin America. If**

one considers that not long before this tour he made his first official visit to Mexico, then the geographic contours of this next stage in the story of the White House's foreign policy south of the Rio Grande are sketched in high relief. The main goal of the marathon which took place is also clear—to show support for the fragile Latin American democracies. What were the specific results of the conversations held last week by the head of the Washington administration and what can be said about the tone of the meetings that took place? The editorial board talks about this with its correspondents Sergey Svistunov (Brazilia), Andrey Zagorskiy (Lima), and Vadim Listov (Mexico City).

[Svistunov] The results of G. Bush's visit to Brazil were graphically summed up by Marcilio Marques Moreira, this country's ambassador to Washington. "The American Government," he said, "did not arrive with a suitcase filled with money. Instead, we were shown a suitcase filled with good will."

In fact, with regard to the very urgent problem of foreign debt, the Brazilians did not obtain any concessions from their guest. Although cloaked in a smooth and polite diplomatic form, Bush's prescription boils down to the following: Inasmuch as you took money from private banks for the most part, you must come to agreement with them concerning conditions for repayment. In answer to President F. Collor's appeal to "share political responsibility" for the solution of this most complex problem, the master of the White House "washed his hands of the matter like the Biblical Pilate," concluded well-known television commentator Sergio Amaral. Moreover, the American position even hardened somewhat....

[Zagorskiy] Indeed, if anyone was expecting the President of the United States to appeal to creditor banks to grant Latin American debtors more favorable conditions and to prolong the repayment of their debts, he would have been disillusioned. In Uruguay, G. Bush himself said right out that "resolution of these problems consists not in increasing aid, but in broadening trade." In the meantime there are differing points of view with regard to intentions to make a transition to free trade between the United States and the states of Latin America.

[PRAVDA] Could you give us more detail on this aspect?

[Zagorskiy] Many here—and, perhaps, not without grounds—do not rule out the thought that as a result of a liberalization of continental barter, and even more as a result of the creation of a zone of free trade in the Western hemisphere, a mighty stream of North American exports may inflict a serious blow on the industry of the Latin American countries.

[Listov] Nonetheless, the trade and economic "initiative for the Americas" proclaimed by G. Bush is not rejected out of hand in Mexico City, for example. One even gets the impression that the Mexicans are quite interested in the creation of a zone of free trade in Latin America, or more accurately—in the Western Hemisphere. It seems that both political and business circles in Mexico suppose that if there is a decision to put Bush's initiative into effect, then Mexico, which has concluded a free trade agreement with the United States, will also receive tempting access to a continent-wide market. Therefore close Mexican-American relations, on the one hand, tie in fully with the current "From Alaska to Tierra del Fuego" project, and, on the other, they agree with Mexico's own interests in the region.

[PRAVDA] Correspondence in a few similar interests is not the same as a guarantee of mutually acceptable compromises, however. Has there been any concrete movement on that level?

[Svistunov] In this case there has been some. Primarily on the question of the long-awaited removal of individual limits on the delivery to Brazil of American advanced equipment of a strategic nature such as IBM supercomputers. On a broader scale it is a question of widening scientific and technical cooperation between the United States and the Latin American giant. As everyone knows, to a significant degree Brazil has declassified its "parallel nuclear program" which was being carried out by its military departments. This curtain, as we know, hid attempts to master the technology for the creation of nuclear weapons. Now, judging from several signs, the situation in this realm has become somewhat quieter and the military aspects have been muffled. In any case, a transition of Brazil's nuclear potential to peaceful uses has been noted. This, to be sure, is also reassuring to Washington.

[PRAVDA] Incidentally, the crisis in the Persian Gulf, judging by reports of news agencies, became not only an alarming background but one of the most important questions on the agenda in the course of the Latin America tour.

[Zagorskiy] It is not without reason that at every stop the guest gave a detailed explanation of the White House's position with regard to Iraq and at the same time enlisted support or understanding from his junior partners. All the more in that the visit was routed, in particular, through those countries which could suffer substantial losses as a result of a increase in prices for oil because of the crisis in the Persian Gulf....

[Listov] Of course, any increase in world prices for oil will be profitable for Mexico, one of the major exporters of that raw material. Thus we have Mexico's official position, which I would call "expectant neutrality." On the one hand, Iraq's aggression has been condemned here. But, on the other hand, Mexico—as opposed to, for example, Argentina—is not sending its Armed Forces to the region of the conflict. I repeat, it is not even sending them symbolically, as a demonstration of "military solidarity" with Washington.

[Svistunov] They say that Bush, who is extremely concerned by the situation in the Persian Gulf, spent more time in telephone negotiations with West European and

Arab leaders than in meetings with local leaders during his trip through Latin America. After all, the tour had already been postponed two months because of events in the Middle East.

[PRAVDA] ...And so G. Bush's Latin American marathon is over. But serious problems apparently remain in U.S. relations with its southern neighbors and the difference in their positions on an number of important questions of international life.

[Listov] It is characteristic that even against the background of the international processes going on between the United States and Mexico, there is no mention of Mexico's official abandonment of its autonomous and traditionally independent course, for example, with regard to Central America. It is not advisable, for example, to ask whether or not Mexico has lost interest in the Salvadoran or Guatemalan rebels. After all, this is where the latest round of negotiations on the achievement of national reconciliation in Guatemala took place recently. Incidentally, meetings between representatives of the Salvadoran Government and the partisans are taking place here.

[PRAVDA] In short, Latin America is still itself, and many fragments of its political panorama, to put it lightly, do not fully fit in with Washington's approach....

Post-Invasion Panama Lacks Peace, Prosperity

91UF0327A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Dec 90 Union Edition p 5

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Cherepanov: "'Prosperity' Has Not Come: The Panamanians' Faith in Their Government is Falling"]

[Text] Panama City-Mexico City—**On 20 December 1989 American forces invaded Panama to "restore justice, freedom, and democracy" and remove the unwanted General Noriega, who was in sole charge of the country. Almost the entire civilized world condemned this military action at that time.**

I happened to visit Panama a few days after the intervention and saw the immediate results of it with my own eyes: The poor quarters of the capital's Chorrillo neighborhood devastated by American bombing. The traces of the new types of weapons tested during the operation. Commerce lying in ruins following wholesale looting. Finally, servicemen in combat fatigues on each corner, sandbag barriers, armored transport vehicles and helicopters hovering over the city around the clock. The radio, amplified by hundreds of street loudspeakers, called on the population to surrender its weapons and cooperate with the military authorities in the apprehension of Noriega warriors who had gone into hiding, and to return what had been looted.

The country was in a state of shock, but, what struck me most at that time, was that it was joyful shock. The universally hated general was gone. President Endara, who was sworn in at an American base, promised his compatriots peace and prosperity. And many believed him.

A year has passed. On my second trip to Panama I found a different country, different people. Only the unrestored Chorrillo neighborhood is a reminder of what happened. The capital's main commercial street—Avenida Hispania—sparkles with the display windows of numerous stores. Having replenished its warehouses, which were partially laid to waste last December, the Colon Free Zone is once again at the service of wholesale buyers from the whole continent. There are many tourists about.

The military in combat uniform, the sandbags, and the barbed wire around the American Embassy have disappeared. But it is not difficult to divine that the Americans are here, that they are nearby on their bases. It is sufficient to go in the evening to the city's central bus station and watch the crowds of young girls rushing for the buses heading for the Canal Zone. On each day that God sends, lines of local beauties form at the gates of the American military bases in the hope of gaining admission to the private discos. Soldiers, sergeants, and young officers in civvies come out and casually choose for themselves a companion for the evening.

"Do not think that Panamanian women are more amorous than others," my colleague from local radio imparted to me with a tinge of sadness in his voice. "Many simply want to leap into marriage, preferably with an officer, and leave this country. What else is there for them to do: There is no work even for the men. Starting a family in Panama today is madness: What is there to live on?"

An ever increasing number of Panamanians are asking themselves this question currently. One-third of the economically active population is without work. A good part of this has lost its jobs under the present Guillermo Endara government even. The "prosperity" promised last December has not come.

A cab driver complained to me, "When did we have on the city streets young boys selling whatever they could and begging? Everywhere in Latin America, yes, but not in Panama. But now.... Can we live like this?"

The country's economy has not come around, despite all the assurances and endeavors of the government. The last two years of the economic isolation of the Noriega regime and the intervention and the looting which it caused have taken their toll. According to independent economic research figures, the invasion itself caused more than $2 billion worth of damage, causing a 28 percent decline in the gross national product. Guillermo Ford, the present minister of planning and economic policy, has described the situation in the country's economy as "chaos." By the end of 1990 the GNP will be 40 percent lower than in 1987, the last relatively prosperous year for Panama.

For this reason we cannot speak of high trust in the government coalition. According to certain estimates, its popularity index has today dropped to 25 percent. Protest demonstrations and strikes have become a customary occurrence in Panama. On 5 December more than 20 of the country's trade union organizations staged a partial general strike.

The day before approximately 50,000 police officers headed by Eduardo Herrera, a former colonel in the Army which was broken up a year ago and ex-chief of the present police force, occupied police headquarters to protest government policy in respect of the custodians of order (Panama's police officers are very frequently called Boy Scouts, having the uniform, but not the weapons for the elementary protection of those around them and themselves). It was their misfortune that high-ranking American military officers were in the building. The so-called "rebellion," as President Endara portrayed it, was "put down" by American forces. They surrounded the building and arrested 36 persons together with Herrera.

Nor have Panamanians obtained the promised peace. The country has always been renowned for its low level of particularly dangerous crimes. But all this, seemingly, is a thing of the past. Bus drivers and cab drivers went on strike during my trip there—in the past few months alone several dozen of their colleagues had died at the hands of gangsters. A bank robbery occurs every two weeks, which was never the case before.

I got the impression that the country and the people had been cast to the whim of fate. The government coalition—a three-party bloc which local unions have called "talentless and incapable of governing the country"—is preoccupied more with intra-factional struggle than a solution of the urgent socioeconomic problems confronting Panama. The country's two vice presidents, Ford and Calderon, have already clashed with one another openly on several occasions. The head of state himself has had to separate and reconcile them publicly.

Of $2 billion (on which the Endara government was greatly counting), the Americans, who promised piles of gold, have made half available. Nor is this money all going to revive the Panamanian economy. Not to mention the fact that the U.S. Government is pretending that it was not its forces which bombed residential neighborhoods of the capital and the second biggest city—Colon. Even according to the more than modest estimates of the Pentagon, the real damage caused directly by combat operations is in excess of $160 million. The United States has allocated the casualties in the Chorrillo neighborhood... $6,500 to provide themselves with shelter.

...My plane left at three in the morning, and in order to get to the airport I had to call a taxi, which I greatly regretted upon seeing outside the hotel entrance. "It will not fall to pieces, will it?" I asked the owner, just in case. "No, do not worry. I restored it myself. It was stolen from me on 20 December last year. I found it just a month ago without wheels and doors in a remote part of the provinces."

The American forces' "liberating" mission will be making itself known to Panamanians for a long time to come, I believe.

Vlasov Heads CPSU Delegation to Argentina

PM1712103990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Unattributed report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] A CPSU delegation headed by A.V. Vlasov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the CPSU Central Committee Socioeconomic Policy Department, flew to Buenos Aires 12 December for the 17th Communist Party of Argentina Congress.

CPSU Greets Argentine Communist Party Congress

PM1412154190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Greetings message from CPSU Central Committee Secretariat to delegates of the 17th Communist Party of Argentina Congress; date not given]

[Text] To the Delegates to the 17th Communist Party of Argentina [PCA] Congress.

On behalf of Soviet Communists we send a fraternal greeting to delegates to the 17th PCA Congress.

Your congress is taking place at a crucial time for all the world's left-wing democratic forces opening up broad opportunities before them but also requiring responsibility, realism, and coordination of action.

We wish the 17th PCA Congress fruitful work and all Argentina's Communists success in their activity for the sake of working people and in the name of progress, peace, and the strengthening of the friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Argentina.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat.

CPSU Greets Bolivian Communist Party Congress

PM1812101590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
14 Dec 90 Second Edition p 4

[Greetings message from the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat to the Sixth Bolivian Communist Party [PCB] Congress; no date given: "To the Sixth PCB Congress"]

[Text] We cordially greet the delegates to the Sixth PCB Congress and wish it successful work.

We are convinced that the development of friendly relations between the CPSU and the PCB is in the interests of our peoples and the cause of peace and cooperation.

CPSU Central Committee Secretariat

Envoy to Barbados Appointed as Jamaican Envoy

PM1712112390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Dec 90 Union Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "News Item"]

[Text] The USSR president has appointed Vladimir Aleksandrovich Romanchenko, USSR ambassador plenipotentiary and extraordinary to Barbados, as USSR ambassador plenipotentiary and extraordinary to Jamaica in addition.